


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CONVERSATIONS
ON THE
SCIENCE
OF THE
HUMAN MIND.



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CONVERSATIONS
ON THE
SCIENCE
OF THE
HUMAN MIND.

BY EZRA STILES ELY, D. D.

Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the City of Philadelphia.

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***** D. D. of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of
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Ely, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the city of
Philadelphia."

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PREFACE.

THE WRITER of the following pages has endeavoured to exhibit, in a familiar manner, the ELEMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. The sources whence he has drawn his doctrines, are his own consciousness, memory, and reflection; and the writings of Locke, Hume, Price, Hartley, Lord Kames, Reid, Stewart, Duncan, President Edwards, Beattie, Watts, Condillac, and Cogan. What he deems true, and most important in all these celebrated authors, will be found in this compendium. He disclaims all *metaphysics* but those of *common sense*.

He flatters himself, that these *Conversations* will prove beneficial to Students in Law, Medicine, and Divinity; and to the most intelligent young ladies of our country.

No science is so intimately connected with all other systematic arrangements of knowledge as that of which he has here treated; and he cannot but hope, therefore, that many who have neither time nor patience to peruse many volumes, will do him the honour of thoroughly examining one.

Philadelphia, January 1st, 1819.

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CONVERSATIONS.



CONVERSATIONS

ON THE

SCIENCE

OF THE

HUMAN MIND.

CONVERSATION I.

Introduction.—The chief obstruction to the advancement of the Science of the Soul.—Its utility. .

Pupil. You have proposed, Sir, to conduct me through the thorny maze of METAPHYSICS; and I design to follow you, if not with equal steps, at least with equal ardour. Once, I confess, that I hated every thing that could be denominated metaphysics.

Professor. You would make me promise too much. I have only proposed to teach you the *rudiments of the science of the human soul*, which department of knowledge is expressed, in a modern classification of universal science, by the term *Anthropsychia*; but which is rather indefinitely called “The Philosophy of the Human Mind,” by all our ancient writers. This specific science is only one branch of *metaphysics*, which treats of the nature,

relations, and operations of all substances and their attributes. But tell me, why do you speak of the *thorny maze* of metaphysics; and why did you *hate* the name of this extensive science?

Pupil. Because I thought all metaphysical reasonings unintelligible and useless; especially if they related to the human soul. Until you constrained me to study the works of Dr. Reid and his successor, Professor Stewart, I was ready to despair of obtaining any distinct and satisfactory conceptions on this subject.

Professor. Whence arose your principal difficulties in attempting to acquire a thorough acquaintance with the human soul?

Pupil. I had not learned, that in mental science a man must primarily regard his own *consciousness* of what passes within himself, and look to it for the facts from which he is to reason; just as the natural philosopher looks to his *perception* of external objects for all the phenomena, whence he is to derive those general observations, which are called the laws of nature. In the next place, the writers with whom I was conversant, did not appear to be masters of their subject.

Professor. And what is your chief obstruction now?

Pupil. It is either the imperfection of language, or else the imperfect use which metaphysical writers have made of the terms which they possess;* and I am not able at present to determine which.

* A specimen of the improper use of terms, and of metaphysical jargon, may be given from *Hume's Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. i.

Professor. It will be my business to convince you, by actual experiment, I hope, that were the same precision of language to be adopted in teaching that which is known of the human soul, as has prevailed in natural philosophy and mathematics, there might be made as great advances, and enjoyed as much certainty in *Anthropsychia*, as in the two last sciences. The same word has been used by the same writer in two or three different senses, interchangeably; and two terms have been adopted to denote in some instances, the same, and in others different objects. Nothing has contributed so much

p. 29. "An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat and cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may be properly called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be entered upon."

Any body who can disentangle this skein of terms will obtain more credit for his patience than for his intelligence; and were all metaphysics like those of Hume, we should advise mankind to waste no time upon them. In the language of common sense, an *Impression* can be made, strictly speaking, on nothing but material objects. *Impressions* are made on our bodily organs of sense; but in the mind there are no *impressions*, unless by a figure of speech we call our *perceptions* or *conceptions*, by that name. In some places, Mr. Hume speaks of *perceptions* when he writes the word "*impressions*"; and of the *conception* of our perceptions, when he talks of "*ideas* or *copies* of *impressions*."

to produce your thorny maze as the want of definitions for important terms, and a strict adherence to them when given.* Even President Edwards in his "Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will," uses the word *necessity* to denote a physical necessity, and sometimes nothing more than the certain futurition of an event; in such a manner as to produce no little obscurity. Locke uses the words *understanding* and *ideas* without much precision; for the first he

* "The difference in the meaning affixed to words, by different writers, is one of the greatest impediments to the discoveries of moral truths, and the most difficult to surmount. Complex terms being frequently composed of many parts, and each part intermixing its own signification, they are frequently exposed to different constructions: and in controversial subjects, if two authors annex different ideas to the same term, they are taking different courses, and will soon steer out of sight of each others argument. Dr. Reid has justly expatiated upon the necessity of accurate definitions, without his having always made them; and his pupil, Dr. Beattie, has very seldom regarded them. Even that great master of reason, Mr. Locke, who has written in so satisfactory a manner on the errors occasioned by the abuse of words, has involved some of his ideas in great obscurity, through the want of due attention to their precise import. Perhaps no philosopher, ancient or modern, has taken greater liberties with language than Mr. Hume."—*Cogan's Ethical Questions*.

"I know that there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into man's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not that when any one uses any term he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. When he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear and distinct ideas: it is plain *his* are not so. Therefore, there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, when terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination."—*Locke*.

"There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find sects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes, which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue."—*Reid*.

calls a single faculty in some places, and in others it includes *the whole human soul*, with the exception of *the will*. By *ideas* he sometimes intends notions, conceptions, or opinions, and sometimes images of the objects of perception, which he supposes to be conveyed to the mind. Reid and Stewart also use several terms, such as *faculty* and *power*, both as synonymous and not synonymous; while they employ many other words, about the meaning of which mankind do not agree, without accurately describing the meaning which they attach to those symbols of thought. I am sensible, that the precision of language which I have prescribed to myself in our conversations, will render my style formal and dry; but I flatter myself, that what is lost in ease and sprightliness of diction, will be amply compensated for by the certainty of the knowledge acquired.

Pupil. Before you proceed to propose your system, Sir, will you have the goodness to state wherein consists the usefulness of the science of the human soul? May we not think and reason, feel and act, while we remain in utter ignorance of it?*

* “ ‘Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics*, *Natural Philosophy*, and *Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent on the science of *MAN*; since they lie under the cognizance of man, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. ‘Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in reasoning. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not

Professor. Can you seriously ask, of what use is this science? Surely it must be profitable to man to understand the nature of his own bodily organs; for otherwise he could not employ them aright. You would laugh at him who should persist in attempting to walk on his hands, to see with his ears, to hear with his eyes, and to write with his lips. Of how much greater importance must it be for him to understand the nature, number, and operations of the faculties of the intelligent, sensitive, and efficient part of his complex being? The inherent parts of the constitution of our souls are like mental

comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And, as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation."—*Hume's Treatise on Human Nature*.

By quoting some admirable sayings from Mr. Hume, we shall not render ourselves responsible for his numerous errors. Mental science is built upon *consciousness*; which Mr. Hume calls *experience*; and the testimony of others concerning their consciousness. Our knowledge of the operations of our own minds and of the minds of other people, he would say we have by experience and observation. His remark, that mental science lays a foundation for "a complete system of the sciences," has been verified in the review of Judge Woodward's splendid work on *Universal Science*, contained in the *Analectic Magazine*, vol. ix. p. 89, 105, 106.

I have there evinced, that a systematic arrangement of all human sciences may be founded on the operations of two faculties, *perception* and *conception*; for all our knowledge is of things *perceived* through the organs of sense, or of things *conceived of* by the mind.

organs, by which we perform our mental work and appropriate our own intellectual activity to the promotion of our happiness. To know ourselves, is to be prepared for profitable exertions, and a cheerful discharge of duty. If you are thoroughly versed in the science which you are now pursuing, you will be able to refer every duty enjoined to the original constitution of your mind by which it is to be performed; you will be able to make accurate discriminations; will profitably classify the objects of your thoughts; will be prepared to investigate every other science, by knowing the foundation of human reasoning, and the talents which we have received for cultivating it; will be able to detect error and defend the truth; and in short will experience all the advantages which knowledge can boast over ignorance. No man can reason well in any science, or employ his knowledge to advantage, any farther than he is a good, practical metaphysician. The utility of the science of the human soul will, however, best appear from the developement of the science itself.*

Pupil. I can say in its favour, that the pursuit of it has begun to afford me more permanent pleasure

* "We must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science, from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension."—

than all the works of taste; and I hope you will exhibit the elements of it so plainly as to banish from the world metaphysical jargon and nonsense, which usurping the names of philosophy, wisdom, and metaphysics, have disgusted many, and induced the great body of the people to believe, that one who would become a metaphysician must renounce common sense.

Professor. A systematic treatise of the kind you describe, is greatly to be desired. Such an one does not exist; for Dr. Reid, who has excelled all other writers on this subject, employed himself rather in demolishing an old fabrick, than in building up a new one. Professor Stewart is but an elegant commentator upon Reid, without originality, and without any comprehensive arrangement of the topics of mental science.

CONVERSATION II.

The Human Soul defined.—Consciousness.—Judgment.—Axioms.—Substances.—Attributes.—Mind and Matter distinct things.

Pupil. Since you last admitted me to your chamber, Sir, I have paid some attention to Watts on “the Improvement of the Mind;” and I beg leave to read a passage from him. “If we would improve our minds,” he says, “by conversation, it is a great happiness to be acquainted with persons wiser than ourselves. It is a piece of useful advice therefore to get the favour of their conversation frequently, as far as circumstances will allow: and if they happen to be a little reserved, use all obliging methods to draw out of them what may increase your own knowledge.” Now Sir, I design to ask you questions, and shall plead the advice of Dr. Watts in justification of my conduct.

Professor. I have known you, for some time past, to be an expert youth at interrogation; and so, without apology, proceed, to your full satisfaction.

Pupil. Well, Sir, what is the human soul?

Professor. It is that part of the complex being called man, which thinks, feels, wills, and acts.*

Pupil. Why do you call man a *complex* being?

* “By the *mind* of a man,” says Reid, “we understand that in him which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills.” It is true that mind would be distinguished from every other substance, should we merely affirm that it is *that which thinks*; but if the description is extended, it seems to be desirable to characterize it by such terms as include all its opera-

Professor. Because he evidently consists in part of a substance which does not think, feel, will, and act; which we call body; and of another part that does; which is called the soul, or the mind.

Pupil. How do you know that you have a body?

Professor. I perceive the properties of a body, on which I am conscious that I act.

Pupil. How do you know you perceive properties of a body?

Professor. I am *conscious* that I perceive several of the properties of my body.

Pupil. How do you know that you think, feel, will and act?

Professor. I am *conscious* of every one of my mental operations.

Pupil. It seems, then, that we have ultimately the same proof of a mental operation which we have of the properties and existence of a body.

Professor. The very same; and therefore I assert, that the basis of natural history, natural philosophy, and the mathematics, is no firmer than the basis of mental science.*

tions. This, Reid has not done, for the mind is a *sensitive* as well as a *cogitative* being. Besides, to *remember* and to *reason*, are operations that come under the general description of *thinking*. The reader will soon conceive that every thing which the mind does may be reduced to the four classes of operations enumerated in the text.

* "It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought and volition; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every

Pupil. But you have not proved yet, that you have a soul: you have only shown, that you are conscious of your own mental operations. How do you know you have a soul?

Professor. Dr. Reid would have answered, that he was conscious of his own existence; but my opinion is, that *consciousness is the knowledge which one has of his own present mental operations*, and I shall use the word only in this sense. THAT I EXIST, is a proposition which I judge to be true, so soon as it is stated to me, or framed by my own mind, without any reasoning or reflection on the subject. The proposition is self-evident to every man, and the act of the mind in judging it to be true, is a *constitutional judgment*. I am conscious that I judge myself to exist; and such is the make of our minds, that we cannot use a personal pronoun, or an active or passive verb, in the first person singular, or plural, without having this constitutional judgment. There is not a man living, who really doubts his own existence: and the reason is, that the Creator has so formed, and so governs, the human mind, that it ever thus judges, concerning its own being. Should

man too be impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all those sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to that being which he calls *himself*; a being, which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs. From these considerations it appears, that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions."—*Stewart.*

any man wish to judge otherwise, he would find himself incapable of doing it, and, therefore, we assert, that this constitutional judgment is *necessary*.

Pupil. You would have me understand, I apprehend, that necessary, or constitutional judgments, lie at the foundation of the science of the human mind.

Professor. They are the basis of every science: and the foundation on which all our systems of knowledge are erected. Do not the mathematicians begin their course by settling a few *axioms*? And what are axioms but self-evident propositions, to which every mind, necessarily, from its constitution, gives assent, so soon as the meaning of them is apprehended?

Pupil. Some of these constitutional judgments I hope to hear you state ere long; but will you now have the goodness to tell me, what is the real *essence* of this thing which thinks, feels, wills, and acts?

Professor. Here I must confess myself unable to answer you in any other way, than by acknowledging my own ignorance, and expressing my persuasion, that no man in the present life, will ever enjoy the ability of perceiving the essence of any substance. One thing I may venture to promise, that when you, or any one else, will teach me to comprehend the essence of matter, I will explain to you the essence of mind. We know no more of the one than of the other.

Pupil. How, then, do you know that mind and matter are distinct things; and that there is any essential difference between them?

Professor. Your question requires something of

a dissertation, for an answer. I must give you some preliminary statements too, that you may not misunderstand me. Observe then, that I use the words *mind* and *soul* as synonymous: that any thing to which you truly ascribe thought, feeling, volition, or agency, or any or all of these, is what I call a *soul* or *mind*: and that any thing which is the subject of *inherent attributes* is said to subsist, and is called a substance.*

Pupil. But let me know what you intend by *inherent attributes*, before you proceed.

Professor. Any thing attributed to another, which appertains to its original constitution, and without which it would not be the same thing, is an *inherent attribute*. Were all the inherent attributes of any substance to be taken away, we should have no knowledge of its existence. Thus, should the faculties of thought, feeling, volition, and agency be taken away from any thing which we call mind, we should no longer have any knowledge of the existence of that mind; nor can we even conceive of a substance which thinks, and yet has no faculty for thought; which feels, wills, and voluntarily acts, and yet has no faculties for performing these mental operations.

* *Substance* I find a very convenient word, and having given the sense in which I shall use it, I see no objection to it, which will not equally militate against Reid and Stewart, when they speak of *that which thinks*, or of *something extended*. Mr. Hume tells us, that the *idea of substance* can be derived neither from "impressions of sensation," nor from "impressions of reflection." We assent: what then? can we not *conceive* of substance, as well as of *time*, *space*, and a thousand other things? Mr. Locke and Mr. Hume were both erroneous in maintaining that all our *ideas* are derived either from sensation or reflection.

Let me illustrate what I mean by *inherent attributes*, in speaking of matter. Gravity, extension, inactivity, insensibility, and divisibility are attributes of every particle of *matter*, which we call *inherent*; because we conceive them to inhere in the very nature of the thing; and were these all taken away, we could form no notion of the meaning of the word *matter*. Nothing extended, and inactive would then remain. Any number of particles of matter united, or organized, constitute what we call *a body*. Now you ask proof of the accuracy of the prevailing opinion, that body and mind are two distinct substances. Of the *essence* of any substance, you have already learned, that I do not design to speak. Now I affirm, that I am *conscious* of *perceiving* some of the inherent attributes of one thing which is called an egg; and of another, which is called an apple; and I *judge*, that the objects of my perception really exist. I cannot doubt their existence. This I find then to be a law of my nature, that I should judge *the thing which I perceive to have existence*. The mental operation of *judging* implies the existence of the faculty which is denominated *the judgment*. This faculty, I am conscious, uniformly operates in the same way, in relation to some propositions; so that I no sooner understand the meaning of the proposition, that *the things perceived through the bodily organs, called the five senses, really exist*, than I judge it to be true. Every other man of a sane mind has, under similar circumstances, a similar judgment, which results from the original constitution, and the established government of the human soul. Of this *judgment* every rational man

is *conscious*; and testifies that he is conscious, to his companions. I judge, and I am conscious that I judge, therefore, that an egg, and an apple are before me. But I also *judge*, with a like knowledge of my own judgment, that the egg is one substance, and the apple another substance; or that they are two distinct material substances. This judgment follows a previous judgment, that the inherent attributes of an egg are different from those of an apple; which last judgment immediately follows my perception of the attributes of one and of the other, and my discernment of the difference between those which appertain to the one, and those which inhere in the other. Thus, I perceive the shape and texture, the colour, taste, and fragrance of the apple; and then I perceive the shape, texture, colour and taste of the egg: I conceive of a difference between the things perceived in one, and those perceived in the other; and then follows my judgment, that they are different things; each of which is called a substance. Of this judgment I am conscious, and therefore I say, "I know that an egg and an apple are two different and distinct substances." An egg is one thing that *subsists*, to which we attribute a certain number of things, that being deprived of, it would no longer be recognized as an egg; and an apple is another thing that *subsists*; that is, an apple is another substance. In this manner we actually, and philosophically discriminate between different individuals, whether inanimate, or animate; and between different classes of things. So universal is the practical operation of this philosophy, that in every land, he would be called a fool, who should affirm, that be-

tween the sun and moon, earth and water, birds and men, there is no substantial difference. But you wish me to prove, that *mind* is one substance, and *matter* another. Every man may arrive at personal satisfaction on this subject, precisely in the way that I do. Thus, I judge involuntarily, and constitutionally, that *something*, which I call by the pronoun *I*, exists. I am conscious that I think, feel, will, and act; and I judge that *I* have faculties for thinking, feeling, willing, and acting; because thinking is an effect, and a faculty for thinking a cause; and because I judge moreover, that every effect must have some cause. These faculties are inherent attributes of that *something*, which I call *I*; and were they all taken away there would remain nothing of which I could have any conception, or denominate by any personal pronoun. This *something*, which is the subject of these attributes, I call *mind*, or *soul*. I may give it this name to distinguish it from every thing, which has not some of the same attributes. If I find any thing which has any of these attributes, I determine to call that a *mind* too; but if I have knowledge of any thing which has other attributes, but not one of these, I resolve to call it *matter*, to distinguish it; because I judge that those are different substances which are the subjects of different inherent attributes; and that all thinking, feeling, willing, and acting substances should be classed under the head of *mental substances*; while all things not having in my judgment, any of the faculties that produce any of these mental operations, should be considered as forming another class, under the caption of *material substances*.

Do I, then, know of any thing in existence, which is to be excluded from the first class, and assigned a place in the second? I am conscious, that I perceive many different objects, around me, in my chamber; and one of them, about two feet in length, I perceive to be in continual motion, while all the rest are stationary. The little moving thing looks me in the face, and (probably thinking that I am sulky, because I am studious,) cries out, with meaning forehead and eyes, "naughty papa!" I call the thing "my daughter." I am not conscious that she thinks, nor can I be conscious of any thing but of my own mental operations. But I am conscious, that I perceive her make such sounds, with her mouth, as I have made from volition, with my own; and I judge, that her speaking and my speaking are similar effects, that must have a similar cause. I know, that I speak from volition alone; and I judge, that no one thing could speak without volition: therefore I conclude, that my daughter speaks from volition. If she performs the mental operation of volition, I judge she must have the faculty of volition; and if she has the faculty of volition, the thing in which that attribute inheres belongs to the class of *mental substances*. I have found, then, another mind besides my own. *I judge that my soul exists*, and I judge, that another soul exists; and the judgment in one case is as satisfactory to myself as in the other. The external actions of my little daughter, I call effects, of a thinking cause; and sometimes *signs of thought*, because every effect may be denominated the *sign of a cause*. It is a judgment that results from my mental nature, that *I, who am*

conscious, exist; and that voluntary action proceeds from a willing agent.

Pupil. I am not impatient, *Sir*, but it takes you a long time to come to the point.

Professor. Well, I perceive on my paper a small thing, which I call a particle of sand; I know, or am conscious, that *I perceive* it; and such is the frame of my mind, that *I judge* the object of perception to have a real existence. I am conscious too, that I perceive it to be tangible, solid, extended, and divisible; to have gravity, and to be capable of *motion*, but not of *action*; for if left to itself it is stationary; but if I *act* upon it, *motion* is the result. These are some of the inherent attributes of all those things which I would classify under the general term *matter*. Having perceived these attributes of the grain of sand, and discerning them to be different from the attributes of mind, *I judge* that it is a different thing from that called mind; even a different *substance*. The perceptible difference between that something which thinks, or feels, or wills, or acts, or does all these things, and the grain of sand, is certainly greater than the difference between fire and water; and because I perceive in the sand attributes which I find not in mind, and do not perceive in it any of the attributes which I have found in the soul, therefore I conclude that matter and mind are two distinct substances. In confirmation of my own judgment, I have the testimony of all of my fellow men, that they have always found in certain things the attributes of a material substance, and have never found in any of these same substances the slightest indications of thought, feeling, volition,

or efficiency. The same remarks, which I have made concerning the grain of sand, will apply to every other thing, whether in a simple, or organized state; which is solid, extended, insensible, and moveable, but inactive.

Pupil. And so you have made it appear, that we perceive nothing but the attributes of matter, and the external indications of mind; and that we are as well, and as clearly acquainted with the attributes of the former as of the latter.*

Professor. Yes, and that our *judgment* concerning the existence of mental substances, is as solid and satisfactory, as that the material substances around us exist.

* "The essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the last, and by these only we can define or describe them."—*Reid*.

CONVERSATION III.

Faculty defined.—Body.—Simple and Complex Operations.—Essential and Incidental Attributes.—Ten Faculties of the Human Mind enumerated.—All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for all his actions.

Pupil. You have frequently made use of the term *faculty*; will you have the kindness to make me fully acquainted with the meaning which you attach to it?

Professor. By a *faculty*, in general, I intend any inherent part of the original constitution of a substance by which any distinct operation is performed. A body is any number of organized particles of matter;* and this may have many bodily faculties. Thus the body of a man consists of many members; each of which is a faculty for doing something: and were all these taken away, there would be no *body* subsisting; any more than if the particles of matter, out of which it was organized, were reduced to their native elements.

A mental faculty is any inherent part of the original constitution of a mind, by which it performs any simple mental operation.

* Dr. Reid says, "we define body to be that which is extended, solid, moveable, divisible;" which is the description of *matter* in general, but not of *body* in particular. The definition which I have given, corresponds with the most general and approved use of the word.

Pupil. But I would know what you mean by a simple mental operation.

Professor. Any thing which the mind does, is a mental operation: any thing which it performs by one of its faculties is a simple mental operation. For example; if you see, hear, reason, feel, choose, and exert yourself, you perform so many simple mental operations.

Pupil. Your distinction would lead me to suppose, that some mental operations are *complex*.

Professor. They certainly are: for it is the mind which *reads* a paragraph in *the Freeman's Journal*; and this implies the *perception* of the words, together with the *apprehension* of their meaning. A little child might *perceive* the words before he could read at all. Should you *read aloud*, an act of the will to make articulate sounds, and the exertion of the faculty of agency, together with those already mentioned, would be included in reading.

Pupil. It is evident then, because several faculties are concerned in the several acts, that declaiming, preaching, pleading, studying, running, fighting, and praying, are so many complex operations; but I wish to know if any of them but studying is a *mental* operation. Are running and fighting acts of the mind?

Professor. Some actions are neither exclusively mental, nor exclusively corporal; for mind and body both are essential to their performance. We ascribe them, therefore, to the complex being, man; and say that man reads aloud, declaims, preaches, prays audibly, pleads, runs, and fights. These actions, therefore, which require the co-operation of two or

more faculties of man, whether they appertain to the body or the mind, we call *complex operations*: but if two or more *mental* faculties perform the act, without the necessary intervention of any corporal faculty, we call the action performed *a complex mental operation*.

Pupil. It would seem to me, that seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, reasoning, and choosing, are all of them *complex operations*.

Professor. In the proper place, perhaps I may convince you, that they are all *simple mental operations*; or that they are distinct acts, which may every one of them be referred to some one mental faculty.

Pupil. It would be strange, indeed, if you can convince me that *eating* is a mental act.

Professor. *Eating* and *tasting*, young man, are two things, very easily distinguished; and the latter is consequent upon the former. *Eating* is a complex operation of an animal, who *wills* to receive food into his mouth, and *does* what he wills, by his agency upon his corporal faculties, given him for the purpose. *Tasting* is a *perception* of the flavour, or of some quality, or qualities of the food eaten. You know that in a diseased state of the palate and fauces, a man may *eat*, and not *taste* his food. Hence he says, "I have no taste;" and sometimes, to express the same thing, "all things taste alike to me."

Pupil. You have intimated, in a former conversation, that *power* and *faculty* are not convertible terms; because, I conclude, you have use for them to signify different things: but if no expression is

equivalent to that of *mental faculty*, we shall be sadly circumscribed in language.

Professor. Our predicament will not be worse than that of the mathematicians, who always call a triangle a triangle. You may, however, call a mental faculty a *mental organ*, if you choose; and then, you will have two names for one thing.

Pupil. Your philosophy would restrict the meaning of the word faculty as Reid has done, when he says, "I apprehend that the word *faculty* is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind."

Professor. I mean by faculty what Reid understood by "an original and natural power;" but I never call a faculty a power; because *power* is often and most properly used as synonymous with *ability*; and includes every thing essential to the production of an effect. You can distinguish, between the existence of something in our mental constitution, whereby we reason, when we reason, and which exists when not in operation; which is *the faculty of reasoning*; and that which puts the faculty into operation, so that we actually reason, which together constitute *the power of reasoning*, can you not?

Pupil. I remember, at least, that you have elsewhere said, that any thing called *a power*, which is not adequate to the production of an effect, is a *powerless power*. What do you think, Sir, of Lord Kames's use of the word faculty? He says, "man is provided by nature with *a sense or faculty* that lays open to him every passion by means of its external expressions."

Professor. I think he undoubtedly intended, that every man is so constituted, that he has the faculty of judgment, by which he involuntarily judges certain external expressions to be signs of internal passions. This faculty he considered to be as natural to the mind as the faculty for smelling; and therefore he calls it a *sense*, or faculty; and would it not lead to confusion, I would sometimes call a *mental faculty* a *mental sense* too.

Pupil. In our last conversation, you taught me, that some attributes of mind and matter are inherent: pray do you class all other attributes under some general term?

Professor. All attributes are *inherent*, or such as may be called *incidental* and *extraneous*. Any thing, which you ascribe to another, which is not essential to its subsistence, and which therefore may be considered as being without its essence, I call an *incidental*, or an *extraneous attribute*. For instance, a man may have the faculty of reason, without actually reasoning: the *faculty* I call an inherent attribute; but the *act* of reasoning is *incidental* or *extraneous*. Solidity, gravity, extension, and divisibility are *inherent*, or essential attributes of a body; but the colour, the particular figure, the location, and the motion of the same body, are *incidental*; for an ivory ball will have the former attributes, whether it is in one place or another; whether it be stained red, or is white, and whether it move, or is stationary. From this example you will not find it difficult to class most of the attributes of subjects with which you are intimately acquainted.

If you please, I shall now claim the privilege of

interrogating you, on subjects which have been frequently presented to your attention; and if you have doubts about the truth and propriety of any part of the system which I have inculcated, you are at perfect liberty to express them.

What are the principal inherent attributes of the human mind?

Pupil. They are *ten mental faculties*; which, for the want of some new scientific terms, frequently bear the names of the operations which they perform. They are denominated,

- I. The Faculty of Perception.
- II. The Faculty of Consciousness.
- III. The Faculty of Understanding.
- IV. The Faculty of Judging.
- V. The Faculty of Memory.
- VI. The Faculty of Reasoning.
- VII. The Faculty of Conscience.
- VIII. The Faculty of Feeling.
- IX. The Faculty of Volition.
- X. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency.

To one, or other of these, may be attributed all our simple mental operations; and to some two or more of them, all the complex mental operations, with which we are acquainted.*

* "Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds," says Professor Stewart, "they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties." CONDILLAC remarks, that "Centuries must

Professor. What is wanting to account for all the operations of a man?

Pupil. Would we analize, and reduce to their proper faculties, all the operations of man, we must consider his bodily as well as mental faculties; for many things are performed by the co-operation of corporal and mental organs. We must also consider his *powers*, as well as *faculties*. You could not walk, for instance, without legs, a volition to use them, and the exertion of the faculty of agency over them. Neither could you eat without a mouth, and the activity of those mental faculties which are requisite to put it in motion.

Professor. Well, let us defer the consideration of the mental faculties till after dinner.

have passed away before men could have suspected that thought can be subjected to laws; and even at this time the greatest number of mankind think, without conceiving how it is done."

CONVERSATION IV.

Definitions.—Genus and Species.—The Faculty of Perception.—Five kinds of Perceptions.—Instrumentality of bodily Organs.—Consciousness.

Professor. We resume the consideration of the Ten Faculties of the Human Soul; and I shall expect my pupil in giving definitions, to remember the opinion of Dr. Reid, “that there are many words, which, though they need explication, cannot be logically defined;” and that “a logical definition, that is, a strict and proper definition, must express the kind of thing defined, and the specific difference, by which the species defined, is distinguished from every other species belonging to that kind.” Hence, “no word can be logically defined, which does not denote a species; because such things only can have a specific difference; and a specific difference is essential to a logical definition. On this account there can be no definition of individual things, such as London and Paris.” They may, however, be *described* in such a way as to distinguish them from all other cities.

Pupil. I have found some difficulty result from the use of the words *genus*, *species*, and *individual*: I should like, therefore, to have them explained before we proceed.

Professor. The explanation is easy. We have perceived many objects, whose essential attributes are alike; but whose incidental attributes are unlike; and we wish to class them, for our own convenience. If the essential attributes of any number of things are alike, we class them together, and say, they are of one *genus*, or *race*. Thus we perceive fifteen persons, who indicate by their actions, the existence of the same mental faculties within; and they have evidently the same essential corporal members. We say that they are of one *genus*. For this *genus* we wish a name that shall denote any one of the fifteen; and which shall distinguish any one, and each one, from any thing which belongs to another *genus*; to the one, for instance, consisting of animals with four legs; and we call the name *man*; by which any one of the fifteen persons is distinguished from a quadruped; and indeed, from every thing else, but one of his own *genus*, or general class of things. When I call a being *a man*, therefore, every one, who understands the language, knows what *kind* of a thing I mean; but he knows not whether I intend a *white* man, a *black* man, or a *red* man; that is, he knows not what *species* of the *genus* I would designate. We find it convenient, therefore, to make subordinate classes; and the common rule is, to put those things together which are alike in some of their principal incidental attributes. The colour of a man is an attribute of this description; and we say, therefore, that five of these fifteen men, being of a white colour, shall constitute the species of *white men*; the five that are black, the species of *black men*; and the five which are red,

the species of *red men*. Thus, in the *genus*, which contains, by the supposition, fifteen, we have *three species*. Suppose that each species contains a person by the name of *John*. Now I wish to designate one of these, so that the person to whom I speak, may fix his thoughts on one; that is, on an *individual*. If I call him *a man*, I point out only his *genus*, so that my auditor knows I do not mean a quadruped, or reptile; but he knows not which of fifteen individuals I mean. If I call him a *white man*, he knows the *genus* and the *species* of the thing of which I speak, but he knows not which of five white men, that constitute the species of the genus, I mean. Let me speak, then, of *John, the white man*, and he understands me to designate *an individual*, who is neither *John the black man*, nor *John the red man*, nor any one else but the identical one person, of whom I designed to have him think. In like manner, you may class any number of things, in which you can perceive, or apprehend to be, some similar and some dissimilar attributes; especially if some of them are essential, and others only incidental.

Pupil. Might we not have more classes of things?

Professor. Undoubtedly: you might have the *provinces, classes, and orders* of Judge Woodward; and to them add, if you please, a *genus* and *species*. Thus, *a person* might be your *provincial* term; a *human person*, your *classical* name; a *female human person*, your *ordinal* distinction; a *white female human person*, your *generic* appellation; a *tall white female human person*, your *specific* description; and then *Jane, a tall white female human person*, would

point out the *individual*, and distinguish her from every thing not a person; from all persons superior or inferior to human persons; from all males, who might make another *order*, of the same class and province; from all females, that are not *white*; from all females that are *short*; and from all tall females of any other name than *Jane*.

Pupil. Were these classifications to be generally made, would Dr. Reid's description of a logical definition be correct?

Professor. You *define a word* when you clearly describe the thing of which that word is a symbol. Of course, you may invent a term, and then define it; that is, point out the limits of its use, by clearly stating what you mean by it. You may *define an object* of which any word is the sign, by clearly describing that object, so as to distinguish it from every other object. If you will do this I shall be satisfied with your answers to my questions.

What is the faculty of **PERCEPTION**?*

Pupil. The faculty of *Perception* in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge, through the instrumentality of his bodily organs.

* "The perception of external objects by our senses, is an operation of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name appropriated to it. It has so in all languages. And in the English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than perception. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, are words that express the operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses that which is common to them all."—DR. REID.

Professor. Give some example of the mental operations called *perceptions*; or, show what this faculty does.

Pupil. I *perceive* the sun, through the instrumentality of my eyes; I *perceive* a sound, through my ears; I *perceive* the hardness of a ball, through my hand, which touches it; I *perceive* the fragrance of a rose, through my olfactory organs; and I *perceive* the acidity of vinegar, through my organs of tasting; so that *seeing*, *hearing*, *touching*, *smelling*, and *tasting* are so many mental operations, performed through the instrumentality of different parts of the body.

Professor. Can you classify all the *perceptions* of man?

Pupil. All our perceptions are reducible to five classes, which take their names from the *organs of sense*, through which we have them.

Professor. I presume that you use the expression *organs of sense*, in this case, as synonymous with *organs of perception*. Be careful always to use it in this manner, and then I have no objection to your asserting, that man has *five senses*, or *five kinds of perceptions*; and of course that he becomes acquainted with the attributes of matter only by the mental faculty of perception. *Sense* always means either *perception* or *conception*. But why do you speak of perceiving *through the instrumentality* of the bodily faculties?*

* "That nothing external is perceived till first it make an impression upon the organ of sense, is an observation that holds equally in

Pupil. Because the bodily organs do not themselves perceive; and because we find, by experience, that the soul of a wakeful and sane man does not perceive without them. Sometimes, in figurative language, the operation of the agent is ascribed to the instrument; and hence our eyes are said to see; but every one knows, that the eye does not in reality perceive even the inverted image of the object, which is formed on its retina. Every one knows, too, that were the faculty of perception wanting, were the soul absent from the material part of the complex being, man, the eyes could not see, nor the nose smell, nor the hands handle, nor the palate taste, nor the ears hear. Hence it is common, and strictly philosophical, to say, *I see, I hear, I taste, I smell, I touch*; while by the pronoun used we intend something evidently different from our bodily organs. Here I wish, however, to question my teacher. Pray, Sir, if the soul has the faculty of perception, which is an essential part of itself, are any bodily organs indispensable to the mental operations of that faculty? Might we not see, hear, touch, taste, and smell, without the instrumentality of eyes, ears, and the other members of the body?

every one of the external senses. But there is a difference as to our knowledge of that impression: in touching, tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression; that, for example, which is made upon the hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the nostrils by a rose: it is otherwise in seeing and hearing; for I am not sensible of the impression made upon my eye, when I behold a tree; nor of the impression made upon my ear, when I listen to a song."—*Lord Kames.*

Might not the soul, if separated from the body, see material objects?

Professor. You are running furiously into the regions of speculation. Stop a little, and I will tell you all philosophy knows on this subject. When man is awake, and in a sane state of mind, he constitutionally judges, that he perceives only through his bodily organs: but when sleeping, a man often has mental operations, which he at the time judges to be *perceptions*; which are so much like the perceptions he has had when awake, that he cannot distinguish them, either by any difference in their own nature, or in his feelings, which are consequent on them; but when he awakes, he knows that his eyes were closed, and that light did not shine on them, when he was conscious of seeing; that no material lips uttered sounds, when he heard; and that no real object was present, when he embraced and kissed a friend. The consciousness which accompanied these nocturnal perceptions, was like the consciousness of his wakeful hours; and gives proof of the actual performance of mental acts of seeing and hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, or of nocturnal actions resembling them, without the intervention of material organs. A man who is insane, in like manner has perceptions, which are purely mental, and without the instrumentality of the external organs; for he sees angels and devils in the air, and hears them address him; or he performs such mental operations as a sane man would, were visible forms of celestial beings presented to his vision; were they to utter real, but seraphic sounds in his ears.

Pupil. Is not this wholly the work of imagination?

Professor. The imagination of sleeping and insane persons is frequently very active; but when they *see* a house with their eyes closed, or the face of a friend; and are conscious of the act, it would be unjust to say, that they are not conscious of a *perception*, when they readily distinguish between perceptions and the work of the imagination. If bodily organs were absolutely essential to perceiving, we should undoubtedly see objects in the position of their images on the retina; so that we should see all the heads of our friends occupying the place of their feet.*

* "There is no phenomenon in nature more unaccountable, than the intercourse that is carried on between the mind and the external world: there is no phenomenon which philosophical spirits have shown greater avidity to pry into and resolve. It is agreed by all, that this intercourse is carried on by means of the senses; and this satisfies the vulgar curiosity, but not the philosophie. Philosophers must have some system, some hypothesis, that shews the manner in which our senses make us acquainted with external things. All the fertility of human invention seems to have produced only one hypothesis for this purpose, which, therefore, hath been universally received: and that is, that the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from without, by means of the senses: so that their use must be to convey these images into the mind"—"There are laws of nature by which the operations of the mind are regulated; there are also laws of nature that govern the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate conclusions which the human faculties can reach in the philosophy of bodies, so the former are the ultimate conclusions we can reach in the philosophy of minds."—"It is evident, therefore, that the pictures upon the *retina* are, by the laws of nature, a mean of vision; but in what way they accomplish their end, we are totally ignorant."

—DR. REID.

Pupil. It would be a very natural inference from your doctrine, that a disembodied spirit could perceive visible and material objects, as truly as any man who has bodily organs at his command.

Professor. I shall not object to such an inference. At any rate, we know that God is a Spirit, without bodily organs, and that he beholds the works of his hands. He has mental perceptions of material objects; and has formed men in his own image; but while they continue in the world, his good providence has connected their ordinary intercourse with matter, with material organization.

Pupil. Have you not, dear Sir, restricted too much the use of the words *perceive* and *perception*? It is customary for a person to say, “*I perceive* your meaning: *I perceive* the truth.” In short, men talk about *perceiving* every object of thought, whether visible or invisible.

Professor. It is true: and they use the words very indefinitely, or else figuratively. It is not improper to use the word *perceive* as we do the verb *see*, figuratively, for mental *seeing*. Thus we *see* or *perceive* a truth, when we *conceive* of the meaning of a proposition, and judge it to be true. But in philosophical discussions, we should avoid indefinite and figurative expressions as much as possible, if we would arrive at certainty in mental science. I never use, therefore, *perception*, for any act of *conception*, or *mental seeing* of immaterial things.

What is the faculty of CONSCIOUSNESS?

The faculty of Consciousness in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul

by which he has immediate knowledge of all his own mental operations.*

Professor. We are conscious in every instance, by an *act* of consciousness, or a mental operation, bearing that name. Now I would ask, have we as many acts of consciousness as we have other mental operations?

Pupil. Undoubtedly we have an act of consciousness, for every other mental operation, of which we are conscious.

Professor. Is every act of consciousness subsequent to, or co-existent with, the mental operation, of which it is the object?

Pupil. You have taught me, that consciousness is the only ultimate source of knowledge upon the subject of mental science; and I cannot say, that I am ever conscious of performing two mental operations at once. I must conclude, therefore, that an act of consciousness is immediately consequent upon every other mental operation. Thus, I *perceive* and am *conscious* that I perceive; I *conceive*, and am *conscious* that I conceive; I remember, and am *conscious* that I remember. The act of consciousness, however, is performed so immediately after each

* "Consciousness is a word used by philosophers, to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with *memory*; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in popular discourse. It is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external thin s."—DR. REID.

other operation, that I am insensible of any lapse of time; and should not wonder if some should deem consciousness and the object of it, in any particular case, simultaneous.

Professor. Of what use is the faculty of consciousness?

Pupil. Without it, we could not *know* that we think, feel, will, and have efficiency. Consequently we could never have *knowledge* of our own existence, or of our mental identity. We could never predicate any thing of ourselves, nor act as responsible, moral agents. Besides, consciousness is as essential to mental science, as perception to our knowledge of perceptible objects, and of the phenomena of natural philosophy. We could not testify concerning any thing done by the mind, without consciousness, any more, than concerning things extraneous to the mind, without the faculty of perception.

Professor. Which source of knowledge is the most satisfactory, perception or consciousness?

Pupil. At first thought, people would generally say, “*perception*; for we are more certain of nothing, than of what we see, hear, smell, touch and taste.” Yet, upon reflection, every one will judge, that there is no higher certainty in our perceptions than in our consciousness; for we may with propriety ask a man, how he knows, that he *sees* the sun, *hears* the sound of a cannon, *smells* the fragrance of a rose, *tastes* the flavour of an orange, and *touches* a marble surface; and he must answer, “I am *conscious* that I do these things;” so that the certain knowledge of our *perceptions* themselves consists in our consciousness. We *know* that we

see, hear, smell, taste and touch, only by our faculty of consciousness. Could we doubt concerning the operations of this faculty, we might doubt whether we perceive at all; and consequently whether any external objects of perception exist.

Professor. And thus we should be driven to Bishop Berkeley's theory, that there is no material substance in existence: and thence to Hume's, that *impressions and ideas* are the only things that exist.

Pupil. Pray, Sir, is our consciousness the result of volition, or not?

Professor. If I will to perform an act, and to be conscious of it; I find an act of consciousness follows the determined act; but I cannot suspend my consciousness by a volition; and generally I am conscious without any volition on the subject. Could we cease to be conscious at pleasure, it would be equivalent to the power of destroying our own mental existence, by a volition. Should such a power be given to man, he could escape from the world, and the government of his Maker.

CONVERSATION V.

The Faculty of Understanding or Conception.—Different Operations of this Faculty.—Imagination.—Discernment.—Comprehension.—Apprehension.—Intuition.—Some general laws of Conception.—The importance of this Faculty.

Professor. What is the Faculty of **UNDERSTANDING**?

Pupil. The faculty of understanding in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge of things which are not perceived through the instrumentality of the senses.*

Professor. Do you distinguish *The Understanding* from *a faculty of understanding*?

Pupil. By *a faculty of understanding* we intend that particular faculty which has just been described; but the expressions, *The Understanding*, and *The Intellect*, are often used to comprehend all the faculties of the human mind, except those of feeling, volition, and agency. To *the understanding, or the intellect*, belong the faculties of Consciousness, Per-

* “It is plain that one sense cannot judge of the objects of another; the eye, for instance, of harmony, or the ear of colours. The faculty therefore, which views and compares the objects of *all* the senses, cannot be sense.” *Price's Review*, p. 18. In other words, he might have said, *conception* is an act of mind distinct from *perception*.

ception, Understanding, Judgment, Reasoning, Memory, and Conscience.

Professor. The understanding or the intellect, then, comprehends seven faculties, called *intellectual*, of which that of understanding any thing is one. Has this faculty any other name?

Pupil. It is called *Conception* by Dr. Reid and others; for by it we *take in* a subject, *form a notion* of a thing, or have an *idea* of it. We *conceive* of the meaning of a term, a clause, a proposition, and a sentence. Mathematical points and lines, are objects of *conception*, which cannot be *perceived*. All *abstract terms*, such as virtue, vice, goodness, state, faculty, power, liberty, and man, denote objects of which we have knowledge only by this faculty. The science of numbers, or arithmetic, and all the sciences commonly included under the terms *mathematics* and *metaphysics*, *morals* and *theology*, have their origin in the operations of *Conception*. We cannot *perceive*, but we can *conceive* of number, space, quantity, time, spirit, substance, relation, moral obligation, guilt, and the Deity.

Professor. The operations of the faculty of understanding are numerous: can you classify them?

Pupil. I have never attempted it; and think it would be very difficult to do it, in any other manner than by referring them to the objects upon which they terminate. Thus, for instance, all *conceptions of images* formed by the mind, of things which do not really exist, I would put together in one class, and term them *imaginings*.*

* "I may *conceive* or *imagine* a mountain of gold, or a winged horse; but no man says that he *perceives* such a creature of imagina-

Professor. So that *The Imagination* is nothing but *the faculty of conception employed in forming images*. I frankly confess, that *The Imagination* is not, in my opinion, a faculty distinct from that which conceives, or forms notions of things.

Can you name some other principal operations of this faculty of understanding?

Pupil. **DISCERNMENT** is an operation of the mind, in which it *conceives of some difference* between two or more objects.

COMPREHENSION is a firm conception of some extensive or complex object. We *discern* differences: we *comprehend* difficult and complicated things.

APPREHENSION is any act of the mind in understanding the meaning of a statement. Thus, a person speaks to me; I will to attend to him, that I may understand him; and when I do it, I say, "*I apprehend your meaning.*" It is a figurative expression, and literally signifies *to take hold* of any thing. I may *apprehend* the meaning of a proposition without passing any judgment upon it.

INTUITION is any such conception of the meaning of a proposition, as is immediately followed by a judgment that it is true. This is also a figurative expression, taken from the act of *looking into* any thing.

tion. Thus *perception* is distinguished from *conception* or *imagination*."

"Let it be observed therefore, that to *conceive*, to *imagine*, to *apprehend*, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all."—*Reid.*

Professor. When the mind, therefore, *imagines*, *discerns*, *comprehends*, *apprehends*, or *performs* an act of *intuition*, it is the subject of different species of *conceptions*.

Pupil. Pray, Sir, has man any *complex ideas*?

Professor. Every *idea* is a *conception*; and every act of conception is a simple operation. Man has, therefore, no *complex ideas*. He conceives, however, of *complex objects*; even as he may see a complex object; and yet the act of seeing is simple.

Pupil. Has man any *abstract ideas*?

Professor. Man conceives of the meaning of *abstract terms*, or has ideas of certain things, which he resolves to consider as abstracted from certain other things that he knows to be connected with the former. For instance, I conceive of the *figure* of an ivory ball, *abstracted* from the colour, and other attributes of the ball. Here the *idea* is one simple thing, that may be conceived of as abstracted from all other mental operations, and even from the efficient of it; and the *object of the idea* is a *figure*, which is a term that denotes something that may be considered abstractedly from all other attributes of any substance. *Abstract terms*, or names of things that may be considered abstractedly from other things with which they are always connected, there certainly are; but of *complex*, and *abstract ideas*, I know nothing by my own consciousness, besides what I have here disclosed.*

* "A great philosopher," Dr. Berkeley, "has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are

From your own consciousness of what passes in your mind, can you give any *general laws of conception*?

Pupil. A few, I think; for I find, that I conceive of every mental operation which I remember to have performed: and I can renewedly conceive of any remembered past conception, by a voluntary exertion to do it.

Professor. And hence, you naturally conclude, that other persons whose minds are similarly constituted, can do the same, and lay it down as a general observation, or law of mental operation.

Pupil. An example may be given, thus: I perceive a fair female form; I close my eyes, and perceive it no longer; but I remember that I did perceive it; I will to conceive of it; and immedistely I do conceive of it; so that the feeling consequent upon the *conception*, is hardly distinguishable from that which followed the *perception*.

Professor. Can you conceive of all objects of perception?

Pupil. Every object of perception is an object of conception. This is another general rule; but all objects of conception are not objects of perception. Thus, I conceive of seeing, hearing, smelling, tast-

nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon occasion, other individuals, which are similar to them." "Tis a principle generally received in philosophy, that every thing in nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this, therefore, be absurd in *fact and reality*, it must also be absurd in *idea*."—*Hume*.

ing, and touching, but I cannot perceive a thought, a circle around the earth, or the *distance* between the sun and our planet.

Moreover, I find, that one man in his present state, often has different conceptions of the same object; and that similar conceptions of the same object differ in the degree of their vigour and vivacity. *The state* of my body and of my mind, I find by experience also affects the conceptions of the human mind, both in their nature and degree.

Professor. Can you give any general laws concerning the origin of our conceptions?*

Pupil. I can account for them generally, in no other manner than by saying, that man has a faculty of conception, and therefore it is as natural to him to form conceptions as to breathe. From what

* "Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds, they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and uncompounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are the general laws of our constitution, and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics, hold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws, which nature has established, are to be investigated only by an examination of facts; and in both cases, a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation of an infinite number of phenomena."—*Stewart.*

"Now, as the act of moving large masses, has its laws in the faculties of the body, and in the levers which our arms acquire the power of using; so the act of thinking has its laws in the faculties of the mind, and in the levers [*powers*] which our understanding has likewise learned to use."—*Condillac.*

has been already said, it will be evident, that many of our conceptions are occasioned by our perceptions; as those perceptions are occasioned by the existence of external objects. Our social relations give rise to other conceptions; and we never attend to the use of our own language by any one, without having some apprehension of the meaning of the speaker, or some conceptions concerning him, and the subject of his discourse. Hence, the *notions* of men very much depend upon education, taken in its most extensive sense; upon the times in which they live; the events which occur; the temperament of their constitution; and the circumstances of their existence.

Professor. Are our operations of understanding the result of our volitions or not?

Pupil. Many of them result from volition, and many of them do not. The same is true of perceptions. Now when I perceive something without willing it; or even when I will not to perceive it; I find that an act of conception involuntarily succeeds it. Thus, I will not to see an obscene picture; some one unexpectedly presents it before my eyes; I see it: I close my eyes, and conceive of it, even in opposition to my volition never to think of it again. So far, therefore, as our perceptions are involuntary, our conceptions may be originated without, or even against our will.

Were it otherwise with us, a man could not be placed in a state of trial by his Maker, unless the man should previously will to be put into a state of trial for probation.

Professor. Your remarks are just. This faculty

of conception, and its operations, are peculiarly important to man; for without it he would have no science, or systematic arrangement of knowledge, concerning any subject. He might, indeed, were his other faculties to continue in operation, perceive external objects, feel, will, and act, but he could have no language superior to that of brutes. Besides, it will soon appear, that our judgments, reasonings, emotions, conscience, and most important volitions, are dependent on our conceptions.

CONVERSATION VI.

The Faculty of Judging.—Objects of Judgment.—A Truth.—A Falsehood.—Classification of Judgments.—They are Constitutional or Acquired.—The former are consequent on Consciousness, Perception, Conception, Memory or Conscience.—The latter result from Reflection, Reasoning or Testimony.—Believing considered.

Professor. What is the Faculty of JUDGING?*

Pupil. The faculty of judging, or *The Judgment* in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he decides that any proposition is true or not true.

Professor. You intentionally make a proposition, in every case, the object of an operation of the judgment, I presume.

Pupil. I do; because every operation of the mind, except it be a *feeling*, terminates on some object, distinct from the operation itself; and because I am conscious, that when I judge, some proposition, some statement, expressed or understood, is the object of it. Not to judge some proposition to

* Of the act of *judging*, Dr. Reid remarks, that it "is an operation of the mind, so familiar to every man who has understanding, and its name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no definition." We are all conscious of judging, and we can have no stronger evidence of the fact. Still, we think a correct definition, would prevent or silence objections. *Judging is a mental decision that a proposition is true or false.*

be true or false, would in our apprehension be, not to judge at all.*

Professor. Can we perform any operation of judging, without some previous mental act?

Pupil. We must *conceive* of a proposition, before we can *judge* that the proposition is true or not true; so that there can be no act of *judgment* without some previous *conception*. This is one general law of mental operation.

Professor. Is there not some reason to suppose, then, that judging is rather a *complex*, than a *simple* operation of the human mind?

Pupil. No more than there is reason to think, because a horse goes before the cart, and the cart comes after him, that they are not distinct things.†

* The proposition which is the object of judgment, need not be expressed by sounds or letters. It is sufficient that it is conceived of by the mind. "There may be judgment which is not expressed. It is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit and not expressed. Nay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they affirm or deny; the definition," (that *judging* "is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another,") "therefore must be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is only another name for judgment."—*Reid.*

† "Although there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be expressed by a word or words, which make no complete sentence. When simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend, a proposition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or false. It is self-evident, that every judgment must be either true or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be true nor false, as was shown before. One judgment may be contradic-

The fact, that our Maker has so constituted our minds, that we perform our mental operations in a certain order, no more destroys the distinctness of them, than the order observed in the production of flowers and fruits evinces that they are the same.

Professor. What is the object of every true judgment?

Pupil. A truth.

Professor. And what is a truth?

Pupil. I shall quote my teacher's language. "*Any proposition* in which is predicated any thing which was, is, or will be, in relation to an object, *is a truth*. On the other hand, that proposition in which any thing is predicated of an object which neither was, nor is, nor will be, is a falsehood." Of course, every untrue judgment has for its object a falsehood. "*The adjective true denotes something pertaining to truth. A true proposition is a truth.*"

Professor. Can you classify all human judgments?

Pupil. They are either *true* or *false*, and thus may be divided into two classes.

Professor. These two classes would include all; but such a classification would be of little service

tory to another; and [but] it is impossible for a man to have two judgments at the same time, which he perceives [conceives] to be contradictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth, and that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory propositions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the meaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true at the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be false. For these reasons, I hold it to be certain, that judgment and simple apprehension are acts of the mind, specifically different."—

Reid.

to the cause of science, unless you would give us a list of truths and falsehoods. Do you think of no classification more important to the science of mind?

Pupil. All judgments of the human mind are either *constitutional* or *acquired*.

Professor. Distinguish these two classes.

Pupil. *Constitutional judgments* are such as immediately follow some previous mental operation, without requiring any induction, or experience. They result from the constitution of our minds, and are common to all men of sound mind. *Acquired judgments* result from some voluntary, inductive process, from testimony, or from experience.

Professor. Can you reduce constitutional judgments to *specific* classes? You know they are numerous.

Pupil. We may refer them to the different mental operations upon which they are consequent, and from which they seem spontaneously to arise.

1. The *consciousness* of the mind is followed in every man, by the constitutional judgments, *that he exists; that he performs the mental acts of which he is conscious; that another did not perform them; and that his mental operations are not all alike in species and degree.* No man ever doubted these propositions, if we may judge from the universal language of mankind; and all men decide that they are true, so soon as they form any just notions of consciousness.

2. *Perception* is immediately followed by many constitutional judgments. We are so constituted, that we no sooner perceive external objects, than we judge, *that they exist; that they exist without*

us; that they have such qualities as we perceive in them; and that they are perceived through the organ, which is the instrument of their perception. For instance, when I *see* a horse running full speed towards me, I *judge* that there is a horse, that he is running towards me; that he is of a bay colour; and that he is not something else than I perceive him to be. In like manner, when we know the names of things, and perceive them, we judge that whatever we perceive really exists, and that our senses do not deceive us. These judgments are common to all; and hence Berkeley and Hume, while they adopted a theory which excluded the actual being of all material objects, as firmly judged, in spite of their efforts to the contrary, as any men, that the ground was under them, and the sky over them; that the bodies of their fellow men were around them; and that all the objects of their perception existed, and were such as they perceived them to be. Were these constitutional judgments not to result from our perceptions, these perceptions would be of no practical use in life; for should we see a precipice in our path, and not judge, that a precipice was there, we should never will to avoid it; nor could we conceive of danger from any material substance.

3. *Memory* gives rise to other *constitutional judgments*; for without any effort, learning, or experience, we judge, that our own mental actions, which we remember, actually had existence: and *that we, who remember, did exist*. If we remember to have heard any one speak, we judge that he did speak; and hence in giving testimony, we are said to affirm

or deny. In testifying, we publish our constitutional judgments, that result from memory; for, when we affirm, that an arraigned person murdered his brother in our presence, we declare that we remember to have seen the murderous act performed, and that we judge the fact to correspond with our remembered perception. If we should not judge things to have been as we remember to have perceived them, our memory would be of no practical utility. All men, however, are constitutionally constrained to judge, that they actually have perceived, conceived, judged, inferred, felt, willed, approved, remembered, been conscious, and acted, as they remember they have acted, been conscious, remembered, approved, willed, felt, inferred, judged, conceived, and perceived.

4. Many of our *conceptions* are followed by *judgments*, for which we can account in no other manner, than by saying, that we are so constituted that we thus judge, without reasoning, or any voluntary effort. All those *conceptions* which are properly called *acts of intuition*, are of this description; while other conceptions may, or may not be followed by judgments, according to the circumstances of those conceptions. Thus, I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, "*I read yesterday;*" and from the circumstance that *I remember* to have done it, or am told by a credible witness that *I did it*, *I judge* it to be a truth. But *intuition*, without any thing else connected with it, is the occasion of all those judgments, which being expressed in words, are called *axioms*, or *self-evident propositions*. For example; by barely *looking into* the thing, by *intuition*, I discover

and judge, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause. We no sooner conceive of the meaning of this proposition, *by looking into it*, than is, *by intuition*, than we judge that it is a truth.

Professor. Let us call these acts of the judgment, then, that immediately result from intuition, *intuitive judgments*. In most sciences these are the most important of our judgments, because all systematic arrangements of knowledge are founded on *axioms*. The constitutional judgments, however, that are consequent upon *perceptions*, are most important to the common transactions of life.

Proceed in your account of constitutional judgments.

Pupil. I can think of only one other source of them; and therefore I remark,

5. That an act of *conscience* is not only preceded by some judgment, but is also followed immediately by some constitutional judgment. The action of which we *disapprove*, we judge ought not to have been done. Now conscience *approves* or *disapproves* of actions, when compared with some moral law. If we *approve* of any contemplated action, we judge that it ought to be done. We find too, by consulting our own consciousness, that we *judge* a moral agent to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, commendable or censurable, according as we approve or disapprove of his moral conduct.

Professor. Are you satisfied, that these are constitutional judgments?

Pupil. I am; for while a man's conscience performs different operations at different times, relative to the same object; and while different men

mutually oppose each other, in their acts of approbation, and disapprobation; still, every man judges, at the time in which he really *disapproves* of any moral action, that it ought not to be done. It is common to all men, to judge immediately after the operation of conscience on the subject, that men are to be justified or condemned, according to their approbation or disapprobation of their moral conduct.

Professor. Hence if the conscience is erroneous, our judgment, concerning the obligation to perform certain moral actions, will be erroneous also.

Are not some constitutional judgments immediately consequent upon reasoning, feeling, willing, agency, and even judging?

Pupil. Were *feeling* used for that species of perception which you have called *touching*, as it sometimes is, but not by yourself, I should say, that every *feeling* through the instrumentality of a bodily organ, is followed by a *judgment*, that we *feel*, through that particular organ. It is probably, however, more correct to say, that the consciousness and conception of a feeling are followed by a judgment, that something has occasioned it.

Professor. It is true, we judge, that there can be no feeling without some cause of feeling; but this is an *intuitive judgment*, tantamount to our intuitive knowledge of the truth, that there can be no effect without a cause.

You have already stated, that our *consciousness* of judging, reasoning, feeling, willing, and agency, is followed by constitutional judgments, that we, who are conscious, exist; and that we perform the mental operations of which we are conscious.

You have before stated too, that immediately after perception, we judge concerning the bodily organ of perception, that we have perceived through it. Hence, if you prick a man in the thumb or great toe, he instantly perceives it by the sense of touch, and has both a judgment that he was pricked in the toe, or thumb, according as the fact may have been, and a feeling consequent upon the perception.

This instantaneous judgment concerning the place and the mode of our being touched; and indeed, concerning the organ, or part of an organ employed as an instrumental cause of any perception, is designed, by our Maker, to regulate our voluntary exertions, for the preservation of the body. Without it, we should not know to what part of the body we should apply preventives or remedies. The painful sensations that immediately follow some perceptions, are designed to make us immediately *will* to apply some remedy or defence to the part, which we judge to be the organ of that perception which occasions the sensation. Thus I perceive that I touch some sharp instrument. This act of perceiving is in my mind. Instantly I have a *painful sensation*; and I *judge* that I touch it with the hollow of my right foot. The painful sensation induces me to will the removal of the sharp instrument; and my judgment directs my hand to the place affected. Were I destitute of a painful sensation in this case, I might not choose to remove the offending object; were I destitute of judgment concerning the organ touching the instrument, I should as readily move my hand for relief to my left elbow as to the hollow of my right foot.

Pupil. Is not every sensation immediately followed by a constitutional judgment, concerning the cause of that sensation?

Professor. From *intuition* we judge, that there is no effect without a cause; and consequently so soon as we conceive of sensation as an effect, we judge that it must have a cause; and hence we learn to look for the cause. These constitutional judgments, I have before said, are the result of *conceptions* and not of *sensation*. If any constitutional judgment were immediately consequent upon sensation, we should naturally expect it would relate to the perception which occasioned it. Thus I perceive the drawing of a blister plaster on my wrist, and I feel a painful *sensation*. If any judgment should constitutionally follow the sensation, it would naturally be this; that my perception, through the wrist, is the occasion of my painful sensation. Now I find, by my own consciousness, that I no sooner have a perception through the wrist, which is a part of my organ of touch, than I *judge* from perception that my wrist is the part affected; but I find I must have some reflection, and must conceive of some connexion between my perceptions and sensations, or between the application to my wrist, and the painful sensation, before I judge that my pain is produced by the blister plaster. I should think, therefore, that this judgment concerning the cause of sensation is *acquired*, and is dependent upon experience, and some previous intuitive judgment.

Pupil. But why should not *sensation* be followed by a judgment concerning the instrumental cause of it, as well as perception?

Professor. Our business is to ascertain, in mental science, what mental operations actually are performed, and not to conjecture what might be.

It will appear, however, in its proper place, that our sensations themselves are all consequent upon perceptions; so that if a judgment concerning the organ of perception immediately follows the perception, there is no need of another judgment, to the same effect, consequent upon sensation.

Pupil. I wish to know, if we could ever have any correct judgments concerning the nature of Reasoning, Feeling, Willing, Agency and Judgment, without having first performed these mental operations?

Professor. I think not; but then you will please to remember, that our judgment concerning the nature of these operations is consequent upon our *conception* of them; immediately after the performance of the acts themselves. We *judge*; then are *conscious* of judging; then *judge* that we actually have judged; then *conceive* of the nature of the act of judging; and then *judge* that the act is such as we *conceive* it to be. The same is true of the other operations just mentioned; and without *conceiving* of the nature of them, we never form any judgment concerning their nature.

Let us now hear what you have to offer concerning *acquired judgments*.

Pupil. *Acquired judgments* include all operations of the judgment which do not result immediately from our constitution. We denominate them *acquired*, because we learn to form them. We arrive

at them by *reflection*, *reasoning*, and *attention to testimony*.

Professor. Judgments resulting from reflection, may be called *reflective judgments*. Of this description are the judgments formed on the bench, and in the common acts and intercourse of life, from the consideration of a variety of circumstances. Our *experience* is a common subject of *reflection*; and from the two, we judge, that fire will burn us; that water will flow down an inclined plane in future; that the wringing of the nose will bring forth blood; that the sun will rise to-morrow; and thousands of similar judgments.

The result of every course of reasoning is an *inductive judgment*; and of all our judgments, these, even while they are most applauded among men, are most liable to impeachment, and subsequent condemnation. *Constitutional judgments* are never reversed by us; *reflective judgments* sometimes are; *inductive judgments* frequently are.

Have you any distinct appellation for those judgments which have some *testimony* for their object?

Pupil. *Believing* is an operation of the faculty of judging, which has some proposition which is a matter of testimony for its object. The proposition, "I think," I *judge* to be true, because I am *conscious* of thinking. It is constitutional with every man, who thinks and is conscious, thus to judge, so soon as he conceives of the proposition. But if you assert, that you are now thinking of *faith*, I *believe* the assertion to be a truth. I cannot know that it is true, by any other faculty which I possess than that of judgment. The ground of my judgment

is your testimony; and my previous judgment concerning your veracity.

Professor. Is an act of *believing* or of *faith*, an *acquired judgment*? Do we not constitutionally accredit testimony?

Pupil. The utterance of truth or falsehood, is a voluntary act. Indeed, if men *speak* at all, it is from volition. If they speak what they judge to be truth, or falsehood, it is from volition to do so.

Now we find it to be a fact, that all men choose to speak the truth, until they think that some benefit will result from speaking falsehood, or from concealing the truth. This is a general law of human nature.

Professor. But why do men naturally *choose* to speak the truth, under the circumstances which you have stated?

Pupil. I am conscious, that the utterance of what I think to be truth, and the recollection that I have spoken the truth, are followed by pleasing emotions; while the utterance of known falsehood is attended with painful ones. I *choose*, therefore, to speak the truth, and not to speak falsehood, because of the pleasure consequent upon the former, and the pain that I know by experience attends the latter. I judge, moreover, that the experience of other persons corresponds with my own. Hence all men blush and feel shame, at the consciousness of lying, unless they have become in some measure hardened by habit. Hence, men naturally feel anger at the person who accuses them of intentional falsehood.

Professor. It is the constitution of our minds which has connected painful emotions with con-

sciousness of lying, and agreeable ones with the consciousness of personal veracity; and it is our *experience* of this constitution, which induces us to form the habit of uttering truth at all times, unless when we conceive that some advantage, which we prefer to these agreeable emotions, or on account of which we are willing to endure the painful ones, will result from telling an untruth.

Pupil. This constitutional connexion, I remember to have heard you say, constitutes a *predisposition* in all men to utter truth.

There is also in men, a constitutional *predisposition* to believe the testimony which they hear. It is constituted by the natural connexion which subsists between the painful feelings consequent upon the discovery that we have been deceived, and the agreeable feelings which we find consequent upon the discovery, and even the accrediting of truth. To believe our neighbour, when he speaks, is naturally agreeable; to disbelieve him, unpleasant. Hence children believe the testimony of their parents, and of all who speak to them until they learn to doubt, in consequence of having experienced deception.

Professor. If then, mankind have a natural predisposition in their mental constitution to speak truth, and to accredit testimony, I ask again, if *believing* is not a *constitutional*, rather than an *acquired judgment*?

Pupil. Had no obliquity of the human mind occurred, perhaps it might have been constitutional with us to give our assent to every statement made; and *credulity* would never have been known: but the facts now are these; that we find in mankind a

constitutional predisposition to *veracity* and *confidence*; and that, nevertheless, no article of testimony, when proposed to us, is at once, from the constitution of our minds, judged to be true. I affirm, therefore, since every act of believing terminates on some proposition which is a matter of testimony, and since we do not constitutionally judge the testimony to be true, that *believing is not a constitutional judgment*. It is *acquired*, and commonly in the following manner.

We consider the character of the testifier; and if we *judge* that he neither can, nor will utter falsehoods, then we subsequently judge that which we know he has testified to be true. Hence, the act of believing any one's testimony, is commonly subsequent to some prior judgment concerning the author of the testimony. It is owing to this, that a judge considers the character of a witness, when he wishes to form a just estimate of the testimony which he gives; for we well know, that the solemnities of an oath will not induce some men to tell the truth to their own real, or conceived disadvantage.

When a person is previously judged by us to be a competent witness; to be a man of integrity, destitute of an unwise credulity, and well acquainted with the subject of which he speaks, we very readily judge that his testimony is true. On the other hand, if a notorious liar, a foolishly credulous person, and one manifestly ignorant of the subject concerning which he testifies, should utter the truth in our presence, his testimony would not be accredited, unless in our judgment some other circumstances,

with which we are acquainted, should corroborate it.

If we judge a proposition to be true from our own reflection on it, or from intuition, we ought not to call this judgment an act of believing.

Professor. Yet men frequently say, that they *believe* any proposition, which they *judge* to be true; whether it be a matter of testimony or not. Is this correct language?

Pupil. Certainly not, if they would desire to distinguish things by a difference in words, which are, or should be, the signs of *conceptions*, or ideas, or of some other mental operations. I think the word *belief* has been very generally used for other acts of judgment than those of which it is properly descriptive, in consequence of our figuratively ascribing acts of testimony to objects that cannot literally testify. Thus we say, that our senses *testify*; when really they speak nothing; and hence we talk of *believing* them. This will do well enough in figurative, poetical, rhetorical discourse; but not in scientific discussions, or didactic theology.

Professor. What we personally know to be true, we should say we *judge* or *know to be true*; and when we judge that some statement is true, which another declares is true, not because we have personal knowledge on the subject, but for some other reasons, we should use the language of *belief*.

Pupil. What is *assent*?

Professor. It is a judgment, resulting from reflection, that some proposition which another states to us is true.

Pupil. What is *dissent*?

Professor. It is a judgment that some proposition which another declares to be true, is not true.

Pupil. Is *consent* a judgment?

Professor. It is generally used to denote a *volition* to comply with some proposed agreement, or to accede to some proffered terms. It is not a judgment.

It may not be superfluous to remark, that *an act of belief*, and *an act of faith* are synonymous expressions; that any *judgment* of the truth of a proposition, which results from *meditation* or the exertions which others make to produce the judgment in our minds, is called **A CONVICTION**; and that any *judgment*, which *moves* us to a *volition* to act in conformity with that judgment, is called **A PERSUASION**.

CONVERSATION VII.

The Faculty of Memory.—Objects of Memory.—Local Memory.—Classification of the Operations of Memory.—Recollection.—Remembrance.—Memory essential to some Conceptions.—Time.—Duration.—Futurity.—Identity.—Knowledge of our own continued Mental Identity.—Personal Identity.

Professor. What is the Faculty of MEMORY?

Pupil. The Faculty of Memory in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has present knowledge of his past mental operations.

Professor. You make mental operations the objects of memory: are there no other objects upon which the acts of this faculty terminate?

Pupil. I judge, that there are not; because I am conscious of remembering nothing but mental operations.

Professor. Do you not *remember* your absent father's face?

Pupil. It is very commonly said, that we remember material objects; but when I carefully examine my own mind, I find, that I am conscious of remembering my *perceptions*, and even my *conceptions* of my father's face. I *remember*, too, the *feelings* which were consequent upon the sight of his face. I *remember*, moreover, that I have formerly *remembered* these things. In short, I remember, at different times, the simple operations of each faculty; and

those complex ones which result from two or more faculties; but I remember nothing but what has passed in my own mind.

Professor. I cannot say that I am conscious of remembering any thing else: for had I never seen West's celebrated painting of Christ healing in the temple, I should not say that I *remember it*; and when I use such language, my meaning is, that I remember my *seeing it*. In the same manner, when we commit words to memory, so as to repeat them, memoriter, we remember our *perception* of them, either by the eye or the ear. Hence, a memoriter preacher, when delivering his discourse, remembers the *perceptions* which he has had of the words, paragraphs, and pages of his manuscript; so that he "turns over leaves in his mind;" as I have heard one say he did, when reciting it to the people.

Be it remembered, however, that it is a much more profitable employment to remember conceptions, judgments and reasonings, than *perceptions* of words, or other things.

A man who remembers his *perceptions* through his eyes, more readily than any other mental operations, is said to have a *local memory*; or a memory that is particularly exercised about positions and places.

A man who can more easily remember conceptions, judgments, and reasonings, than his perceptions of words, has acquired one of the most important *habits* of memory.

Pupil. I know a person who can remember the date of the birth of every relative which she has, and they are numerous; but hardly any thing else.

Professor. She will serve as an example of *local memory*. I knew a man too, who, from the inspection of maps, could accurately describe the position of every known country, river, sea, lake, ocean, and mountain under the sun; and he hardly remembered any thing else. The origin of this local memory will be explained when we treat of *habit*.

Can you classify the operations of human memory?

Pupil. They might be arranged into ten classes, corresponding with the ten faculties of the human mind, whose operations are remembered.

Professor. That would be a very natural classification. Do you think of any other?

Pupil. All our operations of memory are performed either without, or with, voluntary effort to produce them: and thus may be divided into two classes.

Any act of memory which is consequent upon some volition, is called an act of *reminiscence* or **RECOLLECTION**.

Any act of memory not resulting from some volition to recollect, is called **REMEMBRANCE**.

Recollection, therefore, is consequent upon some volition to recollect; but I may *remember* without *willing* to do it; and even when I *desire* and *will* not to do it. An *act of memory* may be either *recollection* or *remembrance*.

Professor. Do you conceive of any resemblances between the faculties of *Consciousness* and *Memory*, and their respective operations?

Pupil. Consciousness has for its objects nothing but our own mental operations. The same is true

of *memory*. Could we cease to be *conscious*, or to *remember*, at pleasure, in consequence of simply willing not to be conscious, and not to remember, we might escape from all punishment; and even from the moral government of parents, civil rulers, and our Maker himself. These are *resemblances*.

Professor. State the most prominent difference between Consciousness and Memory.

Pupil. We are conscious of *present* mental operations; we remember the *past*. Thus consciousness makes us know what we are now doing; and memory, what we have done. Memory gives perpetuity, or at least continuance to our knowledge.

Professor. Could we have any knowledge of *time*, or *duration*, without memory?

Pupil. We *conceive* of *time* and *duration*: we do not *remember* them: but as we should probably have no conceptions of perception without having actually seen, heard, smelt, touched, and tasted; so it is most likely we should never have conceived of *time* and *duration*, had we never remembered past mental operations. At any rate, should we *conceive* of perceptions, of *time*, of *duration*, and of futurity, without having exercised our senses and memory, our *conceptions* would be of that class which we have termed *imaginings*.

Professor. We find it to be a law of our constitution, that some conceptions of some things, shall be subsequent to some acts of perception or of memory. I have particularly observed in children indications, that they had no conceptions of the meaning of the terms, *to-day*, *yesterday* and *to-morrow*; no conceptions of time past, duration, and futurity; until they had exercised the faculty of memory.

Often I told my little daughter, when two years of age, that "to-morrow I would do something if we should live;" and she has answered, "yes, Papa, we live;" and for a considerable time could not conceive of the difference between living *now*, and at some *future time*. Memory, therefore, is actually exercised by children, before they learn to conceive of time.

Pupil. Does *personal identity* consist in *consciousness*, as Mr. Locke affirms that it does; or in *Memory*?

Professor. In neither. *Identity* is an object of *conception*; not of *consciousness*, nor of *memory*. In forming an idea of *identity*, we *conceive* of some being as having existed in past time, and as existing at present, or at some subsequent time; so that without having some notion of past and of present time, we could not conceive of identity. Memory, therefore, is as necessary to our conceiving of identity, as it is to our conceiving of past and present time. We next *conceive*, that this being which now exists, is the same which did exist; and this is our conception of the *identity* of a being. If we conceive, *that any thing now is, and from any past time has continued to be essentially what it was*, we *conceive* of *identity*; and if we *judge* that this conception is a conception of a truth or of a falsehood, we *judge* concerning the *identity* of the thing; that it is the same thing that it was, or that it is not the same thing that it was.

I perceive a watch hanging over the mantle-piece. I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, *that watch is the same which hung there yesterday*. This

is a *conception* concerning identity. I *judge* the proposition to be a truth; and this is a *judgment* concerning the *identity* of the watch.

Now let me arise and examine the watch. It has the same appearance externally, which I remember I perceived it had yesterday. I still judge it to be the *same*. Let us open it. The wheels that I expected to find within are not to be seen. I reverse my judgment concerning *identity*, and say, this is not the same watch which hung here yesterday. The identity of the *case* I recognize; but it is not the *watch* that it was; for some of the essential parts of the *watch* are gone. Now let me take it to a watch-maker; and let him supply all the internal parts of a watch. I still recognize the *identity of the case*; but I judge that the internal parts are *new*. It is no longer the *same watch*; unless by *watch* I mean merely *the case* of a watch.

Again, let us suppose that on opening the watch, instead of finding any wheels gone, every thing appears within and without, as I remember the watch I took down from the same nail did yesterday. I now judge this to be the very same watch I took down yesterday; because it looks like the same and I know there is no other silver watch in my house. Under present circumstances I cannot doubt its *identity*. But I may have a wrong judgment in this case, for here come ten audible witnesses, who all testify, that one of them took down my silver watch from that nail last night; that they took it to an artist; that he melted the silver case, in their presence; and that he melted every internal part separately; but having done all this, he refashioned

the whole again, in the very mould in which it was made, so that every part now appears just as it did before it was reduced to a fluid; and that they restored it to the nail. I believe the witnesses: can I predicate identity of this watch, and of the watch that hung there yesterday? I cannot. Had I seen each part in the crucible, in a fluid state, I might have said, these are the *identical particles* of silver which composed my case; and these the *identical particles* of brass that composed the wheels; and so of the rest: but this is a *new, another* watch; formed out of the materials of the old one. Want of *continued existence* as a watch has destroyed its identity as a watch.

Let us now change the subject, and instead of a watch, speak of a particular human soul, or mind. This mind now exists: and has the ten constituent faculties of every human mind. If we judge this same mind existed at some time before the present, and has now the same faculties which it then had, without having ceased to be, between the two given points of time, we predicate of it *identity*. Should this mind, however, be annihilated, or cease to be; and should another be erected like it, it would be *another*, and not the *same* mind.

Pupil. I remember you have said in your *Quarterly Theological Review*, "that *mental identity* consists in the continued existence of all the constituent mental faculties of that mind of which we predicate identity. Take away any one of the ten faculties from any human mind, and the identity of that mind would cease." The identity of the other faculties might be continued, but the mind constituted by

ten faculties would cease to exist; and the being that should retain the nine would be a different mental being from any now called human.

Professor. Can you discriminate between *mental identity*, and the *knowledge* which the mind has of its *identity*?

Pupil. Very easily; for a man may be in a swoon; he may be destitute of all mental operations; and yet his mental faculties may all continue in existence, and be the very same that had being before the swoon.

“Our *knowledge* of our own *mental identity* we have by the operations of *consciousness* and *memory*; which has led many erroneously to suppose, that personal identity consists in consciousness, or in memory, or in both. We might as well say that the identity of a table consists in *consciousness*, as that the identity of a moral agent consists in *knowing*, that he is the same being to-day, that he was yesterday!” *Quarterly Theological Review.*

Professor. Tell me, then, since you have explained what you mean by *mental identity*, how a man comes by his knowledge that he is the same mental being that existed and acted yesterday?

Pupil. I perform a mental action; I am *conscious* of it; and upon being conscious, constitutionally judge, that *I now exist*. Again, I remember that I was *conscious* in some past moment; and I constitutionally judge, that *I did then exist*. Now should the question be started, whether this *thing*, denoted by *I*, that I call *myself*, be a *mind* or not, I should answer, that by *I*, or *myself*, I mean one individual mind. Should it be demanded, Is your mind that

did exist, and now exists, one and the same mind? I answer, that I judge it, upon reflection, to be the same, in all its constituent faculties; for I am *conscious* of now performing all the different mental operations which I *remember* that I did perform; whence I *infer*, that the mind is possessed of the same faculties, and is essentially the same.

Professor. But how do you know, that you have not *ceased* to exist between the time of your present consciousness, and that past time in which you *remember* that you did perform certain actions?

Pupil. I *now* remember, that when I was two years of age, I saw my paternal grandfather incline his chair backwards, until he tumbled over; and from my constitution I judge, without being able to doubt the truth of my judgment, that *I*, who now remember, *now exist*; and that *I*, who now exist, *did then exist*, when I remember to have seen what occurred. That *I*, who now exist, am the same individual that did then exist, is implied in the constitutional judgment, that *I, who now remember, did then exist*.

Now, if I state the proposition, *I have continued to exist from the time of the most remote mental operation which I remember, until the present time, in which I remember it, without any cessation of being*; I conceive the meaning of it, and judge that it is a truth.

Professor. You do indeed thus judge, and so does every other rational man. Ali, who remember, judge, that they have continued to exist, uninterrupted, from the time in which they remember any thing; but the question is, how come they by

this judgment? Is it a *constitutional* or an *acquired* judgment? Answer this question, and you will then show, *how* a man obtains knowledge of his *continued mental identity*.

If the judgment is *constitutional*, it will be instantly formed in your mind, without any reasoning or deliberation on the subject. If it is *constitutional*, no circumstances can make you seriously doubt it.

To assist you in forming a correct opinion on this subject, let me state a fact.

Some years ago, a man in Northampton in Massachusetts, took his axe, his beetle and wedges, and went into the woods to cut, and split, some fencing stuff. He went alone, and soon after returned in a state of delirium. He continued an active, ingenious, crazy person, for seven years. Near the expiration of that time, he began to indicate approaching sanity of mind; when one day, standing by his fire, and instantly turning round, he asked, "Boys, have you brought in that axe, the beetle and wedges?"

"What axe, father?" asked his sons.

"Why, the one I just left in the woods," said he: I had a pain in my head, and came home, and left it, with the beetle and wedges." His sons and family told him, that seven years ago, he went into the woods; that he had been disordered in mind ever since; and that they never had been able to find the implements which he then carried with him.

He went with his sons to the spot, on which he had left his farming utensils. The helve of the axe, and the whole of the beetle, except the iron rings, had mouldered under the leaves, and returned to

dust. The axe, and the wedges, and the rings were brought home; but the restored man never was able to remember any thing that occurred during seven years; and could *judge*, only from *testimony*, and *reflection*, that he had continued to exist during that portion of his life. His judgment of his *continued identity* was certainly *acquired*. The truth of the anecdote may be relied on: I had the account from the late President Dwight, a native of Northampton.

Pupil. This man constitutionally judged, that he existed, at each, and every time, in which he remembered any one of his mental operations.

Professor. All men do the same.

Pupil. Could we then remember something for every moment of our existence, we should constitutionally judge, that we had existed in every moment, from the present, to the most remote, time, in which we remember any thing done.

Professor. True; but then no man does remember something done by himself, in every moment of time, during which he judges that he has continued to exist; and hence no man constitutionally judges himself to be the subject of a continued mental identity.

Pupil. Then the judgment that a man has concerning his own continued mental identity, must be *acquired*; and I am confident that all men have it; for no man judges, that he has at any one time ceased to exist, since his existence began; and all, from time to time, remember certain things, which induce the judgment, that they existed at each particular time referred to by memory. All remember

too, some of their mental operations which were performed during sleep; and hence judge that they exist in time of sleep. In this way they seem to arrive at the judgment, that they have never ceased to exist, since they can remember any thing.

Professor. One thing, then, is certain, that if a man has ever, for a moment, ceased to exist, since his mental existence began, he does not know it; for he judges that he existed at every time of performing any remembered act; nor can he believe it, for no one has ever testified to his temporary extinction of mental being.

Pupil. I should like to hear your account of *personal identity*. Do you distinguish it from *mental identity*?

Professor. When we speak of a human *person*, we mean an individual man, consisting of body and soul. Neither the one nor the other alone constitutes a *person*. Now the question may be asked, can personal identity be predicated of any one who passes from infancy through all the usual changes to old age?

The most important part of the human being, the mind, continues essentially the same, from the cradle to the grave. The body undergoes numerous changes; but there are portions of it, which continue from the birth to the dissolution of the frame, by a process of corruption. Perfect personal identity, therefore, cannot with truth be predicated of any man, at two different periods of his life; and yet the identity of the mental being, the moral agent, may be predicated of one from his birth, to any future period of his existence.

Pupil. What, then, does an old man mean, when he says, "I am the very same *person* that you knew, when I was a little boy?"

Professor. He intends to assert his mental identity, and the fact, that he who now thinks and speaks, was once the inhabitant of the little frame of the boy mentioned; which frame has grown and changed, from time to time, until it presents its present appearance of an old man.

CONVERSATION VIII.

The Faculty of Reasoning.—Premises.—Conclusion.—A Syllogism.—Classification of Reasonings.—Demonstrative and Probable Reasonings.—Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings.—Analogical, Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings.—Reasonings *à priori*, *à posteriori*, *ad absurdum*, and *ad hominem*.

Professor. What is the Faculty of REASONING?

Pupil. The faculty of Reasoning in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he infers conclusions from premises.

Professor. What is the result of every operation of reasoning?

Pupil. An inferred judgment.* In reasoning we always deduce something before unknown from something previously known.

Professor. What is logic?

Pupil. The science of Reasoning: or a systematic arrangement of all we know about the operations of the Faculty of Reasoning.

* “Reasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it is inferred. And this power of inferring, or drawing a conclusion, is only another name for reasoning; the proposition inferred, being called the *conclusion*, and the proposition or propositions, from which it is inferred, the *premises*.”—*Reid*.

Professor. Could any man reason without having some previous operations of judgment?

Pupil. He could not, for reasoning implies some previous judgments and an inference from them. Without admitted axioms, or self-evident propositions, or acquired judgments, reasoning could never commence; but when by reasoning we have established any judgment, it may be used as one of the premises, from which we derive another conclusion.

Professor. Your account would make every act of reasoning imply a syllogism, expressed or understood.

Pupil. A *syllogism* is nothing more than the exhibition of a process of reasoning. It consists of three propositions, the two first of which are called *premises*, and the last the *conclusion*.

It very frequently happens, however, that we state one truth, and infer another from it, without naming one of our premises, because it is so obvious as to be understood by every one. An argument of this kind is called an *Enthymeme*. Thus we might say, "because God is a just being, the just man will be justified by him." The last clause of this sentence is an inference; the first clause is one of the premises, from which it is derived; and the other is understood. The whole chain would be expressed thus:

By a just being a just man will be justified:

God is a just being:

Therefore, a just man will be justified by him.

The first of these three propositions is a truth, so generally known and admitted, that in reasoning from it, few would take the trouble to state it: and

in like manner, we omit thousands of axioms, and generally admitted principles of reasoning.

Professor. Can you classify human reasonings?

Pupil. They are either *true* or *false*. The reasoning of any one, in any particular instance, is false, when the *inference* from the premises is not a legitimate one, or when either of the premises is false. An inference may be legitimate, and yet false, when either of the premises is false; and the reasoning may be false, when an illegitimate conclusion is drawn from true premises.

Professor. What is the usual difference between the reasonings of a *fool* and a *madman*?

Pupil. The *fool* states *true premises*, and infers from them an illegitimate conclusion. His inferences do not naturally, and in the view of rational men, flow from his premises. The *madman*, on the other hand, states false premises and argues conclusively from them. Should we admit his premises we could not avoid admitting his inferences.

Professor. You may give another classification of human reasonings.

Pupil. Dr. Reid has said, "The most remarkable distinction of reasonings is, that some are probable, others demonstrative." Hence, I should say, that in probable reasonings, the conclusion is probably true; but in demonstrative reasonings, the conclusion is demonstrably true. Demonstrative reasoning is called *demonstration*.

Professor. What is the prominent distinction between probable and demonstrative reasonings?

Pupil. In demonstrative reasoning, each of the premises is judged to be certainly true, and the con-

clusion is judged necessarily to result from them: but in probable reasonings one at least of the premises admits of some doubt.

Professor. Give an instance of *demonstration*.

Pupil. Things which are equal to the same, are equal to one another:

The sum of *seven* and *three*, and the sum of *five* and *five* are equal to the same number, *ten*:

Therefore the sum of *seven* and *three*, and the sum of *five* and *five* are equal to one another.

The first proposition in this syllogism is a mathematical axiom; the second is an intuitive judgment, and neither the one nor the other of these premises can be doubted by any one, who understands the meaning of the terms used. The conclusion necessarily follows; and a different conclusion cannot be judged even possible.

Professor. In *Duncan's Elements of Logic*, we have a similar example.

“Every number that may be divided into two equal parts, is an *even* number:

The number *eight* may be divided into two equal parts:

Therefore the number *eight* is an *even* number.”

Here the first proposition is a *definition of a word*; and if you judge it to be correct, from a *conception* of the meaning of the terms, the conclusion will inevitably follow; for every man will, from *intuition*, judge, that the second proposition is true.

Pupil. But I judge, that the *definition* is not correct; for it would prove every number to be an even number. Thus *five* as well as *eight* may be divided into two *equal parts*. *Two and a half*, are a part of

five, equal to *two and a half*, the other part of five. Thus every number may be divided into two *equal parts*. He would have been correct had he said, "Every number, the units of which may be divided into two equal parts, is an *even number*;" for we could not divide the *units* composing the number *five* into two equal parts. One *unit* would remain after we had made two equal parts, each of which should contain two; and by the definition we are to make two even parts by the units, without dividing a single unit into halves. Hence *two, four, six, eight, and ten* are called *even numbers*; for they can be equally divided without leaving a unit for the remainder; and *one, three, five, seven, and nine*, are called *uneven or odd numbers*; because the *units* that compose them cannot be divided into two equal numbers of *units*.

Professor. You are correct. *Duncan's Logic* might, without any detriment to the cause of science, be dismissed from our colleges. Can you give as good a criticism on Dr. Reid's division of *demonstrative reasonings* into *metaphysical* and *mathematical reasonings*. You know he says, "The reasonings I have met with that can be called strictly demonstrative, may, I think, be reduced to two classes. They are either *metaphysical*, or they are *mathematical*."

Pupil. *Mathematics*, strictly speaking, are *things learned*; and *metaphysics* include all things known concerning the nature, relations, operations and attributes of all beings which exist. *Mathematical reasonings*, therefore, ought to include all reasonings concerning things learned; and *metaphysical* rea-

sonings, all reasonings concerning all beings, of every description. Some have restricted the meaning of mathematics and metaphysics; so as to denote by the former, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and the mensuration of solids; and by the latter, the science of all immaterial substances. But such a restriction would not suit Dr. Reid's classification of reasonings; for the axioms of *mathematical* science, (using *mathematical* in the restricted sense,) are such propositions as the *mind* of man, from *intuition*, judges to be true; and so partake of a *metaphysical* nature. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to class our reasonings of a demonstrative kind, under the two heads of *metaphysical* and *mathematical*, whether these words be used in a restricted, or in their most extensive sense. The fact is, *demonstrative reasoning* may be employed in any, and every science, which contains *axioms*, or is founded on *constitutional judgments*.

Professor. Well: give me an example of *Probable Reasoning*.

Pupil. What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past it will do to-morrow:

The sun for a thousand years past has uninterruptedly illuminated the portion of earth on which we live:

Therefore the sun will to-morrow illuminate it. Of the truth of the first proposition in this concatenation, we cannot be certain, unless the Creator of the sun and earth should assert it. It is possible the sun may not illuminate Philadelphia, and the adjacent country. It is possible, in the nature of things,

that it should be annihilated. Were this first proposition infallibly certain, as a self-evident truth is to our minds, the inference could not be doubted; the first could not be otherwise than as it is stated. The reasoning, therefore, is not demonstrative: and it cannot be demonstrated that the sun will shine here to-morrow. He may be completely shorn of his beams, for a day, or a month, or for ever. *Probably*, therefore, might with propriety be inserted in the first of these premises, and in the conclusion; as it may in every instance of *probable reasoning*. What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past, it will *probably* do to-morrow. Therefore, it will *probably* shine on us to-morrow.

Professor. Were it deducible from any self-evident truth, that day and night, seed time and harvest, summer and winter, should never cease while the world exists, that they should not cease would probably never have been made a matter of direct revelation.

Probable reasonings admit of many degrees of probability; and upon *judgments* which are probably true, we are obliged to act in the greater part of our affairs.*

* "Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it, because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence,

Analogical reasonings are nothing more than a species of probable reasonings, in which one or both of the premises is a matter of analogy. The syllogism you have just given is an instance; for the proposition, *that what the sun has done it will continue to do*, is a judgment which we learn to form from *analogy*.

A few other distinctions I will name. They respect *modes* of reasoning.

When we form judgments by observation and experience, or in any other way, concerning individual things, and make them the premises whence we infer general or universal truths, we are said to pursue the *analytic mode of reasoning*. Thus, we judge from observation, that one gravid substance gravitates to the centre of the earth; as Sir Isaac Newton judged, that the apple did. Again, we judge from what we perceive, that another, and another, and another, similar substance does the same; until we have formed this judgment concerning every gravid body, with which we are acquainted. Then we reason thus,

Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. gravitate towards the centre of the earth:

Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. are all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted:

that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to a moral certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; but the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will."

Butler's Analogy.

Therefore, all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth.

The first of these propositions should enumerate in the place of the &c. which we have introduced for the sake of brevity, every gravid substance, with which we are acquainted, and then the inference would be as certain as those constitutional judgments which follow our perceptions.

Should we choose to adopt the *synthetic mode of reasoning*, we might now make some general truth one of our premises, and from it infer some particular truth; thus:

All the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth:

Stone is one of the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted:

Therefore, stone gravitates towards the centre of the earth.

You will readily apprehend, that many sciences are reared by *analytical reasonings*; but that being already established they may be taught in the *synthetic method*. I do not affirm that every systematic arrangement of knowledge, on any subject, called a science, is made by analytical deductions; for many constitutional judgments are themselves general principles. Those sciences which are generally included under the title of natural philosophy and natural history, are all formed originally by *analytical reasonings*: but arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and mensuration of solids, have grown out of the *synthesis of axioms and definitions*.

Pupil. Do not the sciences of natural philosophy and history depend very much upon analogical, probable reasonings?

Professor. Undoubtedly they do; and therefore I wonder, that men of sense should deem natural philosophy any more capable of certainty than mental science. The conclusion, that all gravid bodies *will gravitate to the centre of the earth to-morrow*, is derived from nothing more certain than analogy; and from analogy alone can the natural historian judge, that all human bodies which he has not dissected, have viscera essentially similar to those which he has dissected; and that the same medicines in similar circumstances, will produce similar effects, on the living subject to-morrow, which they have done to-day.

Pupil. I have heard old logicians talk much about reasonings *à posteriori*, *à priori*, *ad absurdum*, and *ad hominem*. Will you explain them?

Professor. Reasonings *à priori*, are inductions concerning *effects* from their *causes*. The *premises*, of course, in *à priori* reasonings, must predicate something concerning the *cause* of a thing; and the conclusion from the premises, some inference concerning an *effect* of that cause. I give an example, from Dr. S. Clark, on the being and attributes of God.

A Being in his own nature infinite, omnipresent, and intelligent, must be infinitely wise:

The Supreme Being is in his own nature, infinite, omnipresent, and intelligent:

Therefore the Supreme Being must be infinitely wise.

Here the nature of the Supreme Being is considered as the cause of his infinite wisdom; which is an infinite, unchangeable effect, of this Infinite, Unchangeable Cause.

Reasonings *à posteriori*, are inductions concerning *causes* from their *effects*. The premises, in reasonings of this kind, must predicate something concerning *effects*. One example will suffice.

Every intelligent creature must have had an intelligent Creator;

Man is an intelligent creature:

Therefore man must have had an intelligent Creator.

Here man is the *effect*, concerning which it is predicated, that he must have had an intelligent Creator: and the Creator is the *cause* of man's existence; concerning which *cause* we infer, that he is intelligent.

Reasoning *ad absurdum*, is an act of reason in which you infer some *absurd proposition*, with a design to establish the converse of that conclusion. This mode of reasoning is adopted, because it is an undisputed principle of reasoning, *that if a proposition be false, the converse of it must be true: and if a proposition be true, the converse of it must be false*. Thus we may assert,

That God is a good being, or

That God is not a good being.

Each of these propositions is the converse of the other; and every one will readily judge, upon the slightest examination, that if either is true, the other must be false.

Reasoning *ad hominem*, is a reasoning *at a man*;

or an act of reasoning in which you take a man's own propositions, whether true or false, for your premises, with a design to refute some of his assertions, or to convince him of some truth.

Pupil. Do you make any distinction between *Reason*, and the *faculty of reasoning*?

Professor. The *faculty of reasoning* is sometimes called the *Reason* of a man; but *reason* more commonly denotes the result of our intellectual operations. Hence we say, that our *reason* teaches us, such and such a truth. *A reason* for an action, is a *motive*; and the *reason* of an event, means the occasion or instrumental cause of that event.

CONVERSATION IX.

The Faculty of Conscience.—Proof that all men have this Faculty.—

Other names for the same thing.—Some general Observations and Laws concerning the Operations of Conscience.—Operations of Conscience always occasion certain Feelings.

Professor. What is the faculty of **CONSCIENCE**?

Pupil. The faculty of conscience in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he performs mental operations of a religious character.

Professor. You would have it understood, I presume, that the religion of which you speak in this case may be either *true or false, rational or absurd, Scriptural, Deistical, or Atheistical*.

Pupil. I would; because all men have *a religion of some sort*, as we judge every rational being, who has a conscience, must have; but I should be far from deciding, that all religions are equally good, or that one may be contradictory to another, and both be true.

Professor. How do you know that all men have a conscience?

Pupil. All men with whom we are acquainted, or of whom we have ever read, *approve* of some moral actions, and *disapprove* of others; according to the moral law which they have either formed or

adopted. The law may, in the judgment of others, be reasonable or unreasonable; but so long as a man approves of the law, in his own mind, he will *approve* of conformity to it, and *disapprove* of the transgression of it.

Now every act of mental approbation, or disapprobation, is a mental operation of which a man is conscious; and which, every man may readily be convinced, is distinct from any operation of any other faculty. It is because men are conscious of these acts of conscience, and judge them to be different from other simple operations of the soul, that they have given them distinct names.

From the general principle, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause, we infer, that all men who approve or disapprove of any moral action, must have a faculty of mind by which they perform these operations: and this faculty we call *Conscience*. Some denominate it the *Moral Faculty*, and others the *Moral Sense*.

Professor. How do men commonly express their approbation or disapprobation of moral actions?

Pupil. They affirm or deny, that they are *right* or *wrong*. They say, that such particular actions *ought*, or *ought not* to be done: and that they are either *morally good*, or *morally evil*. In short, their modes of expressing the dictates of their consciences are very numerous. Had they no consciences, they would never speak of *a sense of moral obligation*, *rectitude*, *virtue*, *piety*, and *religion*; unless they were to *imagine* things, of which, from experience, they could form no *conceptions*.

Professor. The fact that men either mentally ac-

cuse or excuse themselves, for their own conduct, is another proof that they have consciences: and their attempts to make other men approve or disapprove of certain courses of conduct, are evidence that they think other men have consciences as well as themselves.

Pupil. May not every operation of conscience be resolved into *judgment* and *feeling*, and so be accounted a complex, instead of a simple operation?

Professor. After mature reflection upon what passes within me, I feel constrained to express my judgment, that the *approbation* or *disapprobation* of a moral law or action, is neither *a judgment*, nor *a feeling*, but a single act, that seems to partake of both. I am conscious that I *judge* the proposition, *men ought not to steal*, to be true: I am *conscious* of certain *feelings* too, consequent upon this judgment; and I am conscious, moreover, of *approving* of the proposition as a rule. The acts of *judging* this moral rule to be true, and of *feeling contentment* with it, or *love* for it; appear to my mind to be as distinct from a *conscientious approbation* of it, as any acts of memory from those of reasoning. As a *particle* is a word distinct from every other part of speech, and yet partakes of the nature of a verb and of a noun, so it appears to me, that an act of conscience partakes of the nature of a judgment and of a feeling, and yet is distinct from each, and every other kind of mental operation.

It is by this faculty that I experience what is called a *sense of obligation*, and a *sense of accountability*.

Perhaps you are able to enumerate some general

laws concerning the operations of conscience, which will serve to distinguish them from other mental acts.

Pupil. I am conscious of approving or disapproving actions only when I remember that I have compared them with some rule of moral conduct, and judged them to be conformable or not conformable to it.

Professor. Every operation of conscience, then, relative to moral actions, presupposes an act of the judgment.

Pupil. Certainly; for I never approve of any action without previously judging that it is right; that is, conformable to some rule of action, which I have laid down.

Again; I never judge any law to be reasonable, equitable, and obligatory, without some previous *conception* concerning it: the same is true of my judgment concerning actions; it is consequent upon some *conception* of them, and of their relation to a law: so that my moral approbation is consequent upon my judgment, and my judgment upon my *conceptions*.

Professor. Ultimately, then, our dictates of conscience are dependent on our *conceptions*; and hence we learn the importance of having right *conceptions*, or a right understanding of things; for if a man verily thinks, (conceives and judges,) that he ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth, his conscience will approve of the action. Hence we hear of the blinding and perversion of conscience. It is by having a darkened understanding, that men approve of what is wrong in the judgment of more

enlightened and exalted minds. If you would produce in a man a good conscience, rectify his conceptions and judgments.

Pupil. It must be owing to this connexion between the operations of Conception and Judgment, and those of Conscience, that the most ignorant people, generally speaking, are the most vicious.

Professor. Undoubtedly; their consciences in many cases are not exercised at all; and in other instances, from wrong *notions* concerning law, duty, and the nature of moral actions, they approve of moral evil.

Pupil. It is another peculiar law of Conscience, that if a man acts contrary to his own moral approbation, he immediately disapproves of his own transgression. In figurative language, Conscience always makes a man condemn himself, for not doing what she approves, and for doing what she condemns. A similar law exists in relation to no other mental operation. We may act contrary to any other mental operation, and she will not infallibly condemn us. Indeed she often approves of our yielding our own judgment, for the sake of peace; and requires opposition to some of our most ardent emotions; but if any man dare to act contrary to his Conscience, however uninformed, or misinformed, she may be, Conscience will surely scourge him. It is for this reason she has been called the Vicegerent of God in the soul; and is often compared to an impartial Judge.

Professor. Dr. Reid has very well remarked; "Conscience prescribes measures to every appetite, affection, and passion, and says to every other prin-

ciple of action, so far thou mayest go, but no further. We may indeed transgress its dictates, but we cannot transgress them with innocence, nor even with impunity. We condemn ourselves, or, in the language of Scripture, *our heart condemns us*, whenever we go beyond the rules of right and wrong, which Conscience prescribes. Other principles of action may have more strength, but this only has authority. Its sentence makes us guilty to ourselves, and guilty in the eyes of our Maker, whatever other principle may be set in opposition to it. It is evident, therefore, that this principle has, from its nature, an authority to direct and determine, with regard to our conduct; to judge, to acquit, or to condemn, and even to punish; an authority which belongs to no other principle of the human mind."

Pupil. It is another law of Conscience, that every act of disapproving of our own past conduct, should be immediately followed by some *emotion of shame, self-contempt, or disgust* with ourselves: and another, that *disapprobation* of the past conduct of others should occasion in us the *emotions of disgust, aversion, discontentment, contempt or indignation* in relation to them.

On the other hand, approbation of our own or our neighbour's past moral actions, is immediately followed by some agreeable affection in our own minds.

Professor. Operations of Conscience, then, are always productive of pleasure or pain.

Pupil. And in this way Conscience rewards or punishes men in the present life.

Professor. Is there any distinction between those

operations of conscience, which respect the conduct of other men; and those which regard ourselves?

Pupil. When we approve or disapprove of our own conduct, our consequent emotions are more ardent, than those which ordinarily follow our approbation or disapprobation of the conduct of our fellow men. This has led Dr. Wylie to divide the operations of conscience into those of *seoscience* and *heteroscience*; or into *acts of conscience that respect ourselves*, and *acts of conscience that respect others*. These may be considered as two classes of operations performed by one faculty. Our general rule, therefore, may be expressed thus: acts of *seoscience* are commonly followed by emotions more pleasing or more painful than those which are consequent upon *heteroscience*.

CONVERSATION X.

The Faculty of Feeling.—Feelings distinguished from other Mental Operations.—One general Law of Feelings.—Classification of all Human Feelings.—Sensations considered.—Three Appetites.—Uses of the word Taste.—Emotions.—Description of the principal Affections of Man.—A rule concerning inordinate Affection.—Regard.

Professor. What is the faculty of FEELING?

Pupil. The faculty of feeling in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he experiences feelings. This is the sensitive faculty.*

Professor. Can you define those mental operations that you call *feelings*?

Pupil. If I cannot define them, I am *conscious* of them, and therefore I know that I am the subject of them. I can *distinguish* them from all other mental operations, by stating this fact, that they have no object distinct from themselves; whereas every other mental operation has some object upon which it terminates. If I *perceive* it is some object without the mind, which is presented through our

* “It is the mind that feels; it is to the mind alone that the sensations belong,” says Condillac, very truly; but *feeling* he unhappily uses for *perceiving*, and *sensations* for *perceptions*. Hence he says, “we have five sorts of *sensations*. The mind *feels* through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and chiefly through touch.”

bodily senses; if I *conceive*, it is of some substance, or attribute, or image, or meaning of a word, clause, or sentence; if we *judge* or *reason*, some proposition is the object; if we are *conscious* or have *memory*, it is of some mental operation; if we *approve* or *disapprove*, it is something of a moral nature; if we *will*, it is to do, or not do, some action; and if we exert our *efficiency*, it is upon some mental faculty or bodily organ; but if we *feel*, it must be some *feeling*, and nothing else.

Professor. In what consists all human happiness or unhappiness?

Pupil. In human *feelings*. Were we destitute of these, we should *feel neither pleasure nor pain*. All the happiness or unhappiness, which we derive from our *thoughts*, is inherent in the *feelings* which they produce; for, if we have any degree of the one or the other, we *feel* it.

Professor. It seems necessary for you to define the word *thought*; that no misconception may arise from the manner of your using it.

Pupil. Any operation of any one of the seven faculties of *The Understanding*, I call a *thought*. Agency, volition, and feeling are mental operations, which we exclude from the catalogue of *thoughts*; and they are excluded in all languages.

Professor. You would assert then, I suppose, as a general rule, that men never have any *feeling* except in consequence of some *thought*, *volition*, or *efficiency*.*

* "It is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever starts up in the mind without a cause: if I love a person, it is for good

Pupil. Upon self-examination, I judge, that every feeling I ever had, was preceded by some thought, volition, or efficiency, which was the occasion of it. If our feelings were not dependent on some previous mental operation, or upon some antecedent, it would be very absurd to inquire, what is the occasion of our having one feeling and not another; or why we feel as we do. If we give the *reason* for our *feeling* in any particular instance, it will uniformly prove to be some *thought*, *volition*, or *mental agency*.

Professor. Human feelings are very numerous: can you classify them?

Pupil. I can recite your classification, which seems to me to be correct.

“ All human **FEELINGS** may be divided into **SENSATIONS** and **EMOTIONS**.

“ Our **SENSATIONS*** are those *feelings* which are immediately consequent upon our *perceptions* of objects without the mind, through the five bodily organs of sense.

“ Our **EMOTIONS** are those *feelings* which are consequent upon other mental operations than our *perceptions*, by the organs of sense.

qualities, or good offices: if I have resentment against a man, it must be for some injury done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no distress of body nor of mind.”—*Lord Kames*. We must *conceive*, we should say, of some good quality, or office; of some injury, or of some distress, before we can *feel love, resentment, or pity*; for we may feel if all these are imaginary things; but we cannot feel without some conception of them as real.

* “Sensations,” says Price, “is only a mode of feeling in the mind.”—*Review of Morals*, p. 19.

“EMOTIONS are subdivided into *Affections* and *Passions*.

“*Affections* are those *emotions* of the mind which are naturally pleasurable to us.

“*Passions* are those *emotions* of the mind which are naturally painful to us.

“This brief classification includes every feeling of which we are conscious.”*

Professor. According to this account of *sensations*, they are always consequent upon *perceptions*. How do you know that men do not *feel* through their bodily organs when they have no perceptions? Is it not common for men to say, “I feel that this is smooth, this rough, this soft, and this hard?” Do they not tell you, that they *feel* pain in their eyes, when oppressed with too much light; and in their fingers when they are cold?

Pupil. It is customary, indeed, for people to say, that they *feel*, whenever they *perceive* any thing; and they speak of *feeling*, as if it were equivalent to *perception*, because every perception is followed instantly by a feeling of some kind. *Feeling* too is often used for *touching*; but because a *feeling*, distinct from the *perception* of a thing by the *touch*, is consequent upon every act of *touching*, we should distinguish in our language between *touching* and *feeling*.

Professor. Now, for the proof that the particular kind of *feeling* which we call *sensation* is always consequent upon *perception*.

* Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 454.

Pupil. Well, then, when I put my finger upon a polished surface, I am *conscious* that I *touch* or *perceive* something smooth; and I am conscious that I have an agreeable *sensation* immediately following the perception. When I *touch* a rough, and especially a prickly substance, I am *conscious* that a very different *feeling*, or *sensation*, immediately follows the act of *touching*, from what I experienced when I touched something smooth and polished. I find the same to be true, when I attend to any operation of seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting: so that my consciousness teaches me, that every perception to which I attend, is followed by some *sensation*: and no man can say that his perceptions to which he does not attend, are not thus followed, unless he can testify to that of which he knows nothing.

That I never have a *sensation*,* but in consequence of some perception, I deduce from the fact, that I

* DR. HARTLEY has well said, " *Sensations* are those internal feelings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies." Another sentence that deserves, from its obvious truth, to be cited, can scarcely be found in his " *Observations on Man*." That work is a fanciful attempt to explain *how* all mental operations *may be* imputed to the instrumental agency of *vibrations in the infinitesimal white medullary particles in the substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and nerves*. That there are any such *vibrations* he has not proved; and no one can affirm, from his own observation, feeling, reason, consciousness, or experience of any sort. Dr. Hartley, however, admits, that these *vibrations* are merely the *instrumental*, and not the *efficient* causes, of *sensations*, and other mental operations; so that he no more accounts for the intercourse between the soul and body than those who confess it to be incomprehensible.

am able to trace my sensations to some antecedent perceptions.

Again, I know that objects of perception have been sometimes presented to my bodily senses, and that I had no sensations in consequence of their physical action on my body, until I perceived them. For example, I have been walking the streets in such a state of mental occupation, that I have not perceived a friend whose image, I subsequently learned, must have been formed on the retina of my eyes; and not perceiving him, I had no such a sensation of a pleasurable nature as always follows the perception of his animating face. Had my sensation been immediately dependent on *physical impression*, I should have had a pleasing sensation from the image of my friend in my eye, without perceiving him. I give another instance. I have been so engaged in study for some time, as not to perceive the pricking of a pin; and I felt no painful sensation until I had perceived it.

Professor. All who have attentively examined their own mental operations, must have found, that the faculty of Conception, and several other faculties, are often so busily engaged as not to afford the faculty of Perception leisure, or opportunity, to operate. Hence a very thoughtful man may ride through a fine country, and perceive very few of its beauties. Such a person is frequently called an *absent* man; for indeed he seems to be like one absent from the objects of perception that surround him. When engaged in writing, I do not hear the conversation, which passes in the usual tone, in my chamber; and very frequently mental science so

engages my Reason, Judgment, Memory, and Conception, that the shrill voices of my children, pulling at my knee, to ascend into my lap, are scarcely perceived, while the same action of the modulated atmosphere on my ears, at other times, would be the occasion of my hearing every syllable. So long as I do not *hear* the noise of my children, it gives me no painful sensation.

Pupil. Your remarks have brought to my remembrance this fact, that men who feel acute sensations of pain, from the gout, rheumatism, or other disease, may for a time, by close attention to some important, interesting study or business, avoid feeling the pain.

Professor. By their energetic attention to some intellectual subject, they preclude, for the time, all *perception* of objects through their senses; especially the operation of inflammation, or other disease, upon the organs of touch; and so have no *sensations*, because they have no perceptions. Not long since, I was wounded on the knee; and the pain was intense so long as I perceived any thing through my knee; but for a little time, when I could deeply engage my mind in the study of mental science, or theological inquiry, or devotional exercises, I had no sensations of pain from my knee, because I ceased to perceive through the wounded part.

I lay it down, therefore, as a fundamental law, that man has no sensation except in consequence of some antecedent perception.

Can you reduce our *sensations* to classes?

Pupil. They may be divided into as many classes as we have species of perceptions, or bodily organs

of sense. They are sensations consequent on seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, or tasting.* In each of these classes we may find as many sensations as we have ever performed acts of perception. Every distinct colour, when seen, is the occasion of a distinct sensation; and so is every modification of figure, with every other visible object.

Professor. What do you mean by *The Appetites* of man?

Pupil. Any sexual sensation, any sensation from hunger, and any sensation from thirst, is *an appetite*. *The appetites* of course include three species of sensations, which are the most powerful and influential. The word *appetite* is derived from *appeto*, to *catch at*, or *earnestly seek* any thing. The appetites, figuratively speaking, may be said, to *catch at*, or *earnestly seek*, that which will gratify them.

“Our other sensations generally derive their names, when they have any, from the qualities of external things, which, being perceived, occasion those sensations. Usually we couple an adjective, descriptive of the quality, with the verb *feel*. Thus we say, *I feel hot*, *I feel cold*, *I feel warm*, &c.”† The philosophical explanation of these expressions

* “Every feeling, pleasant or painful, must be in the mind; and yet, because in tasting, touching, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression made upon the organ, we are led to place there also the pleasant or painful feeling caused by that impression; but, with respect to seeing and hearing, being insensible of the organic impression, we are not misled to assign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings caused by that impression; and therefore we naturally place them in the mind, where they really are.”—*Lord Kames*.

† *Quarterly Theological Review*, vol. i. p. 457.

is this. *I perceive hot air*, or some other *hot substance*; I have *a sensation* of a peculiar kind, consequent upon the *perception of heat*: *I perceive cold air*, water, ice, or some other *cold substance*, and have *a sensation* from the perception of coldness: *I perceive warm air*, or something else of a *warm quality*, and *I have a sensation of warmth*. *Cold, hot, and warm* are adjectives, that must agree with some noun, or name of a thing, of which they denote some quality.

"If we touch a rough object, the feeling consequent upon the perception of the roughness by the touch, we call *a sensation of roughness*. In like manner, we speak of feelings, or *sensations*, of *smoothness, hardness, softness*, and the like. A great multitude of sensations are consequent upon our perceptions through the eye, for which we have no distinguishing terms. Every different effect produced in or upon the body, being perceived, occasions a distinct feeling. Thus from the pricking of a pin we have one sensation; from the act of pinching, another; from the gout in the system, another; from tasting twenty different liquors, twenty more; and instead of naming each distinct and different sensation, we merely say, that *we feel pleasure or pain*, in the part of the body, which we judge to be the organ affected, or the bodily instrument of the particular perception, that occasions the feeling."*

Professor. What do you mean by *pleasure* and *pain*?

* Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458.

Pupil. "Pleasure and pain are attributes of *feeling*; and the feeling really is in the mind. We say *the pain* is in one of our bodily organs of perception, merely because we have *the painful sensation* through the instrumentality of that organ. For the same reason we say *the pleasant taste* is in our mouth."*

Professor. What do you mean by *taste*?

Pupil. An *act of tasting* is a mental perception through the mouth, palate, and tongue. An *act of tasting* is sometimes called *a taste*; and the sensation consequent upon this act of tasting is also frequently called *a taste*. The term moreover is figuratively used to denote *nice discernment*, especially in works of imagination, and the *lively emotions* consequent upon that nice discernment.

Accurate discrimination upon moral subjects, accompanied by lively emotions, is frequently called moral taste.

To apply *taste* to the operations of Conception, Judgment, Emotions, and the works of Imagination, such as painting, music, and sculpture, will answer in figurative, but not in philosophical discourse.

Professor. Under the general term *feeling*, you have included *sensations and emotions*; and under the term *emotions* you include *affections and passions*. Let us have your account of the affections.

Pupil. Every one is conscious of having those mental operations which we call *affections*, and is

* Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458.

able to conceive of them. It is only requisite to describe, and distinguish them as clearly as possible. All of them we cannot be expected to enumerate; for not all of our emotions have distinct names. Many of them require a circumlocution to express them.

The account which I give is but a recitation, with a few interpolations, from the *Quarterly Theological Review*. Among the AFFECTIONS we enumerate,

I. LOVE, which is a pleasing emotion, consequent upon the conception and judgment, that some object is lovely, either on account of some of its inherent attributes, or because it is calculated to promote some agreeable feeling in ourselves.

The emotion of love, is a generic expression, which includes several *species*; which are designated, generally, according to the object upon which the mental operation terminates, or else according to the relation of the person who loves. Hence we have, 1. *Paternal love*, which is the love a father exercises. 2. *Maternal love*, which is the love a mother feels. 3. *Conjugal love*, which is the love married persons exercise towards each other as partners. 4. *Filial love*, which a sister exercises. 5. *Fraternal love*, which a brother feels. 6. *Social love*, which is the love of society. 7. *Personal, or Self-love*; which is the love of ourselves. 8. *Selfishness*, which is the inordinate love of one's self. 9. *Benevolence*, which is love of the happiness of others. 10. *Complacency*, which is the love of an object for its inherent attributes, or for its own sake. 11. *The love of fame*,

the *love of knowledge*, the *love of power*, and the *love of happiness*, which need no explanation.

II. Joy is another strong affection, consequent on some thought of an event or object, past, present, or expected, which we deem very desirable for ourselves, or in relation to others.* When we think again of any source of joy, and feel a new, similar emotion, we are said to *rejoice*. "GLADNESS is an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by incidents, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves, which are not of sufficient moment to raise the ecstasies of joy."†

III. CONTENTMENT is an affection consequent upon our judgment, that the thing with which we are contented, is not to be dispraised, blamed, or highly commended. It is a feeling which often results from contemplating conduct, circumstances, characters, or events that neither displease, nor afford much, if any, positive gratification.

IV. SATISFACTION is an emotion which we experience, when we judge, that any object is fit, suitable, reasonable, or what might have been expected; or in consequence of thinking of the accomplishment of some desire. Hence we say, "we are *satisfied* with your conduct," when any one has conducted as we should have desired him; and hence the Christian says, in relation to the Supreme

* "In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation doth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy."—*Lord Kames*.

† Cogan's Philosophical Treatise, p. 64.

object of this affection, “ *I shall be satisfied, when I awake in thy likeness.*”

V. CHEERFULNESS is a moderate affection which we experience, in consequence of some thought about objects with which we are contented. It has for its object generally our present state, and future prospects. It is a feeling which occupies a place between *gladness* and *contentment*; being inferior to the first, and superior to the last. It is generally of longer continuance than any more ardent emotion.

VI. DESIRE is an affection which we feel in contemplating an object, which we love, and do not possess; or an action, that we judge would promote our happiness by being accomplished. **A WISH** is the verbal expression of a desire.

VII. HOPE is an affection consequent upon the desire of some object, which we judge to be both good and probably attainable. We may *desire* that which we think we shall never be able to obtain;* but we *hope* only for that, which we have some expectation that we, or others, shall obtain, or receive.

VIII. DELIGHT is an ardent emotion which we experience on obtaining an object desired or hoped for; or in consequence of judging something to be what we highly approve of, and ardently love.

IX. CONFIDENCE is an emotion consequent upon some act of faith, in relation to the word of the

* Full conviction of the impossibility of gratifying any desire, will, however, commonly prevent the recurrence of desire, after the thing of which we despair.

person in whom we confide. We never *confide* in any person, without previously judging that he is true, and competent to promote the happiness we expect.

X. GRATITUDE is an emotion consequent on a judgment, that some one has intended to confer, or has actually conferred, a favour on us.

THANKFULNESS is the name we give any grateful emotion, when it moves us to a verbal expression of our gratitude; and the actual expression of gratitude is *thanksgiving*.

XI. RESIGNATION is an emotion which we feel in consequence of some judgment, that it is wise, proper, best, or necessary, upon the whole, to yield our will to the will of another. It is an affection which often moves us to resolve, that we will make no resistance.

XII. PATIENCE is an emotion consequent upon a judgment that it is reasonable and best to wait and endure. It is a feeling which moves in us the determination to suffer without complaining.

XIII. HUMILITY is an emotion that results from some thought of comparative unworthiness. Of course, it implies some previous judgment, that the person or law, with which we compare ourselves, is worthy and excellent.

XIV. MEEKNESS is an emotion which we experience, subsequently to some thought of insult or injury, and to a persuasion that it is not right, or suitable for us to avenge the insult or injury. It is that feeling which prevents our choosing to retaliate. Christ *felt meekness*, when he was sensible of the injury done him, and yet *opened not his mouth*.

XV. PITY is an emotion consequent upon our judgment that another suffers pain, or is exposed to suffering, and a desire to afford relief.

Some may question whether this should not be called a *passion* instead of an *affection*; but appeal being made to consciousness, the last umpire in matters of this sort, we are compelled to say, that we have never felt pity without having some degree of satisfaction in the emotion.

XVI. ESTEEM is an emotion consequent upon our approbation of a person's moral character, or a judgment that the object esteemed possesses worth.

XVII. RESPECT is a feeling consequent upon a judgment, that a person possesses some degree, at least, of both wisdom and goodness.

VENERATION is a name given to a high degree of respect, for persons eminent in wisdom and goodness.

XVIII. REVERENCE is an emotion consequent upon some thought of a being, whom we judge to be great and powerful, as well as wise and good; or of something appertaining to such a being. *Holy reverence* regards a person, or the attributes of a person, divinely great, powerful, wise, and good: and hence we are said to *feel holy reverence* for God and his house; for his word and ordinances.

XIX. ADMIRATION is a sudden emotion, consequent upon the thought of something sublime, or more than commonly excellent in some respect.

XX. SURPRISE is an emotion that results from the apprehension of something novel and unexpected.

XXI. WONDER is an emotion consequent upon

the apprehension of something deemed strange, or unaccountable.

ASTONISHMENT is a name given to a very great degree of wonder.

XXII. AMAZEMENT is a feeling consequent upon some thought of something novel, unexpected, great, and intricate.

XXIII. CURIOSITY is an emotion consequent upon the judgment that something new to us, may be perceived, understood, or felt, to the promotion of our happiness.

Professor. How do you know that Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, Amazement and Curiosity, should not be classed with our passions?

Pupil. I know from my own experience, that they afford me pleasure; and I judge that they are felicitous to others, for those who have felt these emotions desire to feel them again; and take pains to excite them. The chief pleasure experienced in attention to a play, a novel, and a volume of travels or history, consists in the mental operations of this kind, which are excited by such attention. The pleasure found in these mental affections, induces men to travel far from home; or sit for hours in the odious atmosphere of a theatre. It is the pleasure found in these emotions that induces the ignorant to listen to every tale of horror, superstition, imagination, and wild romance.

Professor. Since all our affections are, in their own nature, felicitous, will it not follow, that every affection is lawful and proper?

Pupil. It is to be remarked, that we may feel an affection for an improper object; or for a proper

object in an unreasonable degree; and every such emotion is called an *inordinate affection*. When an *inordinate affection* induces an *evil volition*, it is said to be a *malevolent affection*. It should be remembered, moreover, as a general law of feeling, *That every inordinate affection produces some passion, which is in some degree painful. Selfishness, for instance, is an inordinate love of one's self*, which invariably occasions in the person who exercises it, some emotion of pride, grief, anger, resentment, shame, or the like.

Professor. Is not *REGARD* an affection?

Pupil. *Regard* is a general term, used to denote any *emotion* exercised in relation to any object. Hence we have *affectionate* and *passionate regards*. I *regard* a man, if I feel any *emotion* relative to him, whether it be good or bad, pleasing or painful. If I have *no regard* to a man, he excites in me no emotions, whether favourable or unfavourable to himself.

CONVERSATION XI.

Account of the Human Passions.—Lawful Passions.—Some general Laws of Feeling.—Sympathy, Commiseration, Compassion, defined.—Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of our Mental Nature.

Professor. Let us now have your description of the Passions of man.

Pupil. I shall proceed with my recitation from your Review; and intersperse a few of my own remarks.

Professor. Proceed; and make such alterations and remarks as you deem meet.

Pupil. Among the PASSIONS we enumerate,

I. HATRED, which is an unhappy feeling, consequent upon some painful sensation, or some thought of an object which we judge to be hateful in itself, or unfavourable to ourselves, or to some one whom we love. It is an emotion directly opposite to *love*.

II. SORROW is a strong passion consequent upon some thought of an event past, present, or expected, which we judge to be very undesirable for ourselves, or in relation to others.

III. GRIEF is an emotion, consequent upon the disapprobation of some conduct in ourselves, or in some one whom we love or esteem. We *hate* the

bad conduct of our enemies; but we *grieve* only for ourselves, or some beloved object.

IV. SADNESS is a passion of some continuation, consequent upon some thought of the loss of, the want of, or the despair of, something good, but not in an exalted degree. It is a feeling inferior to sorrow and grief, but superior to discontent.

V. DISCONTENT is a passion that we experience in consequence of some judgment, that the thing with which we are discontented deserves to be dispraised or censured, but not in a great degree. It generally refers to some state, or substance.

VI. DISSATISFACTION is a passion which we find consequent on some judgment, that the object of our dissatisfaction is unfit, unsuitable, unreasonable, or different from what we might have expected or desired.

VII. DISAPPOINTMENT is the passion which we feel in consequence of not obtaining some expected good.

VIII. DESPAIR is a deep and settled passion, consequent on a full conviction, that there is no longer any reason to hope for some object which we desire.

IX. AVERSION is a passion, dependent for its existence on the thought of something so offensive in its own nature, that we wish to think of it no more. Figuratively speaking, we wish to *turn away* our mind from an object of aversion.

X. DISGUST is a strong emotion, consequent upon some strong disapprobation of some person or conduct, on account of something in him or his conduct, obscene, base, mean, or vulgar.

XI. INGRATITUDE is a feeling consequent upon

the remembrance of a favour done or intended, and some hatred of, or disgust at, the benefactor.

XII. PRIDE is a feeling, which one experiences in consequence of some judgment of his own comparative worthiness.

It is an emotion which we always experience, in a greater or less degree, when we think of ourselves more highly, and of others less highly, than we ought to think.

XIII. VANITY is a passion, consequent upon a judgment, that we excel others in something, for which we desire them to admire and esteem us. It moves a man to display his mental, or other endowments, of which he is vain.

XIV. SUSPICION is an emotion, consequent on some sentiment, that persons or things probably are not, or will not be, what they appear, or promise to be.

A DOUBT is the expression of some suspicion concerning the truth of a proposition.

XV. JEALOUSY is a passion, consequent on some fear that another has obtained, or will obtain, some good, which we had hoped to enjoy ourselves.

XVI. ANGER is a passion, consequent upon some thought of an insult, or injury, intended or experienced. It is a feeling, which often moves the will to purposes of resentment, or of revenge.

WRATH is a strong, but RAGE the strongest species of anger.

XVII. FRETFULNESS is a feeling, which we experience in consequence of some unpleasant sensations, or disappointments, or vexations, which we

judge to be of no great magnitude; and yet, of which we will to complain.

XVIII. **VEXATION** is a painful emotion, consequent upon a rapid succession of little occurrences, contrary to our desires, and calculated to interrupt the train of our thoughts, or to impede the course of our business.

XIX. **FEAR** is a passion consequent upon the judgment, that we, or the objects for which we fear, are in danger of experiencing some kind of evil.

TERROR is a high degree of fear, in consequence of some great evil apprehended.

DREAD is long continued fear, especially of evil, the nature of which we do not fully comprehend.

XX. **HORROR** is a passion, that results from the thought of something peculiarly, or unexpectedly, evil, in one's character, conduct, or situation.

XXI. **INDIGNATION** is a strong emotion, resulting from our thoughts concerning some action or conduct, which we judge peculiarly meritorious of feelings of resentment, and the manifestation of displeasure.

XXII. **RESENTMENT** is an emotion consequent on some thought of an insult or injury, and a judgment that it is fit, best, or right, to evince our displeasure against the offending party.

XXIII. **CONTEMPT** is an emotion, that immediately follows our judgment that a person is destitute of wisdom, power, and goodness, and deserves to be treated accordingly.

XXIV. **DISDAIN** is a feeling, that results from the judgment, that a person, or an action is not only destitute of wisdom, power, and goodness, but is

calculated to dishonour all who have intercourse with the one, or do not feel indignation at the other.

XXV. ENVY is an emotion, consequent on a conception of something desirable that is the property of others, and the feeling of selfishness. It is that passion which would induce the volition to appropriate the envied object to ourselves, could we do it with impunity.

XXVI. MALIGNITY is a feeling, exercised in relation to sentient beings, in consequence of some emotion of hatred, anger, envy, suspicion, jealousy, or other passions of which they have been the occasion. It induces us to wish them injury.

MALICE is an inferior degree of *malignity*; and is excited by, and employed about little things.

XXVII. CRUELTY is a passion consequent upon the conception of suffering, hatred to the sufferer, and a desire to inflict pain unnecessarily.

XXVIII. LUST is a passion consequent on some volition to indulge some appetite, or other feeling, in an unlawful manner.

XXIX. SHAME is a passion, that results from a conviction of the disgrace of some one in whom we feel interested; or from the knowledge of our own weakness, folly, inferiority, wickedness, or exposure to disapprobation and punishment.

Professor. Your list is sufficiently extended. What do you mean by *malevolent passion*?

Pupil. Any passion which ordinarily induces in the mind which feels it, an *evil volition*.

Professor. Since all our passions are in their own

nature infelicitous, I would ask, whether any of them may be lawfully indulged?

Pupil. In an evil world, or in a state in which there are any evils, there must be objects to which some passions are suitable. Hence any passion exercised in relation to a suitable object, and in a reasonable degree, is called a *suitable, reasonable, lawful, or sacred passion*.

It is also to be had in remembrance, as a general law of feeling, *That suitable, reasonable, lawful or sacred passions are always followed by some agreeable affection*. Ultimately, therefore, it is for our happiness to exercise right passions, notwithstanding they are in their own nature, in some degree painful.

Professor. If I hate base, mean, and unworthy conduct, I am conscious that I subsequently find *satisfaction*, from thinking that I have felt as I ought to have done. "We may be said to find happiness in *hating evil*, feeling *aversion* from sin, *fearing* God, having holy *resentment*, being *disgusted* with obscene conduct; and in *grief, sadness, sorrow*, and even *shame*, for such things as we know ought to excite these emotions in us; not because the passions themselves are agreeable, but because they are instantly followed by some affection that is. We *love, esteem, or respect* ourselves for these passions; or we feel some degree of *gladness, contentment, or satisfaction* because we have felt as our consciences tell us we ought to have done; or the hope of *probation, or of other rewards*, springs up in the soul."*

Having taken a general survey of human feelings, perhaps you can state some other laws, than those which we have already contemplated.

Pupil. I think I can a few.

RULE I. The nature and degree of every feeling, whether it be a sensation, passion, or affection, are dependent on, and according to, the nature and degree of the antecedent bodily or mental operation which is the occasion of it.

Professor. Give a brief illustration of this rule.

Pupil. If I attend to objects of perception, my acts of perception will be weak or vigorous, in proportion to the impression on my bodily organs; and my sensations will in kind, and in vivacity, ardour, strength, or weakness and dulness, be in proportion to the perceptions which occasion them. My affections and passions, in like manner, will be proportionate to the vigour or debility of those conceptions, judgments, or other operations of mind, that give rise to them.

Professor. Very good. Give another general rule concerning feelings.

Pupil. **RULE II.** The contemplation of a feeling in others, when we do not judge it to be an evil feeling, is commonly followed by a similar feeling in our own minds; which is called a fellow-feeling.

RULE III. The contemplation of any feeling in another, which we disapprove, at the time, commonly excites in us disgust.

Professor. What do you understand by SYMPATHY?

Pupil. When our thought of any *passion*, felt by another, is the occasion of our experiencing a simi-

lar passion, it is called an act of SYMPATHY, or a *sympathetic emotion*.*

Professor. What do you mean by COMMISERATION?

Pupil. COMMISERATION is sorrow experienced by us, in consequence of some conception of the misery of another.

Professor. What is COMPASSION?

Pupil. "Any *sympathetic emotion* occasioned by the *despair, sorrow, grief, sadness, or fear* of another, we call COMPASSION."

Professor. It seems to be a general conclusion from your whole account of the operations of the heart, and the *intellectual faculties*, "that our Creator has made the *intellectual* paramount to the *sensitive* part of our mental nature." He designed that our understanding should regulate our *passions and affections*; and that our *perceptions* through the bodily organs, should limit our sensations.

In this, our *heart* has the pre-eminence over our *intellect*, that all our happiness consists in the operations of the former.

Pupil. It may be added, that all our unhappiness too, consists in our feelings; but it is the province of intellect to promote such feelings as are agreeable, and to prevent such as are painful.

* "Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions of others, but also by their feelings: I cannot behold a man in distress, without partaking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure."—*Lord Kames*.

CONVERSATION XII.

The Faculty of Volition, or the Will.—Some contemplated action the object of every Volition.—Desire and Preference different from Volition.—The Will a dependent Faculty.—Perception and Conception the only independent Faculties of the Mind.—Definition of Volition and Motive.—Inducement and Motive distinguished.—Several general Rules concerning Volition.—An Inference concerning the importance of regulating our Thoughts.

Professor. What is the faculty of **VOLITION**?

Pupil. The faculty of volition in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he chooses, determines, resolves, purposes, or wills, to perform, or not perform, any contemplated action, of which he judges himself capable.

Professor. You make some mental or bodily, some simple or complex, operation, the object of every volition: and by your definition would have it understood, that no man ever has a volition to perform, or not perform, any action of which he judges himself absolutely incapable.

Pupil. Such seems to me, to be a correct definition of an operation of the faculty of volition, which we use as synonymous with *The Will*.

Professor. How do you know, that all men have this faculty of volition?

Pupil. All men declare their consciousness of

willing in certain cases; and there could be no act of volition without the requisite faculty, unless there could be an effect without an adequate cause.

Professor. Do we not choose external objects? If a pear and a peach are before me, may I not say, that *I* choose the peach, and that my volition terminates upon a peach, rather than upon any contemplated action?

Pupil. *Desire* is a feeling which may have a peach for its object; and many have confounded an operation of the will, with this emotion of the heart. If two things are presented to my contemplation, I am said to *prefer* that which *I* most *love, desire, or esteem*: but if *I choose* that which *I prefer*, the meaning of this elliptical expression is, that *I choose, or will to take, or to receive, or to possess, that object which *I prefer to something else**. When apples, pears, and peaches, are all presented to your view, and you *choose peaches*, the meaning of the expression is, that you choose *to take, or receive, or eat peaches*. The question in the mind is, “*which shall I take?*” and the volition is, “*I will take peaches.*”

If men accurately distinguish between their *feelings* and *volitions*, they will find in every instance, that a volition respects nothing but a contemplated action.

Professor. Does the faculty of volition in man ever act independently of all his other mental faculties?

Pupil. Never; if *I may judge from my own consciousness*. *I find, that I perceive without any previous operation of any other faculty than that of*

Perception: I *conceive* too, independently of any other mental operation, in many instances; so that Perception and Conception are independent faculties, that originate thought, or that may be said to have a sort of creative mental ability. It is not so with any other faculty, for if we are *conscious* or *remember*, we must be conscious of, or remember, some mental act: if we *judge* or *reason*, or *approve*, we are dependent on *conception* or some other act, for the object about which we judge, or reason, or exercise our conscience in approbation. If we *feel*, it is in consequence of, and in dependence on, some antecedent mental operation; and if we *exert* our faculty of *agency*, it is in obedience to *volition*. In like manner, if we *will*, it is to do, or not do, something of which we have *conceived*; so that some notion of an action to be done, or not done, is essential to the existence of a volition. Besides, if I *will*, it is in consequence of some other mental act, than the mere conception of the action which is the object of volition; it is from some *motive*; so that the Will is more dependent on previous mental operations than any other faculty of the mind. It requires at least a *conception* of its object and a *motive*.

Professor. The *dependence* of which you now speak, is not any thing extraneous to the mind; but a dependence of one faculty upon one or more faculties of the same mind.

Pupil. Yes, it is a constitutional dependence; that has its origin in the mental nature which the Creator has given, and the laws by which he governs human minds, as certainly as the material universe.

Professor. In what sense do you use the term *volition*?

Pupil. It is a general term, that includes every operation of the faculty of the will; whether that operation be called a *determination*, a *choice*, a *resolution*, a *purpose*, an *intention*, an *act of willing*, a *will*, or any thing else.

Professor. What is a **MOTIVE TO VOLITION**?

Pupil. Any simple or complex mental operation, or operations, which figuratively speaking, *move*, induce, excite, or occasion any volition, are the motive to that volition.

Professor. Of course, every *volition* presupposes a motive, and there are as many motives as volitions in existence, and no more. Do you distinguish between a *motive* and an *inducement*?

Pupil. Any simple mental operation, which of itself does not constitute a motive, but which in connexion with one or more other mental operations, often does constitute a motive, we call an *inducement*. Hence an *inducement* may be considered as any constituent *part of a motive*. I will give an example. I *judge* that a vexatious servant deserves to be flogged; but this judgment alone does not make me *will* to flog him. Immediately after, I *judge* that the servant will be ruined if I do not correct him. I *judge* also, that I am bound in duty to flog him; and from these three judgments taken together, I am induced to *will* that I will flog the boy. Neither of these judgments alone moved me to this volition; but each in conjunction with the other, conspired to induce me to determine that I would flog him. Here the *action of flogging a boy*,

is the object of my *volition*; the *motive* for this volition consists of three distinct judgments; and each of the judgments is *an inducement*.

A *sufficient inducement*, and a *motive* to volition are equivalent expressions; but by *motive* we always mean, that which actually is the true reason of our *willing* in any particular instance. Ask a man why he chose, willed, or determined, as he actually did, in any case; and if he candidly and intelligently answers the question, he will present his *motive* for the volition. But if he states several things, no one of which singly moved him to volition; but all of which together did; each single thing is an *inducement*.

Professor. Why do you define motives to be those mental operations that move us to volition? May not some external object, some creature of sense, some written arguments, or some speech uttered, be a motive?

Pupil. An external object must be perceived, or conceived of, by the mind, before it can have any influence on the will: we say, therefore, that the *perception* of external objects, and not the objects themselves, or some *conception* of them, is the *motive*, or *inducement* to volition, presented by external objects. A speech never moves us to any volition unless it be heard, or understood, or conceived of, or in some way thought of, by the mind: and *arguments* are nothing to any man, before he forms some notion of them: so that, strictly speaking, nothing but mental operations can be motives to volition in any human mind.

When a writer or speaker talks of presenting *mo-*

tives to his readers or hearers, he intends to make such statements as being heard, read, or thought of in some way, will by these mental operations move them to some desired volition. It is the *thought* of the mind concerning a proposition, or its *feeling* consequent upon the thought, and *not the proposition itself*, that constitutes a *motive*.

Professor. It is unquestionably one of the inviolable laws of the human mind, that the *Will* never *operates except in consequence of some motive*. Can you now state any other laws of volition?

Pupil. Any *human feeling* may be an immediate motive to volition.

Any *operation of conscience* may be an immediate motive to volition.

A simple *operation of consciousness* never proves a motive to volition. The same is true of a simple *operation of Perception, Conception, Volition and Agency*.

Any *operation of the judgment* concerning our duty, interest, convenience, happiness, or unhappiness, or concerning the fitness or unfitness, the propriety or impropriety of any action, may be a motive to volition.

Any *inferred judgment* concerning the things just mentioned, may be a motive to volition.

The *memory* of any past volition to choose in any particular way, may be a motive to a future volition.

The *memory* of any operation which we judge we can perform if we will, and of any agreeable feeling that followed it, may be a motive for a volition to perform a similar action.

The *memory* of any past motive may constitute a future motive to volition.

The *memory* of any promise may be a motive for willing to perform the promised action.

Professor. In laying down these rules, I presume you judge, that what commonly has taken place *may* take place again: for we all *remember* that we have repeatedly chosen from such motives as you have described, and it is reasonable to conclude, that we, and other beings like us, may do it again.

Pupil. I can no more doubt, that men may in future do, what they have commonly done in ages past, than I can doubt whether the sun will arise to-morrow; or whether fluids will continue to roll down an inclined plane.

Professor. A motive consisting of a single mental operation may be called a *simple motive*; and a motive consisting of two or more mental operations may be called a *complex motive*. Can you name any simple motives?

Pupil. I sometimes have a volition immediately consequent upon some *feeling*, and a *conception* of the action which is the object of volition.

Professor. The conception of the action willed is essential to every volition; and it is also essential, that we should not judge ourselves absolutely incapable of the action. These are pre-requisites to every volition. But these pre-requisites existing, a *simple feeling* may be a *motive* for willing immediately to perform any contemplated action, that we have not judged ourselves incapable of performing. This simple feeling is consequent upon some intellectual operation; but it is the *feeling*, when it exists, that constitutes the *motive*.

Professor. In the same manner, any single feeling, operation of conscience, act of the judgment, result of reasoning, or act of memory, that moves us to a volition, is a simple motive: but when we will in consequence of two or more inducements, the motive is complex.

Professor. The greater part of our volitions, I think, are the result of complex motives. *I will to eat*, we will suppose. If I thus will, because I now have a pleasant sensation from tasting food, and for this reason alone, my motive for willing to eat is simple: but if I not only *feel* present pleasure in tasting, but *judge* that eating is necessary for my sustenance; and from both these considerations, will to eat another mouthful, the motive is complex. Again, if I would not eat another mouthful merely because I now *feel* an agreeable *sensation* from the last, but if I will to eat it, from the present sensation in conjunction with *remembrance* or *recollection* of past pleasure derived from eating, and a *judgment* that I shall feel the better for eating it, my motive is again complex, and is constituted of three distinct inducements; viz: a sensation, an act of memory, and a judgment.

Have you any other rules of volition to give?

Pupil. That which has been a motive to a particular volition in a man, at one time, and in one state of body and mind, may not prove a motive to a similar volition, at another time, and when he is in a different state of body and of mind.

Similar feelings, however, in the same man, generally occasion similar volitions, unless they are counteracted by some dictate of the Judgment or

Conscience, or by some memory of painful feelings, that formerly resulted from an action similar to the contemplated one. For instance, a man who has formerly chosen to eat, from the sensations of hunger, will, when hungry, generally determine to eat again, unless his judgment informs him, that his health requires a temporary abstinence, or his Conscience approves of his deferring the act of eating, until he has discharged some more immediately urgent duty. Let a physician seat himself at table, and he will eat, if he is hungry, and does not judge that it is best for him to abstain; or if his Conscience does not require him to visit a patient, before he gratifies his appetite. The same is true of other men, with a change in the objects of duty, to which Conscience may call them.

It is our knowledge of this rule, that enables us to anticipate very accurately how men will act, when certain appetites crave indulgence, or when any given emotion is excited in the heart.

Every body knows, that *men will choose to act as their sensations induce them, unless Judgment, Reason, Conscience, or Memory, or all of these, present stronger inducements, and so furnish a motive for resisting, denying, and subduing their sensations.* Hence, if men *will to act* at all from their sensations, without giving the Judgment, Conscience, Reason, and Memory time to be exercised about the action, they invariably *will act according to their sensations.*

The same rule holds good in relation to our emotions. If men *will and act hastily*, they commonly act out their feelings; or they will to act

from the emotions of the moment. These are *rash men*.

Hence, every man knows, that *anger* will move that man, who feels the passion, and acts suddenly, without consulting any other faculty than that of feeling, to purposes of retaliation and revenge.

Professor. A little attention to human character and conduct, will convince men of the truth of this rule, that any man who has many ardent feelings consequent upon his perceptions; and comparatively few consequent upon his operations of Conscience, Reason, Judgment, and Memory, will generally be governed in his volitions, by objects of sense.

Pupil. Might you not have given another rule, prior to this; that a man who more generally exercises his *perception*, than his Conscience, Reason, Judgment and Memory, will have more *sensations* than *feelings of any other kind*; and so will in his Volitions be mainly a *sensual man*?

Professor. The truth of your position cannot be denied. You might have added, that a man who employs his faculty of Conception in the work of imagination, more than all his other intellectual faculties, will have more feelings consequent on imaginations, than on the operations of Judgment, Reason, Conscience, Memory, and Perception; and if he wills from his feelings mainly, as men generally do, his Imagination will control his Will. This man is styled a *visionary*, or *romantic being*.

Pupil. A person such as you have now described, would be justly deemed *insane*, I think.

Professor. The most general rule, with which I am acquainted concerning volitions is this, that a

man's habitual volitions are as his habitual feelings: for there is scarcely any motive of which *some feeling*, or a design to promote some feeling, is not a constituent part.

Pupil. Of course, since a man's feelings are as his thoughts, and his volitions are as his feelings, his volitions must ultimately be as his thoughts. "As a man thinketh so is he."

Professor. And hence we infer, that it is a matter of unspeakable importance, by education, revelation, and every other practicable way, to regulate a man's thoughts.

Could we secure the *right operation of the seven faculties of the understanding*, and employ them exclusively about desirable objects, we should then infallibly secure the exercise of *right feelings*, and of *right volitions*.

CONVERSATION XIII.

The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency.—An Operation of this Faculty distinguished.—Proof of the Existence of this Faculty.—Objects of our Efficiency.—Some Operations of Man that are ordinarily performed without Volition, may be performed from Voluntary Exertion.—How the Mind exerts an Agency on the Body is unknown by us.—The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental Faculties considered.—On the Consciousness, Perception, Conception, &c.

Professor. What is the faculty of AGENCY?

Pupil. The faculty of agency in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he performs from volition, or instinct, any action.

Professor. *Agency* and *efficiency* you will use as synonymous expressions. Any operation of the human mind, you will bear in mind, moreover, is called an *action*; but a *mental agency*, *exertion*, *effort*, or *efficiency*, is only such an *action* as we perform in consequence of a *volition* to do it, or of some *instinct*.

Pupil. I think I have understood your distinction, ever since I read your NOTES to the *first American Edition of Dr. Reid's Works*. You have there said, “*We think, we will, we act*. Here are three mental operations, which belong to three different faculties. The first belongs to the under-

standing, the second to the will, and the third to a faculty not the least important, which metaphysical writers have not honoured with a distinct name and place in their systems. It is *the faculty of agency*, which has generally been confounded with *The Will*. There could be no agency without the Will, or some Instinct, any more than will without thought; but these things ought not to be confounded. The faculty by which we *WILL*, is not the faculty by which we *DO* what we will. They are as distinct as the volition to walk, and the act of walking, which is consequent upon the volition; or as the perception of an external object, and the judgment that it exists. It is true, that where the *power* of doing any thing exists, the performance of it immediately follows *the will* to do it immediately; because the Author of our constitution has thus connected volition and agency; but the faculty of the will may exist, and operate, after the power of agency is gone. I judge that I can speak; I will to speak; but the power of doing the thing which I will, was, without my knowledge, previously taken away. In this case my Creator has separated the power of agency from the power of volition. Should I continue, from any derangement of intellect, to think that I could speak, I might continue to will, without producing the action of speaking.”*

Professor. How do you know that you have any faculty of efficiency?

* Upon the principle, that I may do what I will with my own property, I have altered a few words in the foregoing extract.

Pupil. I am conscious of exerting an agency in consequence of a volition. I am conscious of a *voluntary efficiency*; and this efficiency I judge to be an effect, which must have some cause. I judge too, that the mind which is conscious of a voluntary efficiency must be the cause of this efficiency. But it could not be the cause of this efficiency, without being adequate to it, for it is self-evident, that every effect must have an adequate cause. Now this in the human mind, which renders it adequate, under certain circumstances, to voluntary efficiency, I call the faculty of efficiency in the human mind. That other men have a similar faculty, I *believe* from their testimony, and infer from the analogy between their actions and my own.

Professor. Have the operations of the faculty of Efficiency any objects? If they have, what are they?

Pupil. An operation of the faculty of efficiency in man, has for its immediate object, either his body, or some of the faculties of his own mind.

Any bodily action which we judge we can perform, we *exert* ourselves to perform, whenever we will to do it: and we find that most of our bodily organs are excited by our mental efficiency. If I will to open my mouth, my faculty of efficiency so operates upon the muscles of my mouth, through the nerves connected with those muscles, that I actually open my mouth. If I will to speak, my faculty of doing what I will, so operates upon my mouth, lungs, tongue, larynx, and other organs of speech, that they inhale, expire, and modulate the air expired, in such a manner as to produce all the

variety and combinations of articulate sounds, of which vocal language is composed.

If I will to walk, my faculty of agency operates upon the nerves connected with the muscles of my legs, in such a manner that the action of walking is produced.

In short, any voluntary animal operation which a man performs, is the result immediately of his faculty of agency, and only mediately of his faculty of volition; for the will has the government of the body only through the faculty of agency.

Professor. Many of our bodily operations are performed ordinarily without any volition to produce them. The muscular distending and contracting of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the winking of our eyelids, the peristaltic motion of the intestines, and breathing, are of this description; hence they are called *involuntary animal operations*: but although they are generally involuntary, yet we find that the faculty of agency has some ability to reach some of them; and that some of them may be voluntarily performed for a little time. Hence, if I will to cease from breathing for a short time; or to inhale more air than is natural, by breathing oftener than is usual; or to inhale a greater quantity at a time, by a longer inspiration than is common; or to wink at a certain time; I find that my faculty of Agency executes my volition. By inhaling more air than is natural too, in any given time, I may voluntarily, if I know this will be the effect, increase the muscular action of the animal heart.

By knowing the effect of certain medicines on my system, by experience, or judging of them from

analogy, I may also, voluntarily, produce changes in the state of my fluids, and even of the solid parts of my body; and thus exert a physical agency upon my own animal frame.

The principal concern of our faculties of volition and agency, however, with our body, is to produce such bodily operations as are never performed without the exertion of either a voluntary, or an instinctive efficiency upon the human frame. We never eat, drink, speak, read, walk, sit, ride, stand, nor labour, in any of the mechanical or fine arts, without the voluntary employment of our faculty of efficiency, upon the requisite bodily organs.

Pupil. Can you tell me, Sir, how the mind exerts its efficiency upon the body?

Professor. I frankly confess, that I cannot: and moreover I affirm, that no one has ever yet done it. I do not proceed so far as to assert, that no one will ever be able to do it; for it becomes not me to say, to what extent the faculties of the human mind, and the boundaries of human knowledge, may be enlarged. The fact that mind operates on matter we know, but of the mode of operation we cannot conceive. This is *no more* mysterious or incredible than another fact, that matter operates on matter, in most instances in an inconceivable way. The *modus operandi* in every chemical process is a mystery.

In the animal frame, we have learned, by various experiments, that muscular motion is dependent on the action of the nerves upon the muscles; for if the nerves that lead to any limb are divided, or tied, the muscular motion, that used to result from the

operation of voluntary efficiency, will no longer take place. The spinal marrow is the great trunk of the inverted tree of nerves, in the human body, of which the brains are the root; and if the spinal marrow be broken, the limbs of the body supplied with branches of nerves issuing beyond the broken place, will be as incapable of voluntary and instinctive motion, as the limbs of an oak of growth beyond the point of truncation. A dog with a broken back, that drags his hind legs after him, is an illustration of this truth.

Cut off the communication between the brains and any part of the nerves growing out of them, and the muscles upon which the truncated nerves are laid, will no longer obey the will, and of course, the bones into which the muscles are inserted, will cease to be moved at volition. Hence it is inferred, that the mind must first act upon the brain, and dependent nerves, before the muscles and bones can move according to the exertion of voluntary or instinctive mental efficiency. These are facts; but *how* the nerves act upon the muscles, that is, how one material organ acts upon another; and how the faculty of mental efficiency operates on the brain and other nerves, no one has ever shown; nor are we, at present, able to show. It remains one of the secrets of nature. It is as difficult for us to conceive how the mind acts upon the brain and nerves, as to conceive how it might operate directly on the muscles, bones, and blood. It is as impossible for us, at present, to conceive at all of the mode of mental agency upon any part of the body, or of the mind, as to conceive of the essence of the substance of

matter, of the operation of a chemical solvent, of the nature of the action of the gastric juice, or of the nature of the causation of attraction, cohesion, and gravitation.

Let us not, however, reject the knowledge which we do possess, because we do not know every thing, which we conceive it would be desirable to understand.

Let us now inquire concerning the operations of the faculty of Efficiency upon some of the other faculties of the human mind. What can you do in and with your own mind, when you will it?

Pupil. I find, when I will to be *conscious*, and *endeavour* to do what I will, that an act of consciousness immediately follows both the *volition* and the *exertion*: but I find also, that if I *exert* myself to refrain from being conscious, I cannot *effect* my *purpose*; so that my faculty of agency cannot stop the operations of *consciousness*. It has been previously shown, that for a wise reason, this faculty has not been subjected to Volition, and its executor, Efficiency.

Professor. Well, proceed to review our faculties in the order in which we have treated of them. *Perception* is the next.

Pupil. I often perceive, through my eyes, ears, nose, and organs of tasting and touching, without any voluntary exertion to produce my perceptions: I even perceive frequently in direct opposition to my voluntary exertions.

I am conscious, however, that I frequently make exertions to perceive, and that perceptions of such objects as are to be perceived, are immediately

consequent upon the voluntary employment of my bodily organs. If I will to see my wife, that is in the room, and exert myself to do it, my eyes are turned towards her, and I see her. If I will not to see her, my mental agency closes my eyelids, or turns away my face, and I do not perceive her. I have a similar control over my other senses; for I can feel, what is to be *felt*, and so on, by a voluntary exertion to do it; and, to a certain extent, I can refrain from hearing, by stopping my ears; from smelling, by holding my nose; from future tasting, by keeping my mouth shut, and free from the thing to be tasted; and from touching many things, by keeping my body free from any contact with them.

We are, therefore, in the present world, percipients, partly from voluntary exertion, partly without it, and partly contrary to it: so that in perception we are subjected only in part to our own self-government.

The most effectual way to prevent the perception of any object, which we cannot remove from our senses, is to remove from it; and if we can do neither of these, we may sometimes prevent perception by vigorously employing some of our other mental faculties, about some interesting subject. If I sit still, and make no exertion, I smell the offensive effluvia of boiling cabbage from the kitchen; but if I closely apply myself to any object of conception, judgment, conscience, affection, or passion, I do not perceive any thing fetid in the air which I breathe.

The faculty of *Conception*, or of *Understanding*, is often acted upon by the faculty of *Efficiency*. If

I remember any conception, and will to have a similar mental operation, I find that *voluntary exertion* will put the faculty of conception in operation, so that I again conceive of the same thing.

When I will to employ this faculty in forming *imaginings*, without previously conceiving of the mental images which I shall form, I find that *voluntary exertion* will put the imagination to work. In this way all works of imagination are produced. If the faculty of agency did not affect the imagination in this way, no voluntary work of the imagination, such as a novel, or a face which a painter never saw, or a figure such as a statuary never perceived, could ever be the result of design, and intelligent exertion.

Again, when I will to employ my faculty of understanding upon any particular subject, and to render my faculty of perception and other faculties subservient to it, my faculty of agency will produce reading, or some other kind of mental employment, in which conception will be principally engaged. Hence, if I will to study a particular subject, my exertion will produce repeated conceptions upon the subject, many of which will, and many will not, assume the form of mental propositions: and thus conception furnishes, as it were, raw materials to the Judgment, Reason, Conscience, and Feeling.

Professor. You have spoken of *reading* and of *study*: we must have a definition of these terms before we proceed.

Pupil. *Reading* is a complex operation of the mind: and consists of a voluntary perception of characters and words, printed, written, or painted, to-

gether with an *effort* to *conceive* of the meaning of them.

Professor. This is a very good description of reading to one's self, without any enunciation of the words; but *reading aloud* is a still more *complex operation*; for it implies an agency which is partly voluntary, and partly instinctive, upon the organs of speech, as well as of seeing, and conceiving; so as to produce the actual seeing of characters, that denote things; the conception of the things denoted; and the utterance of the sounds, for which, as well as other things, the characters stand.

Pupil. Well, *study*, I think is the employment of any intellectual faculty upon any subject, in consequence of some voluntary exertion to understand that subject.

Professor. But what am I doing, if my mind is busily employed in thinking upon various subjects, without any voluntary exertion to limit it to any particular subject?

Pupil. You are engaged in a *revery*; you are *thinking*, to be sure, but you are not *studying*.

Professor. I fear there is much *revery* and little *studying* in the minds of most men. But not to indulge ourselves in a *revery*, proceed in your discourse upon *Efficiency*.

Pupil. The faculty of *Judging*, will not immediately yield to any mental agency upon it, so as to form a particular judgment correspondent to our will and desires; but if I will to employ my judgment about any particular proposition, I can do it, by a voluntary exertion, until I come to some decision upon that subject; or else will to suspend

my judgment upon it; or resolve on some other mental pursuit. I may take a circuitous course of operation on my faculty of judgment, so as to render its decisions conformable to my predominant feelings, by voluntarily considering such conceptions, arguments, and other judgments, and such only, as are most likely to produce any desired judgment: and in this way, do men commonly pervert their judgment.

Professor. We may exert an efficiency *indirectly* and *mediately* on our judgment, you mean to say; but not *immediately*. This is true, especially of our acquired judgments; but our constitutional judgments generally, will not yield to any mental oppugnation. Hence, it is truly said, we cannot always *judge as we feel*; we cannot always *believe as we desire*; but that men find no great difficulty in working themselves into a *belief* correspondent with their feelings, on many subjects.

In relation to the *Memory* we may remark, that if we will *not to remember*, we cannot cease to remember at will. Every act of recollection is dependent on the operation of the faculty of Efficiency on the Memory. In many instances, however, we exert ourselves to recollect some past mental acts, which we judge we must have had; and are unable to *effect* the thing which we have willed. Memory, therefore is only partially under the control of our voluntary agency.

Pupil. The faculty of *Reasoning* never operates except in consequence of some voluntary efficiency upon it, but the nature of the inference depends on our conception of the premises, and not at all upon

volition or efficiency. In *paralogisms*, or instances of false reasonings, a *non sequitur* as it is called, or a *conclusion which does not result* from the premises, may be attached to them, that shall be any thing, which we have previously determined to make it; but since this is not reasoning, but a pretence of reasoning, our remark, that an inductive judgment does not depend on any voluntary agency on the reasoning faculty, remains unimpeachable.

The subjects of reasoning are determined on by the will, so that we always reason from voluntary exertion, and on voluntarily selected subjects. In preparing and presenting these subjects, by its agency over other faculties, the efficiency has great influence.

Our *conscience* can be acted on by our efficiency, only *mediately*, through our *Conceptions, Reasoning, and Judgment*. We must change our mental views of a law, of obligation, and of conduct, before we can alter our approbation or disapprobation; and should we desire, and will, most earnestly to approve immediately of what we disapprove, or the reverse, our conscience would not obey our voluntary exertion. Hence conscience often reprobates and condemns us, in spite of our desires and volitions to the contrary. Could we change the dictates of conscience at pleasure, conscience would not be a better guide than feeling, to the path of duty. Conscience may be moulded by the hand of education, and must always operate according to the knowledge which we have; so that we must exert our agency upon something anterior in operation to conscience, before we can reach that moral faculty.

It is happy for man, that his conscience is thus entrenched against the will, armed with efficiency, which is very generally subservient to Sensation, Affection, and Passion.

We may conceive of any particular *Feeling*, and should we think ourselves capable of producing it, by a voluntary exertion, might will to produce it; but we should find that no act of efficiency upon the heart could immediately produce it. The faculty of Feeling is operated upon by the Efficiency of man, only *mediately*, through those mental operations which occasion feeling. Thus, should a man exert himself to produce in himself a particular *sensation*, he could effect his purpose only by his agency on the faculty of perception, to produce such a perception as ordinarily is followed by that sensation. Would he make himself *love*, *hate*, *hope*, *fear*, or *experience* any other *emotion*, he must, by his agency on his intellectual faculties, excite those thoughts which alone occasion those emotions.

We cannot cease to feel, in consequence of any voluntary exertion to cease from feeling; so that the heart of a man is but partially, and that indirectly, under the goverment of his will and agency.

Professor. Now then, for *The Will*: what can a man do with his *will*, if he will? Has he any power of agency over his own volitions? This is the very pith of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy; but you must treat the subject without the least reference to any theological disputation.

Pupil. You have taught me to treat this subject philosophically; that is, to exhibit a fair, simple picture of my own consciousness and memory.

Well then, I am not conscious that I will, neither do I remember that I ever did will, except in consequence of some motive; and hence I conclude, that if my faculty of agency ever operates on my will, it must be *indirectly* and *mediately*, by operating on those faculties which furnish and present motives for volition. A volition which I remember that I once had, to determine at a certain future time, in a particular case, in a particular manner, I find may be a motive to that determination, so that a volition remembered, may become a motive to a future volition: but I do not find, from any thing in my own memory, consciousness, or experience, that the recollection of any past, voluntary agency, produces immediately any volition; or that I have any direct efficiency upon my own will.

Professor. You may read, if you please, the following extracts from the notes on Dr. Reid. I have altered a few words for my own satisfaction, and made some additions.

Pupil. "It remains for us to inquire if the power of agency extends to the faculty of the will, so as to regulate its volitions. We think; and when we will to think, the object of our power of agency is an act of thinking. We perform the external action of writing, and then, the act of writing is the object of agency. We think and write, when we will, because the Supreme Being has connected the power of performing these operations, with the voluntary exertion to perform them. But is volition ever the object of agency? Willing is a mental operation all must allow; and we ask, *Is volition the object of voluntary exertion?*" Do I always, or at any time,

will to have *a certain volition*, and then voluntarily exert myself to produce that volition, so as actually to produce that certain volition? A certain volition always respects some action to be done. If I *will*, that *I now will resolve to*, perform it; I need exert no agency upon my faculty of volition, for *I now will to perform it*; and I could not *will to will* its present performance, without actually having already the certain volition to perform the action in question. If I *will* in future to resolve on the performance of some action, when that future time arrives, if I remember my previous determination, I shall then will to perform it, from the memory of my former purpose; unless I then have some motive for refusing to determine, as I previously intended to do. In regard to a future, intended volition, therefore, no voluntary exertion will produce it in any other way, than by producing the recollection of a past purpose, as an inducement; and even then the inducement will not prove a motive, if any change in our thoughts or feelings, moves us to the choice of not performing the action, the performance of which we formerly intended to will.

“ An apple and an egg lie before me. I have the opportunity of making my election between them. I have not yet determined which I will take, but I will to determine. Will a determination immediately follow my will to determine, even as the motion of my fingers follows my volition to write? Is choice so connected with an antecedent will to choose, as the voluntary motions of the body with the operations of the will, which relate to them? We apprehend that it is not; for every one, who

will examine his own mental operations will find, that after his will to make a choice between the egg and the apple, he must have some motive for his choice of taking one of them. If then he chooses to take one, say the apple, from some motive, and that motive is not the mere volition to determine which he will take, his determination to take the apple is not immediately consequent on any power of agency exerted on the will, but the immediate consequence of that simple or complex mental operation, which constituted the motive. Now that a mere volition to determine which of two things I will take, never was to my mind a motive for the subsequent choice to take one of them in preference to the other, I am certain; for I never was conscious, so far as I remember, of ever choosing from such a motive; nor have I ever known a man who did choose from such a motive. We are conscious of no operation of our efficiency upon the will, which according to a mental constitution produces volitions. We feel persuaded, therefore, that no act of the will, follows a determination to produce an act of the will, in the same manner, and for the same reason that bodily motions, or various intellectual operations, follow volitions. We will to speak, and speak, because the faculties for doing so, are rendered obedient to the faculties of volition and agency: we will to think upon a particular subject, and thought follows our voluntary effort to think; but if we will to have a choice, a determination, a purpose, or any kind of volition, the future volition which a man should imagine himself able to produce, will not follow, without the intervention

of some other mental operation, which shall constitute a motive for that particular volition."

Professor. Well, to conclude, you have only to decide whether the faculty of *Efficiency* ever operates on *itself*.

Pupil. It never does directly: but indirectly it may; for one volition may occasion an operation of agency; a pleasant feeling may result from that exertion; the feeling may be a motive for willing to repeat the exertion; and again, the operation of agency may be consequent upon the new volition. In this way any exertion, consequent upon volition, may give rise to a great variety of feelings, and conceptions, each of which, or any combination of them, may serve as a motive for willing some other similar, or different, operation of agency.

Professor. It appears, then, that this faculty of agency, under the direction of the will, can operate directly on every part of the body to which there is an uninterrupted communication of nerves; and either directly or indirectly, upon every faculty of the human mind; even upon itself. How wonderful, how simple, and yet how complicated a being is man! To a very great extent he can do what he wills; even in the regulation of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, and other mental actions. Let him know himself, and if he perseveringly determines it, he may govern himself.

CONVERSATION XIV.

Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul which are not inherent.—Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity.—Of Physical Liberty and Necessity.—Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and Metaphysical Necessities.

Professor. Having taken a survey of the faculties of the human mind, and spoken of its simple operations, it seems necessary that we should converse a little about the attributes of Liberty, Capacity, Power, Necessity, Disposition, Inclination, Habit, Principles of Action, several Complex Operations, and the Improvement and Injury of the original faculties of the soul.

Pupil. If you please, Sir, I should like to turn interrogator.

Professor. It will, perhaps, conduce quite as much to your edification in knowledge to ask questions as to answer them. You may proceed, without being reproached as a *Yankee*.

Pupil. What then is *Liberty*?

Professor. *Liberty* and *freedom* are terms that denote the same thing. They express the *relative state* of the thing concerning which they are predicated. They express the state of any thing in relation to some contemplated *effectual resistance, obstruction, compulsion, or necessity*, from some ex-

traneous cause. Had we never formed an idea of one of these things, we should never have conceived of *liberty*, or *freedom*; by which we mean a state of exemption from resistance, obstruction, compulsion or necessity. Liberty can with propriety be predicated only of beings that are capable of some operation; and of beings destitute of effectual compulsion, or restraint, from without themselves.

A mere animal, for instance, is capable of animal operations, such as walking, running, flying, swimming, eating, drinking, and sleeping. Now an animal, that is capable of walking, has liberty to walk, when he is not physically obstructed in walking, so as to be absolutely prevented, by some other being. A fish, that has fins, and is alive in the water, has *liberty to swim*, when it is not physically and effectually restrained. A bird has *liberty to fly*, so long as it has wings capable of wafting it, and is not physically compelled to desist from using them. Cut off the fins and tail of a fish, and the wings of a fowl; and then the fish has no liberty to swim, the bird no liberty to fly. Leave the fins on a fish, but take it out of the water, and it has no liberty to swim. Leave the wings of a bird on his back, but hold it under the water, in your hand, or thoroughly drench its plumage, and it will have, for the time, no liberty of flying. An animal that is capable of slumbering, and that is not prevented from sleeping, by something that disturbs him, has the liberty of sleeping. Man is at liberty to perform any action of which he is capable, when he is not physically and effectually restrained from doing it, by some being

more powerful than himself. This is a physical liberty of action.

To ascertain, therefore, the extent of man's liberty of action, I must ascertain what actions he is capable of, and how far he is physically prevented from doing them, by some extraneous cause. The idea of restraint, implies some restraining cause or agent.

Man is *capable* of performing those actions which he has *power* to do, when he has the *liberty* of doing them. For instance, when a man has all his limbs in a healthful state, wills to walk, and finds the faculty of agency on his muscles obedient to his will, he has the *power* of walking, if he is not physically prevented from walking, by some cause without himself. We say, therefore, that he is *capable* of walking, or has a *capacity* for walking, under such circumstances, when nothing but *liberty* is wanting to constitute the perfect *power* of walking.

Pupil. So that a man may have a *capacity* for walking, when he has *no power* of walking, because he wants *liberty* to complete his power of walking.

Professor. I hold my little son by the legs: my arms are more powerful than his legs: he *wills to walk*, but *he has not the power* of walking, because I hold him fast. He has not the *liberty* of walking; but he has a *capacity* for walking. Had he *liberty* he would have the *power*, for nothing but *liberty* is, by the supposition, wanting to constitute his power of walking.

Now a man has *liberty* to perform all those actions, of which he is *capable*, when no physical restraint is exerted upon him by some extraneous

cause. If any physical restraint is exerted upon him by any extraneous cause, to force him not to do, any action for which he has a capacity, he is not at liberty to perform the contemplated action.

Pupil. It seems to be requisite, I think, to ascertain what *powers* a man has, in order to a correct understanding of the liberty with which he is endowed. Pray, Sir, what constitutes the *power* and the *liberty* of perception?

Professor. Each kind of perception requires distinct things to constitute the power of that particular perception. The general description, which I give of **POWER** to perform any operation, is *this*, that it includes every thing essential to the actual production of that operation. Of course, the existence of a faculty or of faculties for doing any thing, is always included in any particular power of action. **LIBERTY** of action is another thing included, for where there is no physical liberty to perform the action, there is no power of performing it.

Pupil. You speak, I perceive, exclusively of the *liberty of action*. Would you distinguish it from the *liberty of not acting*?

Professor. *Liberty not to perform any particular action* is the exemption of any agent from compulsion to do, or the physical necessity of doing, an action. Liberty to perform an action may be called, for the sake of distinction, *positive liberty*; and liberty not to perform an action, *negative liberty*. Exemption of an agent from compulsion to do, or not to do an action, is the prominent idea included under the term of *liberty*, whether it be positive or negative.

Pupil. That a man may have liberty to perform

an action, is it necessary that he should have, at the same time, liberty not to perform it?

Professor. *Negative liberty* is essential to *positive liberty*. A man cannot be compelled not to do an action, and yet have liberty at the same time to perform it; nor can he be compelled to do it, and yet have liberty not to perform it. He cannot, therefore, have physical **LIBERTY** to do an action, and yet be under the physical *necessity* of not doing it: nor can he have the liberty of not doing it, and yet, be under the necessity of doing it; so that if he has *positive liberty* to do an action, he must not be under the necessity of not doing it, which is the same thing as to say he must have the *negative liberty* of not doing it.

Pupil. Well, Sir, is it essential to **THE POWER of performing an action**, that we should have *the power of not performing it*?

Professor. It is not; for this would imply the necessity of the co-existence of two directly contrary powers, to constitute a single power. In many instances the power to perform a mental operation implies something which would render the existence of a power of not performing the same operation, an impossibility. This will appear from the description of different powers.

Pupil. I am constrained to interrupt you again, for I wish to know whether the *power* and the *liberty* respectively, of doing any action, implies the power, and the liberty of performing a directly contrary action.

Professor. Certainly not, for every distinct action must have its proper power and liberty. To walk

one way, and to walk in a directly contrary way, are two opposite actions. Now a power to walk one way, since it is a voluntary action, may imply, among other things, a volition to walk in that particular way; and the motive for willing to walk in that particular way, may be the very motive for willing not to walk in the opposite way; so that *the power* to walk in one way may exist, when I have *no power* to walk in the opposite way. Again, one way may be open to me, and the other may be effectually obstructed; so that I have *liberty* to walk in one way, and not in the opposite. It is to be remarked, that walking in one way, and not walking in that one way, are not *opposite actions*. *Not doing* is the mere negation of action. The *converse* of a proposition in which an action is predicated, is not a proposition in which a directly *opposite action* is predicated, but one in which the non-entity of the action is affirmed. For instance, *I walk southward* is not the converse of *I walk northward*; but *I walk not southward*, is the converse of the first statement; and *I walk not northward*, of the second. A *negative particle* introduced in any proposition, in the right place, will make it the converse of what it was. I may have power and liberty to walk, when I have not to sit; or to stand still, when I have not to walk; or *to will* one action, when I have not the power and liberty *to will* a contrary action.

Pupil. You was going to describe the power of perception, before I interrupted you. What, Sir, is the power of seeing?

Professor. The *power of seeing* includes the faculty of perception, the existence of a sound eye in

its proper place, and of light; the transmission of rays of light from an object of vision to the eye, and the exemption of the other faculties of the mind from such intense employment, as prevents perception, together with the liberty of seeing. If all these things, but the last, should conspire to produce the power of seeing, and some one more powerful than ourselves should exert a physical agency on our faculty of perception, so as to prevent our seeing, we should not have the power of seeing. The liberty of seeing, however, when all the other things named conspire to produce the power of vision, cannot be taken away, so far as we know, by any other being than our Maker. By the eye in its proper place I intend, in its due connexion with the optic nerve and brain. If light be absent, or if no eye exist in its proper place, or if there be no faculty of perception, or no object of vision; or if the mind be wholly occupied with the mental operations, there is no power of seeing, in a sound man, when awake, and under the ordinary operation of the laws of our mental nature.

To constitute the *power of hearing*, the faculty of perception, a sound ear in its proper place, the vibrations of air upon the tympanum of the ear, a state of mind in which other things do not intensely occupy it, and the liberty of hearing, are essential.

The *power of tasting* includes the existence of liberty to taste, a faculty for tasting, the organs of tasting in a proper state; and the contact of something to be tasted with those organs.

The *power of smelling* is constituted by the existence of the faculty of perception, the nasal organs

in a proper state, the liberty of smelling, and the contact of some effluvia of the object to be smelt with those organs.

The *power of touching* includes the liberty, the faculty, and the organs of touching in a proper state; together with the contact of something with those organs, to be touched.

The nerves spread over the whole body, in a proper state, may be considered as the essential part of the bodily organs by which we perceive in these five different ways.

Pupil. I am impatient to hear your account of the power of performing the other simple mental operations.

Professor. The existence of the faculty of Consciousness, and of some previous mental operation, of which to be conscious, together with the *liberty* of being conscious, constitute the *power of consciousness*.

The existence of the faculty of Understanding or Conception, together with liberty of operation, constitute the *power of understanding*.

Pupil. Is not the previous existence of an operation of consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, conscience, volition, feeling, and agency, requisite to constitute the *power of conceiving* of each of these things?

Professor. Why did you not add, "and of conception?"

Pupil. Because I clearly understood, that it would be absurd to suppose, that an operation of conception was essential to constitute the power of conception, for that would be supposing an opera-

tion of conception must have existed before there was any power to perform it.

Professor. You are correct. It seems, then, that we may have power to conceive of an operation before we actually perform that operation. *Conception* is an instance of this kind. Now then I ask, what should prevent me from conceiving of an act of memory, had I the faculty of conception, without the faculty of memory?

Pupil. I know not that you would be *prevented* from doing it; and so you *might* do it, if you had *power*. That you would not have the power, I cannot affirm; for I conceive of an angel, of Satan, of a mountain of salt, and of a man as tall as a steeple, without ever having perceived, or ever before, perhaps, conceived of such things.

Professor. It is true, that we more readily conceive of such mental operations as we have had, than of any which we have not performed; yet I cannot ascertain, that the actual experiencing of any operation is essential to the power of conceiving of them. *Conception*, as we have already shown, is a sort of creative, inventive, originating faculty of the human mind.

Pupil. What is the power of judging?

Professor. A conception of the meaning of a proposition, together with the faculty and the liberty of judging, constitute *the power of judging constitutionally*. Volition and attention are requisite in addition, to constitute the power of forming *acquired judgments*.

The *power of reasoning* comprehends the previous conception of at least two propositions, two

judgments, together with the liberty and faculty of inferring from them a third, of which he conceives.

The *power of memory* includes the faculty and liberty of memory, together with the previous existence of some other mental act to be remembered.

The *power of recollection* consists of the faculty and liberty of memory, the previous existence of some act to be recollected, a volition to recollect, and voluntary agency on the memory to produce recollection.

The *power of conscience* includes the faculty of conscience, liberty to exercise it, and some previous judgment concerning a law, obligation, and the conformity or non-conformity of some action to that law and obligation.

Of the seven powers appertaining to the seven faculties of *The Understanding*, it may be well here to remark, that God alone has the power of absolutely depriving us of the *liberty of thinking*. We may partially impair our own liberty of thinking; and men may in some instances deprive others of the liberty of employing some of their intellectual faculties for a little while; but him whom God has made free to think, not all the tyrants in the world can compel not to think.

The *power of feeling* includes the liberty and faculty of feeling, together with some previous thought which is the occasion of feeling.

The *power of volition* includes the faculty and liberty of volition, together with the conception of some action deemed practicable to be resolved on, and the apprehension of some motive for willing the performance of it.

The *power of agency* includes a volition to perform some action, together with the faculty and liberty of exertion in obedience to the will.

These are the **POWERS** of man to perform simple operations of the mind. To describe the different powers of complex operations, would require too much time. Only keep in mind, that *power* always includes every thing essential to the performance of an operation, and you will generally satisfy yourself, so far as you have knowledge of causes and effects, what constitutes the power of performing any action.

Pupil. Are there not many kinds of liberty and necessity of which you have said nothing?

Professor. A *law* which does not forbid any action is said to give *liberty* to perform it; because the law presents no legal obstruction to it. A person too, is said to give liberty to do any action which he determines not to use any exertions to prevent from being done. If a law authorizes any action, it may be said to give *moral* or *legal liberty* for its performance.

Of *physical necessity* nothing more need be said. There is a *metaphysical necessity*, that two and two should amount to neither more nor less than four; that a square should not be a circle; that the same thing should not exist and yet exist at the same time; that a proposition should be either true or false, and not both in the same sense; and that a being of infinite knowledge and perfect truth should not lie. Many similar things are metaphysically necessary; and to a metaphysical necessity, or a necessity re-

sulting from the nature of the things which exist, there is no opposing liberty.

Moral certainty, or any thing which is absolutely certain in *moral operations*, has been called, sometimes *moral* and sometimes *metaphysical necessity*, but we think very improperly. When people mean *moral certainty* they should say so; and not confound the *certain futurition* of a moral action with *necessity*.

Some things, moreover, which have been called *moral necessities*, are absolutely *physical necessities*. It is said, for instance, to be *morally necessary*, that every *volition* should be consequent upon some *motive*; whereas this is a *physical necessity*, resulting from the very nature of volition, and the natural constitution of the human mind. It is not only *morally certain* that there will be no volition without some motive; but it is *physically impossible*, during the continuance of the present mental *nature* of man, that there would be any act of the will without some motive, in a sane mind.

CONVERSATION XV.

Disposition of Mind.—Inclination.—Habit.—Imitation.—Consideration of several Principles of Human Actions.—Principles of Substances, Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions.—Sentiments, Instinct.—Instinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations.

Pupil. What do you mean by *Disposition of mind?*

Professor. It is the name of any *relative state of the mental faculties*. I have a mental disposition to learn, if my mind is in such a state as is conducive to the acquisition of knowledge. For instance if my faculties are in such a state relative to learning, that I conceive of the importance of learning, desire to learn, judge it best to learn, and will to pay the requisite attention, that I may learn, I have a *disposition to learn*.

Pupil. You derive the word, I presume, from *dispono*, or *dispositum*, a *placing in order*, and use it always in the strict sense.

Professor. I do: and I assure you, I never found a man who could tell me what he did mean by *disposition*, that attempted to give any other definition of the term. It surely is not the name of any one feeling, or of any other single operation of mind. We hear much of a *disposition to believe*. It is a very important one, if we mean by it such a state

of the mental faculties relative to testimony, as is likely to ensure assent to the truth of credible and valuable testimony. If a man judges that a speaker is a person of veracity, and has interesting truth to communicate, and at the same time desires to hear his testimony, he *has a disposition to believe*. On the other hand, if a man doubts the veracity of a testifier, or hates his person, or judges that he has nothing of importance to communicate, *he is disposed not to believe*.

A right mental disposition in relation to any mental operation to be performed, is as essential as the right disposition of the eye and of light in relation to the seeing of any object; or the right disposition of a cannon, to carry a point blank shot through a target.

Pupil. What do you mean by a mental *Inclination*?

Professor. Mental *inclination* is such a disposition of mind as presents many inducements to any specified voluntary action. It is figurative language, derived from the *inclination* or *bending forward* of the body towards any object. If a man says he has an inclination to go to the theatre to-night, his meaning is, that he has several inducements to will the operation of going, but has not quite determined to go. If he has willed to go; he says, I have determined, resolved, purposed, intended or willed to go to the theatre to-night; but if he has not actually willed, yet thinks himself almost ready to do it, from the inducements which he at present has, he asserts that he is *inclined*, or has an *inclination* to go. A man is always *inclined* to do that, for willing

to do which he apprehends many powerful inducements; but he always wills to do that, for doing which his inducements constitute a motive.

Pupil. Hence I am *inclined* to do many things, which I have not, upon the whole, motives for resolving to do. I have been *inclined* to visit the theatre, but never *willed* to do it; and so was never there.

Professor. Yes; and it is owing to your mental *disposition* that you apprehend any *inducements*, and that you are not actually *moved*, to mental *determination*, and *activity*, in relation to those actions.

Pupil. What should I mean when I speak of mental *Habits*?

Professor. Mental *habit* is any such *disposition of mind* in relation to any kind of action, which we have often repeated, as renders the repetition of it easy, and common. *Habit* is something acquired, and when confirmed, more strongly resembles a mental faculty than any other attribute of the soul. Hence it is frequently called *a second nature*. The habit of *imitation* is one of the earliest which we form.

Pupil. Are there any general laws concerning *habit*?

Professor. It is a law of our nature, that the frequent repetition of any action, shall render the performance of that action easy; and commonly present a motive for future repetitions of it.

Pupil. Of course, it is a law of our nature, that the frequent performance of a particular kind of action, shall produce a habit of action.

Professor. It is another law of our nature, that

not very ardent, but moderately agreeable feelings shall result from habitual actions: and another, that a habit, once formed, shall be difficult to resist and eradicate; but may be destroyed by the formation of a contrary habit.

Pupil. Can you classify the habits of man?

Professor. Not easily; for any action of which he is capable, by being often repeated, may become the germ of a habit, lasting as life. Man forms habits of thinking, feeling, choice, and efficiency. He has habits of speaking, writing, dressing, eating, drinking, sleeping, amusement, idleness, study, and labour. But one thing I would have you remember, that it is of unspeakable importance to form amiable and healthful habits of body, and virtuous, studious, systematic habits of soul: for so powerful is habit, that it may enable the animal frame to resist that poison which would have occasioned death before the habit of using it was formed; and the mind, to take unceasing satisfaction in unremitting, intellectual, and benevolent pursuits.

Pupil. We have heard much about *principles*, and *principles of action*. I would thank you to repeat to me, what you have formerly said on this subject, that your views may be more thoroughly impressed on my mind.

Professor. A *principle*, is the beginning, the origin, the foundation of any thing. It is derived from the Latin word *principium*. When you trace a science to the *axioms* on which it is founded, you trace it to its *first principles*. The *first principles* of any complex substance, are those simple substances of which it is compounded or constituted. Hence,

flour, yeast, water, and salt may be called the component principles of bread; and the ten mental faculties which have been named, the component principles of the human mind.

If we inquire into the origin of human operation, and ascertain what it is that occasions or produces any operation, we ascertain the *principle* of that operation. Hence the soul itself may be denominated a *principle* of thought, of feeling, of volition, and of agency. It is very frequently called an *active principle*, because it has the power of beginning and continuing various kinds of operations.

The principle of any particular action is that which, figuratively speaking, lies at the foundation of it, and supports it. Hence every faculty may be called the first principle of its own operations. Besides these first principles of action, those antecedent operations upon which any subsequent action depends, are called the principles of that action. Hence a *motive* is the *principle of a volition*. If you ask, upon what *principle* a man willed a certain action, you inquire what *motive* induced him to will it.

Any thing that is very generally among mankind, a motive for willing any particular kind of operation, is called a *general*, or *common principle of action*. Hence *hunger*, because it moves all men to seek and receive food, is called a *common principle of action*. Each of the natural *appetites* has the same distinction. *Habit* is an acquired principle of action, because it furnishes a standing motive to every one who forms it, for choosing to act in a particular way.

Mankind are so universally influenced in their volitions, and voluntary exertions, by the desire of wealth, power, society, health, life, happiness, and the approbation of those whom they esteem, that the desire and love of each of these things is styled a *common principle* of action. These desires are natural to all men in their present state. Hence we say, that a man is governed in his conduct by one, or the other, or all of these principles of action, in all the common concerns of life; unless he is habitually moved by a superior, acquired principle of action, called *the sense of duty*.

Feeling and Conscience, as we have already seen, frequently furnish motives for our conduct, and therefore may be called principles of action; and even *common principles*.

The common principle of voluntary *efficiency*, is *volition*; for a man exerts himself upon this principle, *that he will to do it*.

Pupil. Is not *sentiment* a very general principle of action?

Professor. By *sentiment* I design to denote any such *judgment* as ordinarily operates as a motive to volition. I answer, therefore, that *sentiment* is a very common principle of human action.

Pupil. Many of our constitutional judgments I should think, then, might be called sentiments; for the *judgments*, that the things which we perceive, really exist, and that they are such as we perceive them, are principles of action to all men.

Professor. You are undoubtedly correct. It is another common principle of action with men, that every operation of mind of which they are conscious,

or which they remember, has really been performed by themselves. Our judgments, concerning our own mental identity, the intelligence of the persons with whom we converse, the credibility of testimony; and in short, all other permanent judgments, whether constitutional or acquired, which commonly move men to will a course of conduct conformable to those judgments, are principles of action.

One of our most commonly operative sentiments in relation to our voluntary agency upon material objects is this, "That in the phenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances."*

Pupil. What is a *moral principle*?

Professor. Any thing which lies at the foundation of a moral law, obligation, or action.

Pupil. I designed to inquire, particularly, about the *principles of moral actions*.

Professor. When you have ascertained what is a *moral action*, you will then find no difficulty in ascertaining what is the principle of any particular moral action. For instance, if every volition is a moral operation, then every *motive* is a *moral principle*; and the *faculty* of volition is an inherent *moral principle*. If every operation of conscience is a moral action, then the *faculty* of conscience is a moral principle of action; and each *judgment* in dependence on which conscience operates, is a moral principle of conscience. If no operation of man is a moral action, but some operation of *voluntary ef-*

* Dr. Reid.

ficiency, then the *faculty of agency* is a moral principle, the *volitions* on which our operations of agency depend, are moral principles of agency; and the *motives* on which these volitions depend, are *ultimate moral principles of agency*.

Pupil. You speak hypothetically. I should be obliged to you for a definition of a moral action.

Professor. I will offer a few general remarks on this subject; but must refer you for full satisfaction to the science of theology.

Any law given for the regulation of the actions of an intellectual, sensitive, voluntary efficient, or agent, is a moral law. All other laws are called *physical*.

Any action which is required or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral action, in contradistinction to a physical action, or operation.

Pupil. Moral laws and moral actions, of course, may be either good or bad, right or wrong.

Professor. Yes; for every law which a ruler gives his subjects; a master, his servant; a parent, his child; a teacher, his pupil; or the Creator, his intellectual, voluntary, efficient creature, is a moral law; and every act of disobedience, as well as of obedience, is a moral action.

Pupil. In some sense, it appears to me, that a moral action may be a very *immoral* one; and a moral law, an *immoral* law. Am I right?

Professor. Perfectly: for one moral law of one being, may be contrary to the moral law of another being. A parent, for example, may require his child to steal; and God requires the same child not to steal. Now conformity to any moral law is

sometimes called moral, in contradistinction to non-conformity, which is popularly denoted *immoral*, or *vicious*. Moral, therefore, has two senses; one of which is opposed to *physical*, and the other to *immoral*. That *moral law* of any being which is contrary to the *moral law* of the Creator, is an *immoral or vicious law*: and that moral conduct which is required by a moral law of man, but which is contrary to the moral law of God, is immoral conduct. When we enquire, what is a *moral action*? we use the word *moral* in opposition to *physical*. It is in this sense, that I have said, that any action required or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral action.

Pupil. From what you have already said, I should infer, that a *moral sentiment*, is any such judgment on any moral subject, as is commonly a motive to a particular kind of moral actions.

Professor. We accord in judgment; and let me add, it is happy for mankind that all of their acquired *judgments* are not *sentiments*; for then, every man's moral actions would be as unreasonable as his opinions are erroneous.

Pupil. What do you call *Instinct*?*

Professor. An *animal principle of action*; and so called, because it appertains to all animals; and excites them to many actions.

* "Instinctive actions," says Lord Kames, "cannot be said to have a motive, because they are not done with any view to consequences."—*Elements of Criticism*, vol. i. p. 46.

Pupil. What is this *Instinct*? Is it a faculty, or a disposition?

Professor. Instinct in man is such a *disposition of the faculties of perception and agency in relation to each other*, as produces instantly certain actions, without any *conception* of them, or *volition* concerning them.

Pupil. Will you have the kindness to illustrate your definition?

Professor. In a child, the *perception* which it has through the stomach and organs of tasting, in consequence of the operation of the gastric juice on the coats of the stomach, in the absence of food, is immediately followed by an operation of the faculty of agency on the lips, tongue, and throat, which produces the act of *sucking*. The child has no conception of the action, nor of the utility of it; nor of its ability to perform it; neither does it will to perform it, from any motive whatever. It sucks, *instinctively*. The author of our nature has *disposed* the faculties of perception and agency in such a manner, that the child exerts its power of agency in sucking, immediately in consequence of certain perceptions, so that if the child had no other faculties of mind than these two, it would be able to suck. The *perception* which is followed by sucking, is commonly called the *sense of hunger*.

Pupil. Sucking then is an operation performed by *instinct*. What other operations, do mankind perform from this *disposition*?

Professor. It is to be remarked, that men frequently perform those actions from volition, which are ordinarily performed from instinct. With this

understanding, I denominate *swallowing, winking, sucking, shrinking, laughing, crying, weeping, sighing, starting*, and all those actions performed by our bodily members for self-defence, or self-preservation, when they are performed without volition to perform them, *instinctive operations*. None of these are performed, except in consequence of some perception; and they are frequently performed without any intention. Hence instinct is the principle of these operations.

Pupil. I think Dr. Reid represents *breathing*, and the *contraction and relaxation of the muscles, in all VOLUNTARY, bodily actions*, to be instinctive actions.

Professor. I think him incorrect in this; for *breathing*, when involuntary, as it generally is, results not from perception of any kind; but from the mechanical construction of the chest, lungs, and windpipe of the human frame; and the chemical affinity of the blood in the living animal, for a portion of the atmospheric air, called oxygen gas, together with its want of affinity for the other portion, called azotic gas. Hence I have known the dead body of a man to breathe, from pulling down the diaphragm, so as to produce a vacuum favourable to the distension of the lungs. This case of unnatural breathing was purely a *mechanical* operation, without any *chemical* influence.

The action of the muscles in voluntary operations is the effect of our mental efficiency upon them; and although we know not the mode in which our mental efficiency affects our nerves and muscles, yet we know the fact, that upon volition, the mind

does exert an agency upon every moveable part of the body. This is something widely different from *instinct*. The muscles are so connected with the mechanical structure of our bones, and with one another, arranged like loops and pulleys, that the contraction or distention of certain muscles being effected, through the agency of the mind, by the medium of the nerves, the bones are moved mechanically. *Muscular motion*, therefore, when the result of volition, is no more instinctive, than nervous influence, whatever that may be; and breathing is no more instinctive than the circulation of the blood, or the muscular distention and contraction of the material heart. Some of our *involuntary muscular motions*, however, are *instinctive*; as in the case of sucking.

Breathing is partly a mechanical operation, and partly the result of what is usually called the vitality of the blood. The principles of breathing are the mechanical structure of the organs employed in it, and animal life: and the principles of muscular motions are the mechanical structure of the muscles, the influence of the nerves, and the action of our mental efficiency upon them.

Sleeping, involuntary natural breathing, the circulation of the blood, and the motions of the heart, are all dependent on *animal life*. The motions of the bones, are dependent on mechanical structures and muscular operation: and the growth of the bones, nails, hair, and indeed of every nerve, muscle, sinew, and portion of the human frame, upon vegetable life. As the plants of the earth grow from food supplied to them by the earth, air, light,

and heat; so the parts of the human body are fed by the blood; and the blood by the aliments suited to the nature of the vital fluid. We thrive and grow, not from volition, not from instinct, not from mechanical principles, but from the principles of vegetation. As so many capillary tubes in plants convey the sap to every vegetating portion, so the lacteal vessels take up the chyle prepared for them, and convey it to the thoracic duct, which pours the new stream of life into the aorta and heart. From this great reservoir, the arteries take it to every increasing particle of the human frame.

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CONVERSATION XVI.

Several Complex Operations of Man considered.—Attention, Observation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contemplation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.—Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name given to several successive Conceptions.

Pupil. Will you describe some of the principal complex operations of man?

Professor. Of several actions which are partly mechanical, partly animal, and partly mental, such as voluntary walking, eating, drinking, writing, reading aloud, speaking and the like, we have already said enough. Dancing, playing on instruments of music, riding, fighting, and the practice of every domestic, ornamental, mechanical, or other art, is a complex operation.

Pupil. I desire particularly a knowledge of *complex mental operations*.

Professor. Some of the most important complex mental operations, which are described by a single term in our language, are the following, viz:

I. ATTENTION. This is a voluntary effort to confine some one or more of our intellectual faculties to some particular object, or objects, for the purpose of knowing or perceiving something, which we judge may be known or perceived. Attention

always implies *a judgment* that by attention something may be perceived or known; together with a *volition*, and a consequent exertion of the faculty of agency upon some other faculty; to keep it in a state favourable to its appropriate operation; so that at least three simple operations are always denoted by the term *attention*.

Let *perception* be the object of *attention*, for an example. Attention will then include a judgment, that something may be either seen, touched, heard, smelt, or tasted; a volition to exert our faculties to perceive what may present itself to our perception; and an actual agency upon that faculty, so as to hear any sound that may reach the ear, or to see any object exhibited to the eye, or to smell, taste, or touch such things as may come in contact with the organs of these senses.

Let me speak to a man who appears not to hear what I say; or if he hears, not to be employing his Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, Conscience, or Memory, about my statements; and I will say, *attend to me*. If he then judges, that I have something to utter, and voluntarily exerts himself to hear me, and apprehend my meaning, he performs the complex mental operation of *attention*.

II. OBSERVATION. Attention to any object of perception, is the complex mental operation called *observation*. Of course it includes as many simple operations as *attention*. Hence, a statement of any thing which we have attentively perceived, is *an observation*.

III. REFLECTION, is another complex mental act, which consists in a man's attention to his own

mental operations. If he judges that he may know what is transacted in his own mind, and voluntarily exerts himself to remember, be conscious or conceive of; or judge, reason, or exercise his conscience about any of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, or exertions, he is the subject of *mental reflection*. It most commonly denotes *the turning again* of the attention of the mind to itself, and its own conscious operations.

IV. INQUIRY, is a voluntary exertion of the mind upon its faculties of conception and judgment, for the purpose of framing propositions in the form of questions. You exemplify this complex operation whenever your mind creates any interrogation which you put to me.

V. INVESTIGATION, is the institution of an inquiry into any subject, from the desire or the determination to form some judgment concerning it.

VI. CONSIDERATION, is a voluntary, and for some time continued thinking of some operation, or conduct, in regard to its consequences, or other relations. Of course, consideration implies *attention* to at least two things; namely, some operation and its consequences, or other relations.

VII. CONTEMPLATION, is a voluntary, general, and serious consideration, of a number of objects in their various relations to one another.

VIII. MEDITATION, is the consideration of any object with a design to form some plan of future conduct, or to be prepared for some future event.

IX. COMPARISON, implies the conception of at least two things, and of some relative judgment concerning them. Hence if I *compare* one apple

with another, I conceive of each, and of the meaning of the thing which I predicate, at least in my own mind, in relation to them. I say, for instance, this apple, of which I conceive, is *like* or *unlike* that, or is *larger*, or *smaller*, or *better*, or *worse*, than that, of which I also conceive. Something of this nature enters into every mental operation of comparing; so that there is no comparison without a conception of each of the things compared, a conception of the thing mentally predicated in relation to them, and a relative judgment.

X. **ASSOCIATION OR CLASSIFICATION**, is a complex mental operation, which includes the comparison of a plurality of objects, and a determination to arrange, and label them, according to our judgment of their resemblance, or dissimilitude.*

Cast into my lap twenty things, and bid me associate, or classify them. I will perform the operation thus. First, I *perceive* each one of them, in one or more ways, for I see them all; I handle them all.

* "To form a class of certain objects, is nothing else but to give the same name to all those which we judge to be similar; and when out of this class we form two or more, we still do nothing else but choose new names to distinguish objects which we judge to be different. It is by this artifice alone we reduce our ideas to order, and this artifice accomplishes nothing more; we must add, that it can do nothing but this. Indeed we should be grossly mistaken, if we imagined that there are in nature species and genera, because there are species and genera in our manner of conceiving. General names are properly the names of no existing [external] thing; they only express the views of the mind, when we consider things under relations of resemblance or difference. There is no tree in general, no apple-tree in general, no pear-tree in general; there are only individuals; therefore there are neither species nor genera in nature."—Condillac.

Then I compare each one of the twenty with every other one of the remaining number. I perceive that five of them have one colour, which I call red; and, in the operation of comparing, judge that they are *like* each other, and *unlike* the other fifteen in this respect. I call them, therefore, *red things*; because *thing* denotes any object of knowledge, and is the most general term in our language. On *comparison*, in like manner, I *judge*, that five others out of these twenty are *black*, five *white*, and five *green*. I have of course, by comparing these twenty things together, in relation to their colour, and forming judgments concerning them, in consequence of perceptions through the eye, divided them into four companies, or classes, which I distinguish as classes of *red*, *black*, *white*, and *green things*. Now I have performed one work of association: but I attend to the things still, and make another classification. I grasp each thing of the twenty in the palm of my hand; and from the perception of touch, compare each, in order, with every other thing, and judge, that ten of them are in *shape* like each other, and the other ten like each other, but unlike the first ten. I give a particular name to each shape, for the sake of distinction, and so call the one *round*, and the other *cubic*. Hence I have two classes of things; namely, *cubic* and *round things*. On further comparison, I judge them all *alike* in several of their attributes, of a different nature from their colour and shape. They are all *elastic*, of similar consistency, and I saw them all cut out of the tusk of an elephant. I give a name, therefore, to denote this *similarity* of the things in several attributes, and call

them all *ivory*. Hence, should I compare them with other objects around me, that want elasticity, and other attributes which belong to these twenty things, I should say, these are *ivory things*, ten of which are *round*, and the other ten, *cubic* in shape; and five of them are in colour *red*, five *black*, five *white*, and five *green*.

In this way we classify or associate all objects of our *conception*. By this complex operation men have divided all things into *uncreated* and *created* things; into *substances* and *attributes*; and all *substances* into *mind* and *matter*.

Pupil. And is this that *association of ideas* of which we hear and read much that is unintelligible?*

Professor. An *idea* you know is nothing but a *conception*; and all the things of which we *conceive* we class in various ways, in consequence of *comparing* them. An *association of ideas*, is nothing more than an *association* or *classification of conceptions*. Now our *conceptions* will admit of as many classes as there are kinds of things of which we conceive. We have of course *conceptions* of substances, attri-

* "The object which we name a tree, a child will call a tree after us, the very first tree which we shall show it; and this name will be for it the name of an individual. However, if it be shown another tree it will not wait to ask its name: it will call it a tree, and render this name common to two individuals. It will in the same way render it common to three, to four, and at last to all the plants which will appear to it to bear some resemblance of the first trees it had seen. It is naturally induced to generalize, because it is more convenient to use a name which it knows, than to learn a new one. It generalizes, therefore, without having formed a design of generalizing; nay, without remarking that it generalizes." — *Condillac*.

butes, mind, matter, operations, faculties, relations, dispositions, and the like.

Pupil. Are all our classifications acquired?

Professor. Every one of them. Classification is a voluntary operation.

Pupil. Of what great use is *association* of things?

Professor. Should men never classify objects of thought, they could speak of individual things only. Besides, *association* greatly assists our *memory*. It is a law of mental operation, that the *memory* of any thought of a single object should greatly facilitate our *recollection* of other things, which we have at any former time classed with it.

It is even a law of our mental nature, that mental operations which have been classified merely by a conception of, and judgment concerning, the *time* of their existence, should be easily remembered. Hence, if we can only *recollect* one mental operation, performed at a certain time, we can often readily recollect many operations, that very speedily followed it. This is recalling what is called *a train of thought*.

Pupil. But why should the thought of one object in a class, or of one idea in a train, bring up a multitude of other objects, in the same class, or ideas that were in the mind at, or near, the same time?

Professor. I can assign no other reason, why these things should be, than this, that God has so constituted our minds that these things are actually experienced by mankind in general. We find these to be laws of our mental nature; that a train of thought, which has once passed through our minds, if voluntarily or involuntarily commenced again, is easily retraced; that we perform any mental operation, and

train of operations, more and more easily, and rapidly, in proportion to the number of times, in which we have repeated them; and that the memory of one thing shall frequently occasion the memory of a number of other things, with which it was associated by some work of our own minds, or to which it was related by some apprehended circumstances. These are laws of *memory* as well as of *association*.

Pupil. There is another very important complex mental operation of man which you have not named.

Professor. ABSTRACTION, is the XIth complex mental operation, of which I designed to speak. It is intimately connected with classification; and without it we should never have any *abstract terms*, or *general words*, so that language would consist of nouns, exclusively; and of such *nouns* only as denote individual things.

Pupil. Well, Sir, what is *abstraction*?*

Professor. It is a mental process, which includes the comparison and classification of individual things, together with a judgment, that all the things of each class are alike, at least in some respect; and a determination to employ one name to denote any one, and every one, of the individuals of that class, so far as we judge it to be like the rest, without re-

* “There is no *man in general*.—Abstract ideas are therefore nothing but denominations. If we really imagined any thing else in them, we should resemble a painter who should obstinately be bent on painting *man in general*, and who, it is obvious, can never paint but individuals.”—*Condillac*.

garding the things in which it may differ from them.* I will refer to an example just given. Having classified the twenty things cast into my lap, by comparing them, and judging them, I will to use a name that shall designate any one of the ten, that is judged to be of a similar shape, without any present regard to colour, elasticity, or any thing else but *shape*; and I invent, or adopt, the word *ball*. Of each and every one of the round things thus classified, I say, *this is a ball*. Subsequently, if I compare any other object with any one of these ten balls, and resolve not to attend for the present to any thing appertaining to them but their shape, I shall judge, that the other object is like, or unlike, each of the balls in shape. If I judge it, upon comparison, to be like them, in this one respect of shape, I shall say, "this is a ball too."

The ten things that from similarity of shape among themselves, but dissimilarity to the balls, have been put into a distinct class, I wish to speak

* An *abstract term* is such a name of an individual thing of which we conceive, as we judge equally applicable to any one of many similar individuals. Such a term we could neither form, nor use, did we not voluntarily take away, that is, *abstract*, from our conceptions concerning an individual, several things which are peculiar to it as an individual. *Man* is an *abstract term*. In forming it, we *abstract* from our conceptions of an individual man those which are peculiar to any one, and not common to every other individual being, that we designate by this name. We abstract, for instance, the colour of the complexion, the size of the limbs, and the expression of the features, as well as the distinction of sex, when we say, "God made *man* upright." Of the meaning of this term, *man*, we *conceive*, or have *an idea*. We *conceive* that it denotes any one individual, in whom certain attributes meet, without regarding certain other attributes that may be peculiar to some one, and not common to other individuals called *men*.

of in relation to their shape, to the exclusion of every thing else perceived in them, and so I invent, or adopt, the name of *cube*. By subsequent comparisons, I am induced to call every other object, which in shape resembles one of these things, a cube; whatever may be its other attributes. Hence any thing that is judged to be like another thing in shape which we have previously called a ball, we denominate, when considered in relation to shape alone, *a ball*.

Now put, for the first time, five balls of wood, five of ivory, five of marble and five of lead into a child's hat, who by comparing and judging has learned to call them *balls* in distinction from all objects of a different figure. Let him now be taught to compare these balls in some other respect than that of figure. Let them be all of the same size, and he will soon judge, that while alike in shape and size, they are not all alike in weight. By handling them, he will have such perceptions as will induce the judgment, that five may be put into one class, from being like each other, and unlike the other fifteen in weight. In this way, contemplating them for some time, he will make four classes, each of which will consist of five individuals. Now he will want a name to designate each, and every one of the five, as belonging to one of these four classes. There is, however, no name in our language to designate each of a class of objects, merely from regard to their specific gravity. We must therefore turn the attention of the child to other things in which each ball of the five in each class is like all in its own class, and unlike all in

the other classes. The five in one class look alike, and differ in appearance from those of each other class. The five in one class are alike elastic, and the five in each of two other classes are also elastic; but the five in one class are less elastic than the five in the other class. The five in the last class are not elastic. Besides, one class of the balls were cut out of a tree, another out of an elephant's tusk, another out of a gritty block of a certain kind of stone, and the fourth were run out of a substance rendered liquid by heat. The child still wants a name for each thing of each class, that shall serve for every one of five in its own peculiar class. He is taught therefore, to call the five balls, that have a peculiar appearance, texture, and degree of elasticity, that were cut out of a tree, *wooden balls*; and any one of the five is *a wooden ball*. In proceeding thus far, there has been no attention paid to the kind of a tree from which each wooden ball was cut, nor to its colour, nor to many other of its attributes. When, therefore, the child sees any other object, that is a ball, and that has the attributes of wood, he calls it *a wooden ball*, abstracting, or *taking away* voluntarily, from his contemplation of the thing, its size, colour, and all other things, which are not common to every thing in the class of things called *wooden balls*.

The five balls that have the highest degree of elasticity, with a peculiar texture, appearance, and origin, the child calls *ivory balls*; and each and every one of them *an ivory ball*. In like manner he obtains a notion of *a marble*, and of *a leaden ball*.

Pupil. In abstracting, it appears to me, that we

voluntarily conceive of a part of a complex object, of which as a whole we have previously conceived, with a design to classify that complex object, according to the part of which we voluntarily conceive, to the exclusion of its other parts, with objects that resemble it in this selected feature, while they differ from it in others.*

Professor. Every class of things is a complex whole, constituted by constituent parts which have more or less resemblance to each other. *Mankind* for example, is an abstract term, designed to denote all beings collectively which would individually be called *a man*, without any regard had to those attributes in which one man may differ from

* "We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word *conception*, which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word be taken in the first sense, [as it always should be,] I acknowledge that every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality therefore is not in the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived."

DR. REID.

What Dr. Reid calls *a general conception*, is nothing but a *complex object*, of whose distinct attributes we have so many distinct conceptions. We adduce a passage from this author which perfectly expresses our opinion. "I apprehend that we cannot, with propriety, be said to have abstract and general ideas, either in the popular or in the philosophical sense of that word. In the popular sense an idea is a thought; it is the act of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object. This act of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be no general idea in this sense. In the philosophical sense, an idea is an image in the mind, or in the brain, which, in Mr. Locke's system is the immediate object of thought; in the system of Berkeley and Hume the only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind, and therefore no abstract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really such images in the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, because every thing that really exists is an individual."—*Reid's Works*, vol. iii. p. 57.

another. *Man* also is an abstract term, formed by voluntarily conceiving of some things which we have found in every individual included under the term, while we voluntarily exclude from our conception all those minor differences which we discern. One man has a white skin; another, a black skin; one man is tall and another short; one man crooked and another straight; but voluntarily declining to think of these things, I conceive of a part of each of these individuals, of the intellectual and bodily faculties of each, for instance, and then judging, that the colour of the skin, the length, crookedness, shortness and straightness of each individual being disregarded, these are essentially alike in their faculties, I resolve to give each of them the name of *man*, that I may thereby class and distinguish them, from beings that do not possess similar attributes.

Pupil. Is abstraction necessary to classification?

Professor. Conceive of five objects as perfectly alike in all respects as possible. You still find, that they are *numerically* different. If, then, you put these five things together into one class, and call each *a pea*, you conceive of each without regard to its *numerical difference* and individuality. You cannot therefore classify any two things without abstracting from the consideration of each its numerical difference, if you class them from regard to their similarity.

Pupil. Is classification essential to abstraction, so that we could not abstract without it?

Professor. We might abstract had we never before classified; but the first abstraction would lay a foundation for a classification. Should we consi-

der, for instance, the *attribute* of a thing without regard to the *substance* of which it is an attribute, we should prepare the way for a division of a thing into its substance and its attributes.

Pupil. Mr. Locke speaks of *compounding* or *composing* as a mental operation. Do you call this a simple or a complex operation?

Professor. The apothecary *compounds*, when he conceives of, and selects different substances, and amalgamates them, or grinds or mixes them together; but of any mental operation of *compounding* I know nothing, by my own consciousness or memory, or by the intelligible testimony of others; unless it consists in *conceiving* of one external thing, and then of another external thing, and then of the two as being so connected or physically compounded, as to constitute one complex thing; which is nothing different from a simple act of conception, for the object of an act of conception may be either simple or complex. If it is the *union* of two things of which we conceive, this union is a simple object; but if the thing made by union or composition be the thing conceived of, it is a complex object of conception. For example, I conceive of the word *thought*, then of the word *full*, then of the *uniting* of the two, and then of the compound word *thoughtful*. Here is no mental operation of compounding distinct from four successive, simple acts of conception.

CONVERSATION XVII.

Improvement and Injury of the Original Faculties of the Mind.—
They have their Infantile state.—Exercise and Discipline the chief
means of their Improvement.—Insanity, a state of mind resulting
from some Injury.—Dreaming.

Pupil. Are the original faculties of the mind in
man capable of any *improvement*?

Professor. Every one of them is capable of im-
provement by exercise and discipline. We may vo-
luntarily employ one faculty, so as to render many
of its important operations easy from habit; or we
may so neglect to employ it, that its operations will
be comparatively feeble and difficult. In infancy
and youth the mental faculties are commonly in a
feeble, infantile state; and they acquire strength
with years.

Pupil. We have a striking example in the facul-
ty of memory, of the possibility of the improvement
of our original faculties. I have observed, that per-
sons who exercise the memory a good deal, commit
any thing to memory, so as to be able to recollect
it at pleasure, much more easily and rapidly than
others who have exercised it less, and than they
themselves did at first. A child who has learned to
recite one stanza, will subsequently commit two

stanzas with more ease, and in less time than it did one.

Professor. Many persons complain of the weakness and treachery of their memory. They are forgetful, and often cannot recollect, because they have suffered the faculty to become feeble for the want of exercise.

Pupil. Do we not find that some men whose other faculties are very energetic, have bad memories?

Professor. We do; and we attribute it to the fact, that they have exercised their other faculties greatly to the neglect of this. These very men, however, will generally remember those operations of mind which delight them. Hence a philosophical and argumentative man, will remember a chain of reasoning, when he cannot recollect the precise words in which he heard it delivered. He is accustomed to remember reasonings; while others who have employed themselves in remembering and reciting fine speeches, will be able to reiterate an elegant paragraph which they have heard but once, without the variation of a word.

Pupil. Dr. Johnson, I think, remarked, concerning those who complain of the want of memory, *that no man forgets the person who kicked his shins.*

Professor. It is no less true of the other faculties than of memory, that they are improved by exercise. In this respect, there is a strong analogy between the members of the body, and the constituents of the mind. If any one limb is kept in a state of inactivity, it becomes feeble and rigid; but those

parts of the human frame that are exercised most regularly, become most powerful. If men would reason more, they would be more capable of reasoning: if they would exercise their judgment more, they would be better judges. Even the faculty of perception, and the bodily organs of it, are rendered more accurate and capable, by being judiciously exercised.

Pupil. Is it the part of wisdom to improve one or two faculties exclusively, or even pre-eminently?

Professor. No better general rule can be given, than to employ and improve all mental faculties, habits, and dispositions, with due regard to their relative importance. A mere man of memory is a contemptible being; but the man who has all his faculties improved by use, is more likely to obtain that happiness which may result from all the constituent parts of his nature.

We are in danger of exercising none of our faculties, except those of *conception* and *feeling*, too much; unless it be from a wrong education. From education some almost exclusively employ the memory; but if destitute of any injurious, extraneous influence, men will commonly indulge themselves inordinately in that work of the conception, which we call *imagination*, and in *feeling* alone. Conscience and judgment are most commonly exercised too unfrequently.

Pupil. Are our *feelings* capable of much improvement?

Professor. It is the business of a physician, particularly, to prescribe for the regulation and improvement of our **SENSATIONS**, because they depend

on the state of our bodily health and organs, our food, our drink, the state of the weather, the quality and temperature of the atmosphere, the stimulus which we take, and all the various things which are used as medicines. The deaf, dumb, and blind frequently evince how delicate our perceptions and consequent sensations may be rendered by use and constant attention. The senses which any of these persons retain, are generally more acute than the same are in those who enjoy the five.

Our emotions are dependent on previous mental operations; and by improving the quality and the energy of them, our emotions may be improved. We find by experience, that certain thoughts are followed by certain affections; and if we would cherish the affections, and frequently enjoy them, we must voluntarily exert ourselves to reiterate the thoughts. If we find that certain thoughts are productive of certain inordinate passions, which are not ultimately productive of happiness to us, we should exert ourselves to avoid the reiteration of the thoughts which occasioned them: and the best way to expel one class of thoughts, is voluntarily to attend to some other subject.

We may acquire such self-command over our own thoughts, as to attend to any one particular subject, to the exclusion of all others, for a considerable time.

Our feelings frequently need suppression; and the habitual indulgence of them renders us habitually sensitive in an unreasonable degree. We may avoid the force of many feelings, and the existence

of others, by immediately recurring to subjects which ordinarily excite a different class of feelings.

Those mental operations which require the most exertion, lazy people are the least inclined to perform, and those who would attain to eminence should determine by all means to render the performance of them habitual.

Men are naturally averse to close attention to any subject, and extremely reluctant to study, but habits may be formed, that will render idleness, or frequent reverie, burthensome, and regular application to business, a source of moderate, but continued gratification.

Pupil. May not the mental faculties be injured or improved by physical means?

Professor. Every faculty of the mind, while resident in the body, is in a greater or less degree affected by the state of the body. Excessive eating and drinking will for a time benumb all the faculties; and any one of them, by excessive application may be impaired. Insane persons exhibit numerous instances of injury done to the mental faculties, by the imprudent and excessive use of one or more of them.

Pupil. What is *insanity*?

Professor. It is a state of mind in which the mental faculties do not operate in a natural manner.

Pupil. What are the most common mental causes of insanity?

Professor. An excessive indulgence of some affection or passion, is the most common cause of permanent madness. Inebriation is a very common cause of temporary madness, that not unfrequently

terminates in idiocy; which when superinduced may be called the paralysis of all the faculties but that of perception.

Pupil. But what do you say of a perfect natural idiot?

Professor. In my opinion, for I have no certainty on the subject, *a natural fool* never had a human immortal soul, any more than the brutes have.

Pupil. What sort of a soul has a brute?

Professor. I will endeavour to answer that question, in a future conversation *on comparative mental science.*

Pupil. Well, Sir, is not *dreaming* a species of insanity?

Professor. Any mental operation performed while one is asleep, is called *dreaming*. There is some resemblance between the state of an insane person and that of a sleeping person who dreams: still *dreaming* is not *raving*. When one dreams, he does not generally think himself asleep; and when one is insane, he is very prone to think all other men are more mad than himself. In a state of insanity, some of the faculties seem to be dormant, while others perform strange operations: and in sleep the faculties of the dreamer are not all equally active, nor equally consistent in their activity.

Pupil. Do we always dream, when asleep?

Professor. We do not always remember what our minds have been doing, when we were asleep; nor can we recollect any considerable portions of our mental actions done while we are awake. That we do not remember to have been at all times conscious of thinking, feeling, willing, and mentally

exerting ourselves, when asleep, is therefore no proof that we have not been. That our minds are always active, when we are asleep, or in a swoon, I cannot affirm; and must therefore leave you to form your own opinion, from such facts as may occur to you.

Pupil. In what respects, particularly, do the mental operations of a man sleeping, differ from those performed by him when awake?

Professor. A sleeper generally perceives nothing through his eyes, ears, nose, or organs of taste; while he has various perceptions through the organs of touching, and many sensations in consequence of them. A sleeper is more prone to exercise his faculty of conception in matters of imagination, than when he is awake, and often experiences very lively emotions in consequence of them. A dreamer performs many operations, which he judges, at the time, to be acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching; but when he awakes, he is induced to judge, that the objects which he perceived had no real existence, or else were perceived without the intervention of bodily organs.

Sometimes a sleeper judges his conceptions to be perceptions; and this mistake no wakeful person makes, unless he is insane. The insane often make it. Memory, Judgment, Reasoning, Consciousness, Conscience, Feeling, the Will, and the faculty of Agency are also frequently operative during sleep; but this peculiarly distinguishes dreaming from our waking operations; that our voluntary agency upon our bodies is in a great measure interrupted. Dreamers commonly cannot speak, and perform

other corporal actions which they will, and exert themselves, to perform.

There are some exceptions to this general rule concerning the inefficiency of our agency upon our bodily members while asleep; for one who walks in his sleep, called a *somnambulist*, has power over his ambulatory members, and sometimes over his arms and hands, while his eyes and ears are locked up in sleep.

Pupil. In sound sleep, then, the agency of man over his bodily organs and members is in a great measure suspended; so that his thinking and willing and efficiency do not produce their ordinary external effects.

The judgment, moreover, is given to error, in supposing that we perceive, and by our bodily members perform, what we neither actually perceive, nor do, through our bodily members. These seem to be the principal differences between a dreamer, and a wakeful moral agent.

CONVERSATION XVIII.

Comparative Mental Science.

Professor. The professor of anatomy frequently instructs his pupils in the structure of the human frame by comparing it with the frames of different animals. I have pursued something of a similar course with you, in teaching the science of the human mind. I have exhibited to you something of the peculiarities of minds not human, that you might better understand the operations of the human soul. Now let me ascertain what you remember of comparative mental science.

Pupil. Any systematic arrangement of what we know concerning different kinds of minds, when compared with each other, is *comparative mental science*.

Of the minds, or souls, of any other beings than men we know but little, because we have very few means of becoming acquainted with them. Of our own mental acts we are conscious, and have memory, but these faculties afford us no aid in the investigation upon which we are entering.

Professor. What then are our sources of knowledge concerning souls superior or inferior to that of man?

Pupil. Reasoning from external indications of mental operations, and Revelation, are our only

sources of knowledge, concerning the souls of brutes and angels; and concerning the Uncreated Mind.

Professor. What is a *spirit*?

Pupil. Any thinking, sensitive, voluntary agent, that is destitute of a material body, is a *spirit*. The name however is sometimes used as synonymous with *mind* and *soul*. Besides, *mind* and *spirit* are used by some writers to denote Consciousness, Conscience, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, and Memory collectively, to the exclusion of Perception by the senses, Feeling, Volition and Agency, which they denote by the word *soul*. Hence some would say, that men have both *souls* and *spirits*, but that brutes have only *souls*.

We use, however, *mind* and *soul* as synonymous, according to the general custom of mankind, and as comprehensive of the whole substance in any individual that thinks, feels, wills, and voluntarily or instinctively acts; while we use *spirit* to denote this same substance in a state of separation from a material body. *God is a spirit*, without any bodily form.

Professor. What faculties has the *Divine Mind*?

Pupil. All the faculties of the human mind, with the addition of a faculty of Prescience. His faculty of Perception, however, does not operate through any bodily organs; nor have we any reason to judge that his faculty of Feeling ever is the subject of any *sensations*.

Professor. Man, it seems then was formed after the divine mental image; and although he wants *prescience*, yet he is able to acquire such judgment and prudence as supply its place, so far as it is de-

sirable for creatures, to possess any attribute of character resembling it.

What are some of the principal differences between the Divine, and a human, Mind?

Pupil. The first is uncreated, and self-existent; the last is created, and dependent on the first, for the commencement and continuance of its existence. The Divine Mind is infinite and immutable; but the human is finite and mutable. God is *eternal*, or without beginning and without end; but man is only *everlasting*, or without a termination to his mental duration. The Agency of God can produce substances where nothing before existed; but the agency of man has only a very limited power over a few things which already exist.

The Divine Mind is perfectly and immutably good in all its operations; but the human is susceptible of both good and evil.

Professor. You cannot proceed much further, in this direction, without entering upon the *science of theology*; which would be contrary to our present design.

Let us leave the doctrine of spirits, and attend to souls inferior to those denominated human. What do you know concerning the souls of brutes?

Pupil. Divine Revelation says little of them. It incidentally remarks, however, that the soul of a brute goeth downward, at death; by which it is generally understood, that at death the soul of a brute is annihilated.

Our knowledge concerning the souls of animals inferior to man is derived from induction and analogy. We observe the external motions of animals,

and attribute them to such mental faculties in them, as we know are in ourselves the efficient causes of similar external motions.

Professor. Do all animals possess the ten mental faculties which are common to men?

Pupil. No animal inferior to man possesses them all.

Professor. Is any one of our faculties possessed by every animal?

Pupil. The faculty of *Feeling* is; and every creature destitute of this, is denominated a vegetable, a mineral, or something besides *an animal*; and is destitute of a soul.

Professor. You will find also, I think, that one other faculty is common to all. What do you understand by *a brute*?

Pupil. Any animal inferior to the human animal.

Professor. Have brutes all the various *feelings* of mankind?

Pupil. In general, brutes have no other feelings than those denominated *sensations*. That many of them have *emotions* I am not confident.

Professor. Have all brutes *perception*?

Pupil. The greater part of them have; and their sensations seem to be consequent upon them as in men. It is however, very questionable whether some brutes have not sensations immediately in consequence of some impression on their bodies. The snail, the oyster, the clam, and several similar animals, appear to *feel*, but give only faint indications of *perception*.

Professor. Let me state to you a fact. Oysters, if placed with the concave part of their shells

downwards, on your cellar floor, and sprinkled with salt water, will, at the time of tide when they usually feed, open their pearly lips and drink in their accustomed beverage. If you enter the cellar when they are feeding and make a noise, or if you enter with a lighted candle, they will close their mouths in a moment. Do they not hear, then; or perhaps hear and see both?

Pupil. It would be, perhaps, rash to affirm that they do not hear; but to me it seems most probable, that light and sound acting upon them, produce certain sensations, whereupon they *instinctively* exert their faculty of agency in closing their wide mouths. Hence we attribute to *instinct* all their operations. They *feel*, and *act* from *sensation* without any conception or volition. *Instinct* in some few animals inferior to man, I would say therefore, consists in such a relative disposition of the faculties of *sensation* and *agency* that certain actions immediately follow certain sensations.

Professor. Well, I shall not oppose your theory, until I have some positive proof to offer in favour of the notion that they see and hear. That they do something like it, I have already shown. As for conception or volition, none ever saw any indications of either in them. We may remark, that the soul of an oyster, which is destitute of the power of leaving its native place, is the most diminutive soul of which we have any knowledge. The snail, the clam, and other similar creatures, besides the power of sensation are capable of local motion. The clam, upon *a perception* or as you think *a sensation* from the noise of a foot approaching it on the sand

beach, will settle itself to the bottom of its hole. *Sensation and agency* if not perception and agency are so connected in its soul, that certain actions *instinctively* follow certain sensations.

Pupil. *Sensation and instinctive agency*, to a certain extent, it seems then, that all animals, even clams and oysters, have in common with man.

Professor. Which of our five senses are enjoyed by most animals?

Pupil. All animals I believe are capable of *taste* and *touch*; so that even oysters have some perceptions. Many animals are able to *smell* in addition to the two former. The greater number of animals have all the five modes of perceiving which men have.

Professor. Have brutes any faculty of understanding?

Pupil. Some brutes appear to *conceive* of objects of sense, and of these things alone. A horse which has been accustomed to company and then is separated, will, for a day or two, whinny after his companion. If he did not conceive of him, when he does not perceive him, it seems incredible that he should manifest uneasiness at his absence. A horse, a dog, an elephant, and most of the larger tribes of animals, discover frequently design. There can be no design without some degree of understanding. The objects of conception to brutes are, however, few, when compared with those presented to the human mind. We have no evidence that they ever conceive of any of the things denoted by abstract terms.

Professor. Have brutes judgment?

Pupil. I think they never conceive of a proposition, and consequently never have any operations that may be properly denominated judgments. None of them I believe *reason*. None of them have *conscience*.

Professor. Are any of them conscious of their own mental operations?

Pupil. If they are, I have no proof of it.

Professor. Do brutes possess a faculty of *memory*?

Pupil. Some of them appear to, in an inferior degree. They have what may be called *recognition*, or an act of memory resulting from the repetition of any particular perception or conception, but not *recollection*. Recognition is a species of remembrance, that probably is never exercised but in consequence of perceiving again what has been before perceived; or conceiving again that of which the brute has before conceived.

If the horse does not remember any former perceptions of a companion, why should he whinny for him: if a cow does not remember some of her notions of an absent calf, why should she bellow after it, as she will for two or three days after it has been concealed from her? The memory of brutes may be co-extensive with their perceptions, and their conceptions of perceptible objects.

Professor. Have any of the brutes a faculty of *volition*?

Pupil. Some of them appear to conceive of a few external actions, and to will the performance of them. My horse when weary of confinement in the stable, would unhook the door and get out, so that

I was obliged to substitute a padlock instead of a hook. He then gnawed the padlock until he found it useless. Now unless he conceived of getting out, and willed to get out, I cannot assign any reason for his ingenious exertions to do it.

A fox, one should think, must conceive and will the performance of his actions, when he takes wool into his mouth, and gradually immerses his body, beginning with the hinder part, until he has driven the vermin on him to the wool, when he abandons the wool to the stream.

If dogs and elephants have conception, and they certainly indicate design, then they may conceive of something to be done, and will to perform it.

Most animals, however, appear to act exclusively from instinct, instead of conceptions, motives, and volitions.

Professor. You have already said, that brutes possess the faculty of feeling, which is the subject of sensations. They have in many instances *sympathetic sensations*, which very nearly resemble the affection of pity. A few animals discover feelings, which if they do not deserve the name of emotions, are sensations of the highest order. The dog and horse, frequently manifest something like *love* and *gratitude*. An elephant discovers long cherished *resentment*; and most animals in some circumstances evince *fear*.

Pupil. To what extent have brutes the power of agency?

Professor. Their faculty of agency operates, I believe, exclusively upon their bodily organs, so as to produce their accustomed instinctive or voluntary

actions. If they have *conception*, I have no proof that they exert any instinctive or voluntary agency in conceiving of any thing. They give no evidence of voluntary exertions of memory. They have no conscience, judgment, or reason, upon which their efficiency could be exerted. Have they many *instinctive operations*?

Pupil. I know of no brute that *laughs*. Several of them *cry*, and *moan*; two species of them *hiss*; and the greater part of them have all the other instinctive operations which are common to the human family, besides many that are peculiar to themselves.

Professor. Do brutes form *habits* of acting?

Pupil. They are generally as expert in this business as the human species of animals. They seem naturally disposed to imitation; and some of them very soon learn to imitate every thing which they perceive, so far as they have faculties for performing similar actions. The horse forms habits of travelling, and the parrot of imitating the human voice; while every tribe of brutes form other habits adapted to their nature and state.

A disposition to imitate is a natural attribute of all animals that have perception.

A disposition to consort with its own species, is also common to most animals; and most animals are gregarious, or have a disposition not only for a companion, but for considerable company.

Professor. No animal, however, finds society so essential to its happiness as man; and none is capable of deriving such benefit or injury from it.

Have brutes any complex mental operations?

Pupil. None.

Professor. Are the mental faculties of brutes capable of improvement or deterioration?

Pupil. Their mental faculties may be injured by abuse received from man; but their original faculties are capable of little improvement; and that chiefly by physical agency on their bodies. Their habits may be strengthened or eradicated in some instances; and their dispositions may be somewhat affected by the manner of their treatment.

Professor. Man appears to hold a middle rank between superior and inferior souls. When we consider the faculties, instincts, habits, and powers of brutes, in all their variety, we must exclaim, *How manifold are thy works, Lord, God, Almighty!* but when we turn to man, *A single human mind excels them all!*

CONVERSATION XIX.

Recapitulation of the Principal Doctrines taught in the preceding Conversations.

Professor. Any one who would have his pupil master of any science, must repeatedly question him, and require a summary of the knowledge which he has acquired. I wish you thoroughly to understand the science of which we have treated; I therefore will patiently hear from you a recapitulation. Begin, if you please.

Pupil. *Science* signifies any such mental operation as is denominated *knowledge*. The word is derived from *scio*, *to know*.

Any act of *consciousness*, or of *memory*, and any act of *constitutional*, *intuitive*, or *inductive judgment*, is called *knowledge*.

A particular science is any systematic arrangement of knowledge about any particular subject.

Mental Science is our knowledge of mind systematically arranged.

The Science of the Human Mind is our knowledge of the mind of man systematically arranged.

The *consciousness* which mankind have of their own mental operations, is the foundation upon which this science is erected.

Any thing which *subsists* as the subject of inherent attributes, is a *substance*.

A substance is an object not of *perception*, but of *conception*.

The *nature of a substance* is known only by its *inherent attributes*.

All the substances with which we are acquainted, may be divided into two classes; the first of which includes all *material*, and the second, all *immaterial* or *mental* substances.

Any portion of a material substance is called **MATTER**; and any immaterial substance, **A MIND**.

Any number of organized particles of matter is called **A BODY**.

A mind connected with a body is called *a soul*.

A mind subsisting without a body, or considered as separated from it, is called *a spirit*.

Some of the inherent attributes of matter, by which it is distinguished from mind, are *solidity*, *extension*, *inertness*, *mobility*, *divisibility*, and *insensibility*.

The inherent attributes of a mind are its faculties of *thinking*, *feeling*, *volition* and *efficiency*.

Man, in his present state, is a complex being, constituted by two kinds of substances, matter and mind.

The material part of man is so organized as to constitute the human body.

The human mind, and the human body of the complex being man, are, to a certain extent, mutually dependent; and in other respects, severally independent, on each other.

Any thing done by the mind, is called *a mental*

operation; any thing done by the body, *a bodily operation*; and any operation performed by the co-operation of a man's mind and body, is ascribed to the complex being, or person, having two constituent substances in his nature.

Professor. Give an example.

Pupil. Reasoning is a purely *mental operation*; involuntary breathing, a purely *bodily operation*: and *reading aloud*, an operation neither of the mind nor of the body, but of the man, performed through the co-operation of his two constituent substances.

Professor. Well: proceed in your didactic manner.

Pupil. Any operation performed by any single faculty of man, is called *a simple operation*: and any work of man, however it may be designated, by a *single term*, that requires the co-operation of two or more faculties, is denominated *a complex operation*.

Simple and complex *mental operations*, are such as are performed by one, or more of the *mental faculties*.

Any thing done by the mind, or body, or both, is *an action*; and any action performed in consequence of a volition to do it, is called *an exertion*, or *an exercise*, or *an act of efficiency*, indiscriminately.

An attribute is any thing *attributed to*, or predicated of, an other.

All attributes of substances may be divided into such as are *inherent*, or such as are *extraneous* and *incidental*.

Inherent attributes are those which we conceive

of as inhering in the substance to which they belong, and which are essential to its existence.

All other attributes are *extraneous* and *incidental*, for the substance to which they appertain may be conceived of as existing without them.

Mankind are conscious of performing *ten distinct kinds of mental operations*.

We constitutionally judge, that every effect must have an adequate cause.

Man is the efficient cause of all his own mental operations.

That in the original constitution of the human mind, whereby it performs any simple operation, is a mental faculty, for performing that operation.

Without the requisite faculty for performing each of its own mental operations, the human mind would not be an *adequate cause* of the effects which it actually produces.

An *inherent faculty*, is that, in the original constitution of any substance, whereby it is capable of any operation.

The human mind has *ten inherent faculties*, which are called *The Perception*; *The Consciousness*; *The Conception*, or *Faculty of Understanding*; *The Judgment*; *The Memory*; *The Faculty of Reasoning*, or *Induction*; *The Conscience*; *The Heart*, or *The Faculty of Feeling*; *The Will*, or *the Faculty of Volition*; and *The Efficiency*, or *The Faculty of Agency*.

Men when awake and sane, *perceive external objects* through the instrumentality of their bodily organs of sense.

Our *perceptions* may be divided into *five classes*;

viz. those of *seeing*, those of *hearing*, those of *smelling*, those of *tasting*, and those of *touching*.

Men are *conscious* of nothing but their own present mental operations.

Men *conceive* of every object of knowledge. Our perceptions and the things perceived, our conceptions and the objects of which we conceive, are all of them objects of conception.

Any *idea*, or *notion* of a thing, is a *conception* of it.

All *ideas*, or *conceptions*, are *simple operations* of the mind, so that there are neither *complex* nor *abstract ideas* in any mind.

Abstract terms are names invented to designate any one thing in a genus, species, order, province, or class of any description, which contains many things similar to it, in its distinguishing characteristics, but dissimilar in some other attributes.

These terms are called *abstract*, because we conceive of each and every thing denoted by them, as if they were *abstracted* from some of the attributes which belong to them as individuals, but not to all of the same class, that are respectively designated by the same general name.

Professor. Give an example.

Pupil. I *conceive* of the meaning of the term *quadruped*. I take away from each and every individual, when I consider it as a quadruped, every other attribute than this, *that it has four legs*. *Quadruped* is an abstract term. When I call a horse, a cow, an ox, a hare, a tiger, a leopard, severally, a quadruped, I abstract voluntarily, from my conception of each of these animals, their colour, size,

sex, covering, propensities, and all other things in which they differ from each other; while I conceive of each as an animal having four legs, in which they all agree. Instead of having an abstract idea, I conceive of a name, that is capable of being applied to many individual animals, and of describing each in respect to one of its most distinguishing characteristics.

Professor. I shall divide your discourse into several LESSONS by asking you a question now and then. Proceed in your summary of mental science.

Pupil. The *conception* of images of things, especially of things that we judge to have no real existence, is called *imagination*; and the faculty of conception when thus employed, is called the *imagination*.

Discernment, Comprehension, Apprehension, and Intuition are other principal acts of *conception*.

The object of every act of *Judgment*, is some proposition expressed or understood.

All acts of judgment are such as result either from our constitution, or from reflection and experience. The former are called *constitutional*, the latter *acquired* judgments.

For our constitutional judgments we can give no other reason than this, that God has so formed the minds of men that they naturally form such judgments.

Some constitutional judgments are called *intuitive*, because they immediately result from *intuition*. If we judge a proposition to be true so soon as we understand the meaning of it, it is an *intuitive* judgment.

Every proposition, which from bare intuition is judged to be true, is called a *self-evident proposition*.

Any proposition which men constitutionally judge to be true, is denominated an *axiom*.

Our *acquired judgments* are those which we learn to form from reflection, experience, reasoning, and attention to testimony.

Believing, or *an act of faith*, is an acquired judgment; which has some proposition, which is the subject of testimony, for its object.

Memory has for its object in every mind, some of the past mental operations of that mind.

An act of memory consequent on a volition to employ the memory upon the subject, is called *recollection* or *reminiscence*. Any act of memory not immediately resulting from voluntary exertion, is called *remembrance*.

Logic is the science of *reasoning*. Reasoning is the act of inferring a conclusion from some contemplated premises.

Axioms, or self-evident propositions, lie at the foundation of every system of reasoning.

We must argue from things known to things unknown.

Every act of perfect reasoning includes three propositions; the two first of which are called *premises*, and the last the *conclusion*, or *inference*. These three propositions, so connected as to frame an argument, are called a *syllogism*.

When one of the premises is generally admitted, and so well known, that it is not stated, the argu-

ment, consisting of two propositions, is called an *enthymeme*.

Any act of reasoning in which the premises are unquestionably true, and the conclusion necessarily follows from them, is called a *demonstration*.

In *probable reasonings*, the premises are *probably*, but not *certainly* true.

All our reasonings may be considered as either *analogical* or *synthetical*, according as we reason from effects to causes, or from causes to effects.

Our inferred judgments we often reverse, from discovering some defect in the premises whence they were deduced; but our constitutional judgments are never changed.

Professor. Your next lesson is concerning Conscience, which is often called the Moral Sense.

Pupil. Conscience always has for its object some *moral law*, *moral agent*, or *moral action*.

A moral law is any rule of conduct laid down for the government of an intelligent, sensitive, voluntary agent, or efficient.

A physical law is any general observation concerning any uniform physical operations, descriptive of those operations.

A physical action is any operation of an involuntary agent upon mind or matter.

A moral action, as distinguished from a physical action, is any action of an intelligent, sensitive, voluntary agent, that is either required or forbidden, and so to be judged of, by some moral law.

In the judgment of the moral law, which God has given man, those actions of man, and those

alone, which God has either required or forbidden, are moral actions.

Breathing, and the circulation of the blood, for instance, are neither required nor forbidden by the law of our Maker, because they are natural operations; and they are neither morally good nor morally evil. Nevertheless, they are operations predictable of man; and of man too, consisting of body and mind, for so soon as the mind is separated from the body, breathing and the circulation of the blood cease.

Conscience either *approves* or *disapproves* of something of a moral character.

No operation of conscience can be opposed to a man's present judgment: but many are the instances in which the dictates of conscience are hostile to our present feelings.

We have now treated of seven kinds of mental operations, any one of which is called a *thought*. We have spoken of seven mental faculties, that perform these seven kinds of *thinking*, which are denominated together *The Understanding*.

The Understanding therefore, besides a *faculty of understanding*, includes six other *intellectual faculties*.

Professor. Very good: now pass to the *Faculty of Feeling*.

Pupil. The operations of *The Heart* are always consequent upon some previous *thought*.

Our feelings may be divided into *two* great classes; the first of which contains all our *sensations*; and the second, all our *emotions*.

Our *three* most powerful *sensations* are called *appetites*.

Every *sensation* is consequent upon some operation of the faculty of *perception*.

Our *emotions* are either *affections* or *passions*; and are consequent upon *some other kind of thinking* than that called *perception*.

The Will is that mental faculty by which a man chooses, resolves, or determines.

Any act of the will is called a *volition*.

Every *volition* has for its object *some contemplated action*, which a man conceives himself to be capable of performing.

Any *thought* or *feeling*, or complication of thoughts or feelings, or of both, that is the true reason why any volition is performed, is the *motive* to that volition.

No rational man ever had a volition without some motive to that volition.

Any one who has a volition without some motive of which he himself conceives, is either a *fool* or a *madman*.

The immediate consequence of volition is the exertion of our faculty of agency, so far as we have the power of doing what we will.

The mental faculty of *efficiency* operates directly upon some of the mental faculties, and indirectly upon others.

It is the province of man's *efficiency* to perform what he wills.

So far as any one can do this, he has the power of voluntary agency.


Man's power of voluntary efficiency is finite, and

circumscribed by such laws as his Creator has been pleased to establish.

Thus we have briefly surveyed the operations of man's ten mental faculties, which are the inherent, and essential attributes of his mind.

Professor. The *incidental* attributes of the human mind have been treated of in such a concise manner in the preceding conversations, that a recapitulation is needless. Permit me to express a hope, that you will frequently re-consider the doctrines you have learned, and grow in knowledge through eternity.

THE END.





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